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Closing the Border and Opening the Door:
Mobility, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of
Reform
TIMoTHY A. CANOVA*
The U.S.-Mexico border has assumed great practicaland metaphorical significance in discussions about reforming U.S. immigrationpolicy. The border,thanks in
large part to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has become
increasinglyopen for trade andprivate investment. But it remains a looming barrier
For the movement of people, it is a Porous Border dangerous to cross, yet not very
effective in preventing significant levels of illegal immigration. Liberal scholarsand
activists have calledfor an Open Border a proposal that is unpopularand unrealistic due to heightened concerns in the United States about national security. Discussion is now dominated by Closed Border proposals to build a wall and further
militarize the 2000-mile border
Each ofthese paradigms-theClosedBorder Open Border,and today's Porous Borderfails to addressthe painful dislocationsthat inevitably resultfrom the Washington Consensus model offree market fundamentalism, a policy agenda that consists offiscal austerity,
privatization, and the liberalization of trade and private investment. NAFTA has only
intensified these policies and their dislocations within Mexico. The failure of the market
model to help Mexican and other LatinAmerican citizens adjust to painful dislocationshas
become the primary dynamicfueling the flow of illegal immigrantsinto the United States.
Likewise, market dislocations within the United States have contributed to the hollowing
out of the middle class and our manufacturing base, which has in turn led to a surge in
supportfor a Closed Border
This Article draws on insights from multiple disciplines and experiences by
conceptualizing the border as part of a largerfailure of the market to respond to the

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International
Economic Law, Chapman University School of Law. Thanks for comments and encouragement to
David Abraham, Michael Bernstein, Noam Chomsky, Alan Cibils, Bruce Clotworthy, Wayne Cornelius,
John Eastman, Isabel Garcfa, Carmen Gonzalez, Ernesto Herndndez, Michael Intriligator, Kevin
Johnson, Donald Kochan, Will Lyons, Alejandro Nadal, Steve Ramirez, Arvind Singh, Jennifer
Spinella, Irwin Stotzky, Chantal Thomas, Sam Thompson, Mark Tushnet, and Jon Van Dyke. Thanks to
Christine Yee and Daniel Josephson for valuable research assistance. This article also benefited from
presentation and discussion at faculty forums at the University of New Mexico School of Law and the
University of Arizona College of Law, and at the 2006 South-North Exchange Conference on FreeMarket Fundamentalism in BogotA, Colombia and the 2006 Trade and Legal Aid Conference of the
Northeast Professors of Color and the American and Caribbean Law Initiative in Nassau, Bahamas. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author.
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mass scale of human dislocation. Theories of psychology and human development
point to the pivotal role of adjustment in adapting to change and satisfying basic
and higher human needs. This view is consistent with an Eastern philosophical
emphasis on change, in which the boundaries and identity of individual and nationstate are increasinglyrecognized as constructed rather than given, fluid ratherthan
rigid, and capable of considerableexpansion.
Regional development and economic growth theory also suggest an alternative
approach to facilitate adjustment based on public investment in infrastructureand
social overhead capital as preconditions for economic takeoff and sustainable
growth. This alternative is referredto as a "mobilization model" because it empowers the nation-stateto mobilize resources on a mass scale.
While globalization has weakened the nation-state by undermining its ability to
mobilize resources, comparative and historical analyses suggest the viability of
resurrecting this model for organizing and reforming U.S.-Mexico relations at the
border.For instance, after World War II, the United States helped rebuild Western
Europe through the Marshall Plan, a massive foreign assistance program that
facilitatedpublic investment in European infrastructureand social overhead capital.
Meanwhile, the G.L Bill of Rights extended that mobilization model to the United
States by providing public investment in social capital on a mass scale, thereby
facilitating adjustmentfor millions ofAmericans faced with the possibility ofpainful
economic dislocationsat the end of the war These programs cost many billions of
dollars. Between 1941 and 1951, such hyperactive fiscal policy was made possible
by curtailing the policymaking autonomy of central bankers, a constitutionalpractice that, without formal amendment, is no longer followed and has since been
largely ignored by economists and legal scholars alike. Taken together these
institutional responses to change can be seen as adjustment assistance writ large,
helping millions of people to meet basic needs and then move up the hierarchy of
needs to actualize their capabilitiesand potentials.
More recently, the European Union's regionalassistanceprogramprovides hundreds of billions of euros in public investment in the infrastructureof new members-in size and scope, an ongoing Marshall Plan within the EU. At its most
effective, the strategy is one of sequential reform: first, massive public investment in
infrastructure and social capital, along with the strengthening of public and legal
institutions; later the opening of borders to trade, private investment and the
movement of people. The EU experience suggests that regional development assistance can reduce disparities and provide adjustment assistance on a mass scale,
thereby reducing the economic incentives for mass migrationacross borders within
the EU.
Discussions about reforming U.S. immigration policy must therefore directly
address Mexico's ongoing adjustment crisis, which is characterized by enormous
unmet needs in public infrastructure-fromthe lack of adequate transit, health care
and sewage systems to the lack of sufficient employment and educationalopportunities for millions ofpeople. All three borderparadigms-the Open Border the Closed
Border and today's Porous Border-fail to address adjustment needs because each
remains wedded to an extreme market model of development. Meanwhile, the market
model, with its many flawed assumptions, continues to undermine genuine constitutional scrutiny of the private delegations that erode the nation-state.It is therefore
not just the nation-state that is in need of resuscitation, but also a Legal Process
school that once appreciatedthe primary significance of political accountability in
the delegation of lawmakingfunctions.
The mobilization model offers the only realistic alternative to address Mexico's
adjustment crisis throughforeign assistanceand public investment in infrastructure
and social capital. Instead of a militarized "Martial Wall" at the border, we can
envision a "Marshall Wall" of public investment that stems the flow of illegal
immigration.
This project gives serious consideration to proposals made by architects, urban
designers, regionalplanners, and scientific communities for a development strategy
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that would address Mexico 's adjustment crisis by attractingpeople, technology, and
industry to poor border and interior regions, thereby also providing the preconditions for economic takeoff and environmentally sustainable growth. A Closed Border when constructed as a progressive and fluid response to adjustment demands,
becomes a doorfor opportunity that will set the stage for a truly Open Border in a
not too distantfuture.

INTRODUCTION

Proposals to reform U.S. immigration law are often tiedto the issue of border
control. Without effective control of U.S. borders and ports of entry, it is
difficult to imagine much success in achieving many of the objectives of
immigration reform, from homeland security to protecting jobs and working
conditions for U.S. and immigrant workers and shoring up the fiscal positions of
state and local governments. But the enormous financial cost and practical
difficulties of trying to control the two thousand mile border between the United
States and Mexico have stifled the border discourse and limited consideration to
a few dismal proposals for a separation fence and "shallow integration" of the
neighboring economies.'
The proposed separation fence may or may not succeed at walling off "the
other," the would-be immigrant from south of the border,2 but it does represent
a symbol of exclusion, a failure of the reformist imagination, and the stifling of
any broader discussion about the meaning and boundaries of national citizenship-the very nature of rights and duties of citizens in a time of complex
change and globalization.
In this article, I argue that border control should be part of a far wider
discourse, one that draws on multiple disciplines and perspectives to re-imagine
the range of creative possibilities for reforming our borders and the boundaries
of citizenship.3 Such inquiry, comparative and historical in nature, requires a
degree of humility. It recognizes that how we presently structure relations with
our neighbors may not be ideal and we may learn from the experiences of other
people in other times and places.
Part I of this Article introduces an analytical framework for discussing

1. See, e.g., Christopher Rudolph, International Migration and Homeland Security: Coordination
and Collaboration in North America, 11 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 433 (2005) (offering "security
perimeter" of shallow integration of NAFTA economies and retention of each country's sovereignty on
immigration and refugee policies); John Noble, FortressAmerica or FortressNorth America?, 11 LAW
& Bus. REv. AM. 461 (2005) (providing inventory of security perimeter and smart border proposals
based mostly on assumption of policy incrementalism and sharing of information rather than any
"strategic bargain" between NAFrA countries).
2. See Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observations
on Methodology, 45 VnL. L. REv. 1195, 1215 (2000) (arguing that postcolonial development discourse
and prevailing legal ideology attribute persistent economic inequality in less developed countries to
inferior characteristics of "otherness").
3. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis
of Institutions,109 HARv. L. Rev. 1393 (1996).
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migration across the U.S.-Mexico border by considering three paradigms: an
Open Border, a Porous Border, and a Closed Border. For the movement of
people, the current border is a Porous Border; for the movement of goods,
services and private investment, it is an increasingly Open Border. This combination contributes to the functioning of a larger model of economic development,
the so-called "market model." The increase in cross-border trade and investment
necessarily results in dislocations of people working in industries supplanted by
imports. Such dislocations feed the stream of illegal immigrants seeking better
job opportunities in the United States.
Globalization dislocates people on a mass scale while also undermining the
capabilities of the nation-state. For instance, Mexico is unable to provide
sufficient adjustment assistance for its dislocated citizens; the United States is
unable to assimilate or accommodate the inflow of undocumented workers, and
political pressures increase for a militarized solution, the Closed Border. These
deficiencies in both the Porous and Open Border models are discussed in Part II.
In the context of the market model, neither paradigm is able to effectively
address national security concerns, and both further undermine the capabilities
of the nation-state by diluting the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
As discussed in Part III, the Closed Border regime, when based on militarized
enforcement and a market model of development, fails to address the underdevelopment of Mexico's economy, and particularly its employment and infrastructure needs. Discussion of immigration reform has largely ignored the deficiencies
in the market model. Interdisciplinary analysis, drawing on economic development theory and historical studies of regional integration, suggests serious flaws
in the market model, including its failure to provide the preconditions for
Mexico's economic development by not properly sequencing public investment
and institutional reform. In contrast, an alternative economic model, referred to
here as the "mobilization model," would provide for significant foreign assistance and public investment in the social and physical infrastructure of Mexico,
as well as the United States and Canada.
Part III considers regional development through modem post-war history, including
the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Western Europe and Japan after World War II, and the
European Union's regional assistance program that has facilitated EU enlargement.
This discussion seeks to map out a new historiography for sequential reform that
places public infrastructure investment and foreign aid transfers ahead of Open
Borders for labor migration, trade and private investment.
Part IV seeks to apply the learning of this historiography to reform of North
American borders, suggesting that a NAFTA-wide regional development program would help address Mexico's pressing infrastructure and social needs
while stimulating the U.S. and Canadian economies. There is no shortage of
compelling plans and proposals by social scientists, architects and urban designers to transform the U.S.-Mexico border from an obstacle and place of suffering
to a pathway for opportunity and progress.
Part V considers a range of institutional reforms that would be required to
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make the mobilization model work in an era of globalization. The mobilization
of resources, dependent on the fiscal powers of the nation-state, would necessitate the reform of public finance and the creation of new governmental institutions to ensure price and currency stability. By reinvigorating the nation-state
and contributing to economic development on both sides of the border, the
mobilization model offers the only realistic path to an Open Border for future
generations.
I. BEYOND THE PRESENT DISCOURSE ON IMMIGRATION AND BORDER REFORM

A. The Externalities of Globalization and Open Borders:
Economic Dislocationand Demandsfor Adjustment Assistance
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) altered rights and
duties of citizenship on both sides of the border, thereby making North American borders more open and porous for a variety of activities and purposes. The
border-as-barrier metaphor was eroded, national protections were diminished,
and yet in some ways the concept of shared citizenship was strengthened.
Corporate citizens, in particular, shared in new reciprocal rights to trade and
invest across NAFTA borders. 4
NAFTA did not, however, recognize any right for people to migrate across its
borders, and neither did it do anything to slow or reverse the social and
economic conditions in the United States or Mexico that contribute to the
significant flows of illegal immigration across the border. Rather, the economic
dislocations from NAFTA's trade liberalization helped push hundreds of thousands of Mexican farm families into the migration stream.5 The result of
NAFTA, combined with existing U.S. immigration law, is a border that is
legally closed, but for practical purposes has been largely porous and often
dangerously so. Rather than shared citizenship, the model of citizenship is the
traditional model of nationally-bounded citizenship.6
NAFTA has failed to provide for any significant cross-border movement of
public capital, such as foreign aid from the United States and Canada to finance
public infrastructure investment and regional development in Mexico. Again,
the model is not one of shared citizenship, but rather the traditional model
whereby the citizens of one nation, acting through their elected governments,
are free to extend or withhold public capital from their neighbors.

4. See generally PHILIP T. VON MEHREN, CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND INVEsTMENT IN MEXIco: NAFTA's
New RuLEs OF THE GAME (1997).
5. IAN GOLDIN & KENNETH REINERT, GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: TRADE, FINANCE, AID, MIGRATION, AND POLICY 171 (2006) (citing to study showing that approximately 750,000 Mexican subsistence
farmers had migrated by 1996).
6. See Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 963,
972-74 (2000) (discussing traditional nationally bounded status of citizenship in the nation-state).
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This combination of features-an open border for trade and private investment, a closed border for foreign aid and public investment flows, and an
opaque yet porous border for the movement of people-is characteristic of the
market model (also referred to as the Washington-Wall Street Consensus). 7 U.S.

businesses, large and small, benefit from cheap labor in Mexico and immigrant
workers in the United States, while private investors are assured by an environ-

ment of fiscal austerity in both Mexico and the United States.
This market model is part and parcel of a corporate globalization agenda
supervised by multilateral institutions that are often seen as less responsive to
national concerns than to their private constituencies. For instance, trade is
liberalized under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), while
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through its lending and surveillance
programs, liberalizes private finance and restricts the sovereign capacity of
national governments to publicly finance the development needs of their populations.8
The increasingly routine crossing of borders for trade, private investment
capital, and migrant workers-made possible and more efficient by technological advances in communication, transportation, and information flowsundermines the sovereign capabilities of the nation-state. The paradox, however
seldom recognized, is that those same forces of globalization raise new challenges and demands for the nation-state, ensuring the continuing significance of
national boundaries and citizenship. The nation-state is dead; long live the
nation-state. 9
For instance, as it becomes easier for businesses and investors to find cheaper
sources of labor overseas, labor standards and real wage rates have declined in
the United States. Moreover, the squalor and austerity of public sectors on all
sides of NAFTA borders, but particularly in Mexico, have guaranteed a steady
stream of desperate and often illegal immigrants from the periphery to the core.
Freer economic competition necessarily means winners and losers, resulting in
dislocation and crisis for many. Thus, there are persistent demands for adjustment assistance, or when little assistance is forthcoming, for protection and
closed borders. These demands are naturally directed to the nation-state as the
broadest level of government realistically responsive to mass appeals and
accountable to voters. 10

7. See generally JOSEPH SnGLrrz, GLOBALtZAnTON AND ITS DIscoNmTrs 53-72 (2002) (describing the
Washington Consensus of market fundamentalism as an agenda of fiscal austerity, privatization, and
market liberalization).
8. Timothy A. Canova, FinancialLiberalization, InternationalMonetary Dis/Order and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1279 (2000).
9. Cf Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (2004) (arguing that the claim of the nation-state's "imminent demise is
highly exaggerated"). See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
10. In some places, the demands for adjustment assistance, broadly speaking, are met by nongovernmental organizations that are partisan or sectarian in nature, such as the madrassas in Pakistan,
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B. Towards a New Border Discourse:
Mapping the Historiographyfor Sequential Reform
The present discourse about reforming immigration law narrows our choices
to a largely false dichotomy between: (1) ratifying the semi-porous border for
illegal immigrants through an amnesty program, ineffective enforcement, and
ineffective border control; or (2) simply closing the border by constructing a
long physical separation barrier. This Article suggests that a wall at the U.S.Mexico border, revolting to many as an ugly fence of separation, could instead
create a door of opportunity between neighbors, particularly if it is constructed
as part of a larger program of foreign aid, infrastructure investment, and
regional development.
This Article seeks to situate the border debate into the broader context of
economic development and collective action by focusing on foreign aid and
public infrastructure investment, often-overlooked factors that do not flow
freely across NAFTA borders. While this Article focuses on the U.S.-Mexico
border, by articulating a model for economic integration between countries with
widely divergent standards of living, it also seeks to provide a road map for
dealing with other borders and relations with other neighbors in this hemisphere
to Mexico's south and in the Caribbean.
This Article contrasts the market model with a distinctly different border
regime, the so-called "mobilization model:" a more mediated border for trade
and private investment, with greater regulation of cross-border labor and environmental standards; a more open border for foreign aid and public infrastructure
investment; and for the movement of people, a sequencing of reform, starting
with a more closed border regime and building eventually to a completely open
border. The model is referred to in terms of mobilization because it allows the
nation-state to push toward genuine full employment of human resources by
mobilizing and redirecting financial resources into public infrastructure investments, such as transportation networks, health and education facilities. By
mobilizing resources to such ends, the model addresses the persistent demands
for adjustment assistance for those dislocated by the "creative destruction" of
economic growth and trade liberalization." By promoting and ensuring economic take-off for countries like Mexico, 12 the model lays the groundwork for a
truly open border, one without walls or fences or other barriers that keep people
apart.
This alternative paradigm has its precedents in history, perhaps most notably
in the Marshall Plan by which the United States rebuilt Western Europe and
the Hezbollah "Party of God" in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza and parts of the West Bank, often with
the backing of foreign governments. See discussion infra Part [V.A.
11. See generally TYLER COWEN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: How GLOBALIZATION IS CHANGING THE
WORLD'S CULTUREs 11 (2002) (discussing how globalization leads to uneven development, "some
sectors expand with extreme rapidity, others shrink and wither away"); JOSEPH ScHUMPETER, CAPIrrAusM,

(1942).
12. Cf W. W. RosTOw, THE STAGES

SociAusM AND DEMOcRAcY

OF ECONOMIC GROWTH:

A NON-COMMUNIST

MANIFESTO (1961).
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Japan after World War II, and in more recent years, in the European Union's
enlargement project by which it has liberalized trade, finance, foreign aid, and
migration flows between its twenty-five member countries. The Marshall Plan
and the European Union's Regional Assistance Program, often overlooked in
discussions about the U.S.-Mexico border and immigration issues, are considered here as part of a new historiography of mobilization to inform our border
discourse.
The mobilization model and the market model are based on different conceptions of citizenship. The market model grants rights to corporate citizens and
private investors, and since those rights are reciprocal between the citizens of
neighboring countries, it is easy to view the market model as a progressive step
toward shared supranational citizenship. But it is a model of citizenship that is
skewed toward rights and away from responsibilities. In contrast, the mobilization model, while based on the traditional paradigm of nationally-bounded
citizenship, would impose obligations on all citizens-taxpayers, corporate
persons, and private investors. But where the market fails to develop the
infrastructure for economic takeoff, the mobilization model gets the sequence of
reform right: first, regional development, "rule of law" reforms, and economic
take-off; later, freer movement for trade, private investment, migration, and the
development of a more genuine, supranational identity.
The mobilization model's emphasis on the sequencing of reforms borrows
from the insight of economic debates of the late 1990s about liberalizing
portfolio capital flows. 13 While the IMF considered reforming its Articles of
Agreement to make capital account liberalization an explicit policy goal, such
"shock therapy" approaches were widely discredited by failures in transition
economies, such as the Russian ruble collapse and the Asian currency contagion.' 4 Those calling for restrictions on the movement of capital were often
dismissed not only as heterodox thinkers, but as politically unrealistic, which is
perhaps the worst insult among opinion-makers.15 Yet, the orthodox view.
slowly shifted in favor of erring "on the side of caution" by permitting (though
another
never actually encouraging) countries to impose controls of one kind or
16
on capital flows while adopting a sequenced approach to liberalization.

13. Jagdish Bhagwati, The CapitalMyth,

FOREIGN

AFi., May-June 1998, at 7-12; Dani Rodrik, Who

Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?, in SHOULD TiE IMF PURsuE CAPITAL-AccouN'r CoNVERTmIUITY?

55-65 (S. Fischer et al. eds., 1998).
14. GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 5, at 237.
15. See, e.g., James Crotty, The Case for Capital Controls, in UNCONVENTIONAL WisDoM (Jeffrey
Madrick ed., 2000); Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1622-29 (1999). For a range of empirical
evidence and case studies largely confirming the heterodox perspective, see CAPIrrAL FLIGHT AND
CAPITAL CONTROLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2005).
,16. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONONUCS (1999); BARRY EICHENGREEN,
TowAPmS A NEw INTERNATIONAL FNANCiAL ARcumrEcrum: A PRACTICAL POST-AsIA AGENDA (1999); E.

Kaplan & D. Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8142, 2001); Joseph Stiglitz, CapitalMarket Liberalization,Economic Growth, and

2007]

CLOSING THE BORDER AND OPENING THE DOOR

Likewise, discussions on liberalizing migration flows between Mexico and
the United States should refrain from today's all or nothing, open border or
closed border dichotomies. Restrictions on the free flow of people are more
fairly justified if part of a sequenced set of reforms designed to raise living
standards in Mexico and if they provide economic security and adjustment
assistance on both sides of the border, thereby creating the conditions for
liberalizing migration in the future.
Some commentators have already suggested that immigration and border
reforms be structured into a sequence: first a wall, then later an amnesty
program to legalize undocumented aliens in the United States. 17 But such
proposals leave out an important first step in the sequence: namely, regional
development and public infrastructure investment. A wall of public investment,
if part of a comprehensive full-employment and regional development program,
may be a necessary stage in creating a genuine North American community.
First the healthy boundaries, and later the open door. 8
Although some critics of the mobilization model will dismiss it as a simple
return to protectionism and isolation, the reality is quite different. Mobilization
will require more, not less, multilateral engagement to provide for effective
mediation in the cross-border movement of goods, services, and capital and to
transfer foreign aid across borders. While protectionism would simply raise
barriers to trade, the mobilization model seeks to maintain open borders for
trade, although a trade that is far more strategically directed in its consumption
and production patterns. Likewise, the model seeks to maintain an open border
for private investment, albeit an investment flow that is at last taxed at the
turnstile and regulated with the same digital technology driving globalization.' 9
The mobilization model cannot hide from the forces of globalization; rather,
mobilization can only work by embracing a newer, more responsive and
responsible globalization.
C. A Continuum of Paradigms:Open, Closed, and Porous Borders
In 2006, President George W. Bush approved the deployment of 6000

Instability,WORLD DEVELOPMENT, June 2000, at 1075-86; Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei
& M. Ayhan Kose, Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical
Evidence, at 5 (Mar. 17, 2003) (International Monetary Fund Board Document), available at http:II
www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf (concluding that the empirical evidence suggests
that financial integration should be approached cautiously, and with the pace and sequencing of
integration dependent on country-specific circumstances and institutional features) (Rogoff was the
IMF's Chief Economist and Director of Research at the time of the report).
17. See Charles Krauthammer, First a Wall-Then Amnesty, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2006, at A19
(referring to similar proposals by Mickey Kaus and others); Border battler, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22,
2006, available at http://www.nydailynews.comlnews/ideas opinions/v-pfriendly/story411104p347791c.html (reporting Sen. Hillary Clinton's support for a "two-step process" of securing the border
before providing amnesty for illegal immigrants already here).
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
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National Guard troops along the border, the hiring of 6000 new Border Patrol
agents, and signed legislation that authorized the construction of 700 miles of
fencing, the use of high technology sensors along the border, and the construction of new detention facilities for those caught trying to cross the border.2 ° The
Bush plan was met with hostility from immigrants and human rights advocates
concerned that militarizing the border would further punish desperate migrants
without addressing the underlying causes of mass immigration. 2
While promising the rhetoric of reform, the Bush approach should be seen as
a continuation of the status quo-a border that for the movement of migrant
workers is not closed, not open, but rather porous. In fact, the authorization to
construct the 700-mile border fence was not even supported by an appropriation
of funds.22
For analytical purposes, this article proceeds by considering three paradigms
along the continuum of possibilities: an Open Border, a Closed Border, and the
Porous Border.2 3 In Part II of this Article, I discuss the problems associated with
maintaining the status quo of a Porous Border, including threats to economic
security and public safety and the dilution of the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship, concerns that also apply to proposals that would move prematurely
to an Open Border.
Liberal and critical scholars argue passionately and persuasively that hardships to undocumented/illegal immigrants would be greatly alleviated by opening the border, or at least making it much more porous. 24 But while the status
quo of a Porous Border may appear untenable in the long-run, the main liberal
alternative of an Open Border is clearly not popular or tenable in our present
security-conscious political environment.2 5 Although Open Border advocates
20. David Stout, Bush, Signing Bill for Border Fence, Urges Wider Overhaul, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 27,
2006, at A16; Immigration: Cross-bordersuspicions, THE ECONOMnST, May 20, 2006, at 31 (reporting
that the Bush proposal "is largely for show" since the National Guard "will not be empowered to arrest
anyone, and they will be withdrawn after a year or so").
21. President Bush has also proposed a guest-worker program and citizenship for undocumented
immigrants under certain conditions. House Republicans have opposed any path to citizenship as an
amnesty that would reward past lawbreaking and encourage future illegal immigration. Jim Rutenberg,
President Calls for Compromise on Immigration, N.Y. TtMFs, May 16, 2006, at A1; Edwin Meese III,
An Amnesty by Any Other Name.. ., N.Y. TMAEs, May 24, 2006, at A27.
22. Spencer S. Hsu, In Border Fence's Path, CongressionalRoadblocks, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2006,
at Al (reporting the failure of Congress to appropriate funds for the building of the border fence that it
had authorized); Editorial, The Fence Campaign, N.Y ThMEs, Oct. 30, 2006, at A24 (reporting that the
legislation signed into law by President Bush to authorize the building of 700 miles of border fence
included no money for building it).
23. As discussed below, the Closed Border will be split between two variants: (1) a militarized
closed border, referred to as the Martial Wall; and (2) a border that closes, however imperfectly, as part
of a comprehensive regional development strategy and wall of public investment, referred to as the
Marshall Plan Wall. As I conclude, only the latter variant, the Marshall Plan strategy, carries the hope of
a genuine Open Border in the future.
24. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Law and the Border: Open.Borders?,51 UCLA L. REv. 193 (2000).
25. For instance, in late 2004, Time magazine reported "al-Qaeda's interest in moving nuclear
materials from Europe to either the U.S. or Mexico." Adam Zagorin, Bordering on Nukes?, TIME, Nov.
22, 2004, at 19; see also STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VuLNERABLE (2004); Eric Lipton, Testers Slip
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strongly contest such security concerns, 26 restrictionists will always have an
incentive to sensationalize the security threat, and it is difficult to disprove the
absence of legitimate security threats.27 The final alternative in our present
discourse, that of a Closed Border, is often greeted with revulsion by liberals,
opposition by business interests, and hostility south of the border.28 Yet, it is a
paradigm that persists in its appeal precisely because of the dislocations and
fears associated with Open and Porous borders.2 9
The issue of political feasibility permeates discussion of each of these border
paradigms. For instance, Open Border proposals seem utopian in the postSeptember l1th world, while Closed Border proposals suffer from a somewhat
different kind of skepticism, namely that of resource capability.30 It may be
easier to imagine a political alignment in Congress for closing the border than a
federal government capable of actually sealing the border by constructing and
maintaining a border wall. Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could not maintain the levies around
one city, New Orleans. Could the federal government actually construct and
maintain a border wall that stretches 2000 miles? 3 I But the Closed Border
proposal has other problems. Assuming a wall that is actually effective in
Radioactive Materials Over Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at A14 (reporting that undercover
congressional investigators smuggled enough radioactive material to make two dirty bombs into the
United States across both the Canadian and Mexican borders); JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE, NUCLEAR TERRoRIsM: A BRIEF REvIEw OF THREATS AND RESPONSES (2004), available at http:II
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32595.pdf.
26. Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security after September
11, and the Future of NorthAmerican Integration,91 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
27. Eric Lipton, U.S. Borders Vulnerable, Witnesses Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at All
(reporting testimony by scientists and government auditor that the United States remains extremely
vulnerable to catastrophic attack by nuclear weapons, particularly at seaports).
28. See Johnson, supra note 24; Kevin G. Hall & Pablo Bachelet, Calder6n gives Bush earful on
immigration, MIMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 2006, at 14A (reporting Mexican opposition to legislation signed
by President Bush to construct 700 miles of wall); James L. Doti & Esmael Adibi, Let the market
control immigration, ORANGE Co. REG., Apr. 16, 2006 (repeating the argument that undocumented
immigrants would be needed to build walls at the border), available at http://www.ocregister.com
ocregister/opinion/homepage/article-l 103570.php; Peter Kiefer, Vatican Decries Fence Planned for
U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at A10 (reporting that a top Vatican official, Cardinal Renato
Martino, in presenting Pope Benedict XVI's message for the Roman Catholic Church's World Day of
Migrants and Refugees, compared the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall to the Berlin Wall).
29. For an example of the fear, whether it is justified or paranoid, see J. Zane Walley, Coming to
America: "Arab terrorists" crossing border,WorldNetDaily.com, Oct. 19, 2001, http://worldnetdaily.com
news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=24987.
30. For instance, Tom Donohue, the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, dismissed the
border wall on such grounds: "Where are we going to find the workers that we need [to build the border
wall]? ... If you're going to build a wall, you're going to have to build with illegal labor." Jenalia
Moreno, Immigrants seen as key as baby boomers retire, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 20, 2006, at B3. This is
precisely the concern that a regional development program for Mexico would remedy by seeking to
employ and educate many who would otherwise be heading into the immigration stream.
31. James C. McKinley, Jr., At Mexican Border Tunnels, Vile River Rusty Fence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2005, at A8 (reporting discovery of elaborate and expensive tunnels under the border "where the
failures of drug policy, border control and immigration reform meet ever pressing issues of national
security").
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sealing the border, the likely result would be increased hardship for illegal
immigrants desperate for work and for a Mexican economy that has grown
dependent on remittances earned from Mexicans working in the United States.3 2
The symbolic message of such a wall would also be significant and disturbing.33
By drawing on nativistic and isolationist impulses, the Closed Border could
easily represent a barrier to economic progress and human freedom.
As suggested in Part III of this Article, a Closed Border regime that is based
on militarized enforcement and on private capital for Mexico's economic
development will fail to address Mexico's enormous employment and infrastructure needs. The Closed Border/Martial Wall paradigm of a militarized border
seems to have at least some support among many who endorse the free market
development model of limited government, fiscal austerity for the public sector,
and tax incentives for private sector led growth. Sadly for Mexico, hopes of a
foreign investment driven, maquiladora-led economic takeoff for Mexico have
been largely 34eclipsed by the rise of China in the liberalized global trading
environment.
There are significant challenges, therefore, to closing the border in a constructive way that ultimately leads to future liberalization. To both restate and
preview, my thesis is that the Closed Border model necessitates a comprehensive regional development program and a far greater commitment of public
capital investment than has been presently considered by NAFTA countries.
This paradigm is referred to as the Marshall Plan Wall, modeled after the
massive U.S. commitment of public capital investment for the reconstruction of
Western Europe and Japan following World War II, and named after its chief
architect, George C. Marshall, wartime General and Army Chief of Staff, and
postwar Secretary of State.35
Today's free-market approach to regional development along the border is
also contrasted with the European Union's comprehensive and ongoing Regional Assistance Program (RAP) that couples EU enlargement with impressive

32. GOLDIN & REInERT, supra note 5, at 39-40, 176-77; see also ROBERT A. PASTOR & GEORGE G.
CASTANEDA, LIMTrrs To F~iEtNCsuu': THE UNITED STATES AND MExIco (1989).

33. Margaret E. Montoya, Border Crossings In an Age of Border Patrols: Cruzando" Fronteras
Metaforicas, 26 N.M. L. REv. 1, 3 (1996) (tracing the idea for a triple fence at the border to a study
prepared by the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico).
34. Maquiladoras are the jobs at Mexican "maquila" factories that import raw materials for assembly, manufacture, and export. PATRICIA WILSON, EXPORTS AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: MEXICO'S NEW
MAQuiLADoRAS 139 (1992) (origin of "maquiladora" in Spanish language refers to the amount of corn a
farmer pays to a miller to grind corn). Since the accession of China to the World Trade Organization in
2001, Mexico has lost hundreds of thousands of maquiladora jobs to China and Southeast Asia.
Timothy A. Canova, Claire Moore Dickerson & Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and Finance as Inevitably
Transnational:GlobalizationDemands a Sophisticated and Transnational Lens, 41 SAN DIECO L. REV.
109, 130 n.66 (2004); see also Joshua M. Kagan, Workers' Rights in the Mexican MaquiladoraSector:
Collective Bargaining, Women's Rights, and General Human Rights: Law, Norms, and Practice, 15 J.
TRAN NAT'L L & POL'Y 153 (2005) (critical assessment of failure to protect rights of maquiladora
workers).
35. ToNy JuDT, PosTwAR: A HISTORy OF EUROPE Sn'CE 1945, at 90-99 (2005).
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public capital investment and fiscal stimulus for new EU members. As discussed in Part III, the EU approach has succeeded in raising the living standards
of relatively poorer new members through massive public infrastructure investment.
While the EU program has facilitated economic and political integration of
new members, it is not directed solely at border regions but more widely at
pockets of poverty within both poorer and richer EU and non-EU countries.
Likewise, the massive flow of immigration from Mexico into, the United States
stems from thousands of regional sources often deep within Mexico as well as
within other poorer countries to Mexico's south.36 In this way, the border is a
metaphor as much as a physical reality, and any discussion of regional development for the U.S.-Mexico border must also be a discussion about development
for regions of poverty that border regions of prosperity, both within and
between NAFTA as well as non-NAFTA countries. When combined with
internal reforms and regional development, the Closed Border may represent a
necessary stage in the process of political and economic liberalization, leading
eventually to a genuine Open Border.
The tendency to dismiss foreign experiences as alien to our political culture is
not limited to public officials pushing unilateral foreign policies. The legal
academy is often far more interested in judicial reasoning and decision-making
than in any analysis of institutional structures or legislative programs. 37 Ethnocentric thinking is thereby compounded by overlooking comparative and historical analogies. This myopia is particularly acute when considering alternative
models of economic development and regional integration, where the barriers to
discourse are not just geographic or historical, but those imposed by the
orthodoxies of economic theorists.38
American history offers compelling examples of highly successful and largescale programs of public capital investment, from the Marshall Plan that helped
rebuild Western Europe and Japan after World War Il to the G.I. Bill of Rights,
a massive investment in human infrastructure that provided education and
economic opportunity for millions of U.S. war veterans. 39 These precedents are
particularly relevant because of today's overriding national security concerns

36. For many Mexican states such as Zacatecas, Michoacd.n, Guanajuato, Jalisco, San Luis Potosf,
Durango, and Oaxaca, and some urban communities in Chihuahua and Baja California, "emigration has
been an alternative source of employment and income." PASTOR & CASTANEDA, supra note 32, at 317;
see also Ginger Thompson, Mexico Worries About Its Own Southern Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006,
at 1, 12 (reporting that hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants pass through Mexico into the
United States each year from nearly two dozen countries throughout Latin America, the Caribbean,
Asia and Africa).
37. See discussion infra Part V.B.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., ROBERT SOBEL, THE GREAT BooM 1950-2000: How A GENERATION OF AMERICANS
CREATED THE WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUs SOCIETY (2002); MICHAEL J. BENNETT, WHEN DREAMS CAME
TRUE: THE GI BILL AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (1999); SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO

CmzENs: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION (2005).
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that continue to drive discussions about immigration law and border control.
Sadly, there is every reason to believe that security concerns will only grow in
the future, and given the rising levels of hostility to the United States and our
apparent inability to effectively shape political conditions around the world,
perhaps security should be the predominant lens for organizing our borders and
our relations with our neighbors.
Within this historiography are wide comparative differences. During the
Marshall Plan and G.I. Bill, politics were dominated and defined by the onset of
Cold War and the policy of global containment, a context that may be increasingly relevant to today's confrontation between Western secularism and Islamic
radicalism. The economic context, however, could hardly be more different. The
Marshall Plan and G.I. Bill were made possible by institutional arrangements
that empowered the federal government to mobilize resources-financial, human, industrial, and technological. Everything else was secondary to and stemmed
from the imperative to mobilize, hence the term mobilization. The model,
however ill-defined and dimly recognized, was implemented by American
postwar planners in Germany and then followed by nation-states throughout
Western Europe. 40
Today, by contrast, the nation-state is increasingly disempowered by private
capital markets and institutional arrangements that elevate the interests of
private finance above the creation of public goods.41 This Article, therefore,
concludes with an appeal to reconsider some of our most accepted institutional
arrangements, sacred cows that hamper our ability to react to danger, develop
our communities, and strengthen our borders within and without.
II. FROM POROUS BORDER TO OPEN BORDER:
THE PERSISTENT BARRIERS OF DISLOCATION AND ADJUSTMENT

The U.S.-Mexico border is not an open border. While millions of undocumented migrants cross the border each year, many more have been detained and
sent back to Mexico. It is perhaps most accurate to refer to the present regime as
a Porous Border, one that is crossed illegally often at risk to one's safety and
freedom.4 2 Opening the border would no doubt alleviate many of these harms.4 3

40. JUDT, supra note 35. The Marshall Plan provided important resources to nation-states in West
Europe and Japan, enabling the use of active fiscal policy to fund the welfare state and social policy.
41. Jtirgen Habermas, Acceptance Speech for the Bruno Kreisky Prize (Mar. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.signandsight.com/features/676.html (criticizing globalization for depriving the nation-state
"of the tax resources it needs to satisfy its population's demands for collective goods and public
services, or even to maintain the status quo" and calling for "winning back political clout on a
supra-national level" through "convergent tax rates and medium-term harmonization of economic and
social policies").
42. See Kevin R. Johnson, More Open Borders (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Center for Global Trade & Development, Chapman University School of Law); Ginger Thompson, At
Unforgiving Arizona-Mexico Border Tide of DesperationIs Overwhelming, N.Y TIMs, May 21, 2006,
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The Porous Border, like the Closed Border, is also difficult to square with
44
liberal moral philosophy and the liberal economic model of globalization.
NAFTA has liberalized the flow of goods, services and capital across borders,
but migrant workers are left in a legal limbo. Technological advances in
communication and transportation have made illegal immigration easier and
border control. more difficult. Meanwhile, the movement of private capital
across borders has greatly undermined the sovereign capabilities of nation-states
to redistribute resources and provide for the general welfare.4 5
According to classic liberal economic theory, capital and labor will move to
the places of greatest return.4 6 By liberalizing capital flows while impeding
labor mobility, the Porous Border arguably undermines economic development
while punishing Mexican nationals for responding to basic economic incentives.47 Opening the border would therefore permit Mexican nationals to migrate to higher wage areas in the United States and Canada-where the increased
supply of labor would eventually slow the growth of or even depress American
and Canadian wage rates. 48 Likewise, according to liberal economic theory, as
the supply of labor in Mexico declines due to the outflow of migrants, wages in
Mexico should stabilize or even rise.4 9
Seen in this way, restrictions on immigration are anachronistic and regres-

at 24 (reporting that 464 immigrants, including infants and small children, died last year from exposure
and dehydration while trying to cross the border in the Sonoran Desert). "In the last five years, Arizona
has become the principal, and deadliest, gateway for illegal migrants. It accounts for nearly one-third of
the 1.5 million people captured for illegally crossing the border last year, and nearly half the migrants
who died, according to the United States Border Patrol." Id.
43. Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium: Law and the Border: Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193
(2003); see also Randal C. Archibold, Risky Measures by Smugglers Increase Toll on Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A12 (reporting the deaths of nine illegal aliens in the crash of sports utility
vehicle recklessly fleeing the Border Patrol). According to the Border Patrol, smuggling organizations
are showing a total disregard for human life. Id.
44. See PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION: LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND IMMIGRATION
(2000); MARK TusHNET, ImmigrationPolicy in Liberal Political Theory, in JusTIcE IN IMMIGRATION 147
(Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
45. John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
InternationalFederalism, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 903 (1996).
46. DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICs 372 (6th ed. 2006) (concluding that "large wage differential means that many people from those lowrwage countries would like to move to the United States to
earn the higher wages"); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUs, MACROECONOMIcs 58 (18th ed.
2005) (reporting classical analysis that "immigration into a region shifts the supply curve for labor to
the right and pushes down wages"); GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 5, at 167-71 (2006) (discussing the
"pull" factors that attract immigration to the United States).
47. "For the most part, households turn to migration quite rationally and use it instrumentally as an
adaptive strategy to compensate for missing and failed markets in Mexico, conditions that are common
in a country undergoing transition to a developed market society." JORGE DURAND & DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY, What We Learned from the Mexican Migration Project, in CROSSING THE BORDER: RESEARCH
FROM THE MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT 6 (J. Durand & D. Massey eds., 2004).
48. SAMUELSON & NoRDHAUs, supra note 46, at 59 (claiming the effect of immigration is to slow the
growth in wages, or to slightly depress wages, in host economy).
49. For such an example, see Judy Dempsey, Polish Labor Is Scarce as Workers Go West, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at 16.
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sive.50 Notions of national citizenship are increasingly seen as incompatible
with liberal political and economic theory, particularly in an age of globalization.51 Corporate citizens expect rights rather than duties: freedom from government regulation and taxes, but limited responsibilities to the public, to future
generations, their own employees, and often their own shareholders.52 The
Open Border, particularly for capital and goods, is the essence of the Washington Consensus and the agenda for U.S. trade negotiators in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and global trade talks.
When Vincente Fox was first elected President of Mexico in 2000, he
challenged the United States to follow Europe's example by opening the
U.S.-Mexico border. The issue of immigration was among his highest priorities,
and he quickly sought to negotiate with the United States to legalize the status
of Mexicans in the United States.5 3 Fox seemed to have a sympathetic ear in
President George W. Bush. Together, the two presidents set up a binational
panel of cabinet secretaries that began to address issues of border safety,
temporary-worker programs, expansion of permanent migration, and the legalization of undocumented Mexicans in the United States.54 While there were no
plans to establish a common North American customs and immigration policy,
Fox had pledged to crack down on the flow of illegal immigrants crossing from
Guatemala, his so-called "Southern Plan," but the United States offered very
little in help, only $2 million in assistance.55
Also included on the agenda of the binational panel was the issue of regional
economic development, a recognition of the limits of NAFTA's trade and capital
liberalization to spur private economic activity within Mexico.56 Already in
early 2001 it was becoming evident that the NAFTA development model, based
on foreign direct investment, was proving illusory. With China's entry into the
WTO, Mexico lost hundreds of thousands of maquiladora jobs to Asia.5 7

50. Ryan Walters, Managing Global Mobility: Free Trade in Services in the Age of Terror, 6 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 15 (2006).
51. Addis, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that many "enthusiasts of the communication revolution and
other critics of the state system ... [believe] that the state system has been an impediment to
international human solidarity and human flourishing"). The Open Borders vision was given eloquent
expression in John Lennon's Imagine: "Imagine there's no countries. / It isn't hard to do. / Nothing to
kill or die for. / And no religion too. / Imagine all the people, living life in peace. / You may say I'm a
dreamer. / But I'm not the only one. / I hope someday you'll join us and the world will be as one."
52. David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Empower Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
13, 2006, at Al (reporting opposition by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
and other big U.S. business interests to proposed law in China to crack down on sweatshops and protect
workers' rights).
53. ROBERT A. PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AmEIcAN CoMMuNrry: LEssONs FROM THE OLD WORLD FOR

m NEw 120 (2001); Thompson, supra note 36, at 12.
54. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 121.

55. Thompson, supra note 36, at 12.
56. PASTOR, supranote 53, at 121.

57. Elisabeth Malkin, Manufacturing Jobs Are Exiting Mexico, N.Y. Tgms, Nov. 5, 2002, at WI

(reporting that Mexico's maquiladora industry lost 287,000 jobs between October 2000 and March
2002, a twenty-one percent decline, and that thousands of those jobs moved to China, Thailand, and
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Moreover, the benefits from the maquiladora boom have never trickled down to
factory workers and their families in Mexico. Wages remain low (between $70
and $90 a week) and working and living conditions are harsh, as many workers
often live in shacks with roofs made of corrugated tin in border 58
towns with no
paved roads, no sewage systems, and no potable, drinkable water.
The market model is built on sand. At its center is a paradox. The opening of
borders to trade and commerce undermines the capability of the nation-state.
The wider geographic scope of private capital smothers the welfare state,
,constricts public investment and foreign aid, and fuels the flow of people to
cross the border. Meanwhile, those threatened, dislocated, or left behind by the
mobility of trade invariably demand adjustment assistance or attempt to immigrate. The response to such demands and to such immigration pressures is
truncated. The Open Border, deemed inevitable for trade and private investment, is non-existent when it comes to adjustment for vulnerable and dislocated
people. Instead, the response is the Closed Border paradigm, with restrictions
on the movement of people into the United States and on the movement of
public capital and foreign aid from the United States to Mexico.
Throughout the Clinton years and into the early George W. Bush administration, critics of the free-market model were mounting a global mass civil
disobedience movement. The huge size of protests (from Seattle in late 1999 to
mass demonstrations throughout much of the world) started to resemble a global
stalking movement, with protesters targeting leading institutions of power,
including the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Yet policy continued to move inexorably to the right, as Democrats and
Republicans alike embraced the Washington Consensus of fiscal austerity,
central bank autonomy, trade and capital liberalization, and the privatization of
state-owned industries and public services.
The debate about economic development models for Mexico and other less
developed countries has become a tired and tortured one. There is a lack of
consensus on development models, as well as contested assumptions about
acceptable time horizons and future probabilities and risks. Free-market approaches have generally focused attention on the need for reform of Mexico's
legal system (i.e., "rule of law reforms") as necessary to encourage foreign
private investment. 59 In contrast, structuralist and statist models of developVietnam); see also Juan Forero, As China Gallops, Mexico Sees FactoryJobs Slip Away, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003, at A3.
58. For instance, Cuidad Acufia, with a population approaching 180,000, had an annual budget of $9
million in 2000. While Alcoa has operated a highly profitable plant in Acufia, it pays virtually no taxes.

The city has no paved roads, no sewage system and no potable water. Alcoa workers received about $40
a year in profit-sharing, while Paul O'Neill, Alcoa's CEO, enjoyed a multi-million dollar incentive
package, as well as $112 million severance when he resigned to become President Bush's first Treasury
Secretary in 2001. Sam Dillon, Profits Raise Pressureson U.S.-Owned Factories in Mexican Border

Zones, N.Y. Tuirs, Feb. 15, 2001, at A1, 16.
59. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY

OF CAPrTAL (2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH
(1989); Boris Kozolchyk & Dale Beck Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions: A
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ment, focused on declining "terms of trade," have pushed programs of national
self-sufficiency (i.e., "import substitution") and proposed reform of international trade and financial institutions. 6° The debate has generated more heat than
light, often marked by contesting scholars and policymakers talking past each
other. What is urgently needed is a synthesis of these opposing perspectives.
Without adequate public investment in infrastructure, legal codes can be largely
ineffective; 61 and without the rule of law, public spending becomes another
opportunity for corruption and waste.6 2
Both free-market and statist development strategies, when pursued in isolation, will lead to numerous inequities and dislocations. The legacy of statist
policies has been overregulation and opportunities for corruption and bribery. In
Mexico, like in many underdeveloped countries, the tyranny of statist licensing
requirements is administered by bureaucratic elites.6 3 For instance, according to
the World Bank, such entrenched elites feather their own nests by impeding a
range of rule of law reforms, thereby making it more difficult to conduct
business in these countries. 64 But just as alarmingly, the same bureaucratic elite
administers the pain of IMF belt-tightening-the free market adjustment that
takes the form of fiscal austerity and high levels of underemployment.
These practical barriers to economic development are not unrelated to the
practical concerns driving the immigration debate. Reform of both are complicated by the prospect of painful dislocations, the lack of adjustment assistance,
a dearth of economic opportunity, and potential losses to those who would be
adversely impacted by liberal economic reforms and liberal immigration flows
alike. For instance, American workers, faced with a globally competitive market, stagnant real wages and the loss of pension and other benefits--even if
caused primarily by factors other than illegal immigration-will no doubt
continue to push for the Closed Border. Meanwhile, the reality of the Porous
Border reflects the continuing movement of Mexicans and others seeking better
Comparative Analysis, in GLOBAL FORUM ON INSOLVENCY RISK MANAGEMENT (2004) (analyzing the
importance of modern secured transactions law, contrasting Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
with the Mexican Reform Laws of May 2000 and June 2003, and the Model Inter-American Law on
Secured Transactions of the Organization of American States).
60. See, e.g., Lynn Turgeon, Introduction to THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE: AN ANNOTATED

BIBUOGRAPHY, at ix (Lynn Turgeon ed., 1996) (opposing the agenda of the International Monetary Fund
were the "structuralists" who "tended to reject the international division of labor and favor import
substitution by developing countries"); KATHRYN SIKrKINK, IDEAS AND INSTrUmONS: DEVELOPMENTALISM IN

BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA (1991); Peter F. Klaren, The Dilemmas of Development, in PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT: THEORiEs OF CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA (P. Klaren & T. Bossert eds., 1986).

61. For instance, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has not exactly brought prosperity or
private investment to large areas within the United States that suffer from insufficient public investment
in social and physical infrastructure.
62. See generally DE Soro, THE MYSTERY OF CAPrrAL, supra note 59.
63. PASTOR & CASTANEDA, supra note 32, at 231 (discussing Mexico's complex system of bureaucratic protection of import licenses, quotas and tariffs, subsidies, tax breaks, and protections).
64. WORLD BANK, DOING BusNEss IN2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004) (advocating regulatory reforms and comparing 130 countries on the basis of quantitative indicators of business regulations
of property relations, contract rights, starting and closing a business, and credit and labor markets).
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economic opportunities and fleeing the pain inflicted by liberal economic
reforms, including fiscal austerity, privatization, and trade liberalization in
agriculture. As further irony, those painful macro-adjustments are administered
by a bureaucratic elite that fears the loss of its own privilege to extract rents
from local entrepreneurs and foreigners seeking to conduct business in their
local jurisdictions.
In each of these cases-the displaced U.S. worker, the displaced Mexican
farm family, and the Mexican bureaucrat threatened by reform-the failure to
provide adjustment assistance and economic opportunity entrenches their positions. Hence, the resistance of U.S. workers to Porous and Open Borders, the
resistance of the Mexican elite to liberal rule of law reforms, and the continuing
penetration of the Porous Border by migrant workers in search of better
opportunities in the United States.65
Meanwhile, the Porous Border has been an important "safety valve" for
Mexico. Remittances from Mexicans working in the United States are estimated
at about $20 billion a year, larger than many state and municipal budgets in
Mexico,6 6 thereby "allowing elected officials to avoid creating jobs and even
taking legal measures to stop the migration of an estimated 500,000 or more
67
Mexicans a year.,
The issues of displacement, adjustment, and economic opportunity remained
largely unaddressed by the free-market development approach, and are causes
of continuing tension on both sides of the Porous Border. Open Border advocates recognize the importance of these issues by calling for better legal
protections of workers, wealth redistribution, and regional development. 68 But
since all such reforms are recommended as part of a political bargain, rather
than central to the day-to-day reality of the Open Border, many rightly fear that
the adjustment assistance will be largely watered down or neglected after the
Open Border becomes a reality. This has been the unfortunate reality with

65. In such a context of economic insecurity and insufficient adjustment assistance and opportunities, some in the newsmedia viewed it as overly provocative for Andr~s Manuel Ldpez Obrador,
Mexico's recent left-wing presidential candidate, to threaten the privileges of the country's political
elite. See generally James C. McKinley Jr., In Race for Mexico's Presidency, Populist Tilts at a
Privileged Elite, N.Y TiEs, June 17, 2006, at Al, A8 (reporting that L6pez Obrador "vowed to end the
sweetheart deals for government contracts, to stop the government from bailing out failing business and
to slash the salaries of top bureaucrats and elected officials, who make far more than their counterparts
in the United States").
66. Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor, Back to the Future: Immigration Research, Immigration
Policy, and Globalization in the Twenty-first Century, in INTERNATIONAL MIGrATION: PROSPECTS AND
POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET 380 (D. Massey & J. Taylor eds., 1998) (discussing the benefit of
remittances for household liquidity and the multiplier effects for the receiving economy); DouGLAs S.
MASSEY El AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN

ERA

OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

153 (2002) (reporting the development potential of remittances, which for some countries have
exceeded levels of direct foreign investment by a factor of four).
67. Ginger Thompson, Some in Mexico See Border Wall as Opportunity, N.Y TuMEs, May 25, 2006,
atAl.
68. See Johnson, supra note 42 (manuscript at 5); PASTOR, supra note 53, at 120.
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NAFTA's largely ineffective labor and environmental side agreements.
With a lack of consensus among development theorists, private financial and
corporate interests were able to assert political muscle and prevail with much of
their market agenda. By the time of the Fox-Bush summit in early 2001, the
opposition of U.S. workers to Porous or Open Borders was increasingly seen as
anachronistic. Talk of fences along the border did not sit well with either U.S.
business interests or liberals in the triumphalism following the fall of the Berlin
Wall. 70 Technology and liberal theory were colluding to undermine the significance of international borders everywhere. It seemed that history was on the
side of the Open Border and that national citizenship had lost much of its
significance for corporations, investors, and workers alike.7 '
But reports of the death of borders were greatly exaggerated. The September
llth terrorist attacks suddenly made Open Borders and Porous Borders seem
irresponsible, decadent, and dangerous. The Open Border that had seemed
inevitable, now seems impossible for the foreseeable future. The Closed Border
that had seemed anachronistic now dominates the center of debate.
III. CLOSING BORDERS AND OPENING DOORS OF OPPORTUNITY

The Closed Border paradigm that dominates and constrains today's discourse
on immigration reform can be characterized as a militarized solution, therefore
as a "Martial Wall." But there is one variant of the Closed Border, largely
overlooked in North America today, that promises genuine adjustment assistance, regional economic development and human liberty by mobilizing resources on a mass scale, and is therefore referred to as a Marshall Plan solution,
or a "Marshall Wall."
A. Splitting the Closed DoorParadigm:
The MilitarizedBorderMeets the Imperatives of Regional Development
The public demonstrations in 2006 against proposals to militarize the borderwhile impressive in numbers-may not translate into political success.7 2 In the
weeks since those protests began, referendums were passed in three states to

69. See, e.g., Canova et al., supra note 34, at 132 n.65; Joel Solomon, Trading Away Rights: The
Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement, HuM. RTs. WATCH, Apr. 2001, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reportsI2001/nafta/index.htm#TopOfPage; Laura Okin Pomeroy, The Labor Side
Agreement Under the NAFTA: Analysis of Its Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and
Recommendations for Future Labor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 764 (1996); see also Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Labor Case Grows For Maker of
Barbie Gowns, N.Y. TimEs, June 12, 2005, § 1, at 10 (reporting worker claims of abuses and a lockout);
Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade OrganizationIncorporate Labor and Environmental Stan-

dards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (2004) (critiquing the WTO's failure to provide labor and
environmental rights, and comparison to intellectual property protections in TRIPS agreement).
70. PASTOR & CASTANEDA, supra note 32, at 107.
71. Cf Immigration: The Wrong Side of History, Tim ECONOMIST, July 15, 2006, at 28.
72. For a thoughtful discussion of the immigration rights movement, its potential to develop into a
new multiracial civil rights movement, and the obstacles and hurdles facing such a development, see
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deny public benefits, including non-emergency health benefits, to anyone who
cannot prove legal residence.73 This political wind reflects the insecurity of U.S.
workers as well as the not altogether irrational fears about public safety and
national security.
September l1th has altered the political calendar for the foreseeable future,
with each anniversary serving as a sad reminder of the continuing and perhaps
growing threat of terrorist attack. In the weeks leading up to each anniversary of
September 1lth and each election day, TV dramas, documentaries, and movies
remind us of terrorist threats, and top public officials invoke the image of the
nuclear mushroom cloud. 74 While such threats are often downplayed or dismissed by academics,7 5 there is every reason to believe that world events will
continue to rattle American voters and keep the debate about border and
immigration reform focused on security concerns.76
Kevin Johnson's Open Border proposal includes a sole, narrowly drawn
exclusion for national security and public safety that would require "a showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular non-citizen posed a clear
and present danger" to U.S. security. 77 Some would object to placing the burden
of proving exclusion on U.S. officials. But many more would probably oppose
the Open Border regime even if the burden was placed on the foreign national
seeking entry. 78
Official assurances of security, particularly those couched in legalistic presumpKevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a
New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
73. Immigration: The Wrong Side of History, supra note 71, at 28 (reporting on referendums in
Arizona, Colorado and Georgia, and estimating that Colorado's would affect 250,000 illegal residents
in a population of 4.7 million). In October 1994, many tens of thousands of people demonstrated in the
streets of Los Angeles and elsewhere against a crackdown on illegal immigrants. There was a similar
political backlash as fifty-nine percent of California voters approved Proposition 187, the referendum
which would deny state benefits to undocumented immigrants and their children. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 19-20 (2003).

74. President George W. Bush has repeatedly invoked the image of the nuclear mushroom cloud.
See, e.g., David E. Sanger, A Doctrine Under Pressure:Pre-Emption is Redefined, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 11,
2004, at A10 (quoting President Bush as warning that "we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking
gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud"). Former CIA Director Porter Goss, in reporting
new intelligence that Al Qaeda has considered infiltrating the United States through the Mexican
border, concluded that it "may only be a matter of time before Al Qaeda or another group attempts to
use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons." Douglas Jehl, U.S. Aides Cite Worry on
Qaeda Infiltration From Mexico, N.Y TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2005, at A16.
75. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe &
Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004).
76. Even liberal voices have invoked the imagery of nuclear terrorism. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky,
Kennedy Denounces Bush Policies as Endangering the World, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2004, at A16
(quoting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy as stating, "A mushroom cloud over any American city is the
ultimate nightmare, and the risk is all too real").
77. Johnson, supra note 42.
78. John M. Broder, Border War: Immigration, From a Simmer to a Scream, N.Y. TMs, May 21,
2006, § 4, at 1 (reporting rise of Minuteman movement of citizen volunteers patrolling the border, their
initial support from California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, and their extensive coverage by Lou
Dobbs of CNN).
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tions, are less than convincing-a likely consequence of repeated U.S. intelligence and operational failures, from the inability of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to share crucial information and "connect the dots" prior
to September llth, to intelligence failures in Iraq and the lack of adequate
planning and the dismal response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 7 9 An
Open Border would most likely increase the inflow of migrants across the
border, thereby hampering the ability of Border Patrol to identify any particular
terrorist threats. The difference in protecting borders against terrorist infiltration
in an Open Border versus a Closed Border environment may be the difference
between looking for a needle in a haystack and finding one on a doormat.
The Open Border regime has receded over the horizon, and instead Closed
Border proposals have come to dominate public debate, 80 as reflected by last
year's competing Republican proposals, the Senate plan for a 300-mile long
Martial Wall with amnesty and guest workers, and the House alternative of a
700-mile long Martial Wall with deportations of illegal immigrants and criminal
sanctions for those who hire or help them. 8'
The Senate's 300-mile wall plan looked a lot like the Porous Border, but with
increasing hardship for migrants both at the border and within the United
States-more death in the desert, more detentions and deportations, and continued exploitation of illegal immigrants in the United States.8 2 But illegal crossings would probably continue on a large enough scale to maintain the safety
79. Cf. NAT'L COMM'N ON T-RRORIST ATrAcKs UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COIMMISSION REPORT
352 (2004) (concluding that the FBI lacked "the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in
the field to national priorities"); MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HuBRIs (2004); Scott Shane & Thorn
Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y TiMs, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al
(reporting that 3200 Louisiana National Guardsmen, more than a third of the force, were deployed in
Iraq, leaving the state short of troops and equipment, unable to maintain safety and provide aid to
thousands of residents stranded at the Superdome); Andrew C. Revkin, Gazing at Breached Levees,
Critics See Years of Missed Opportunities,N.Y. TiEs, Sept. 2, 2005, at A15 (reporting decades of
budget constraints impeding the Army Corps of Engineers from properly reinforcing the levee system
around New Orleans); The Shaming ofAmerica, THE Eco tonST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 11 (arguing that the
"responsibility for mobilizing the response to a disaster lies squarely with the federal government"
which failed to allocate funding to fortify New Orleans's levees).
80. See, e.g., Jamie Reno, A Great Wall?, NEWSWmEK, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
15240665/site/newsweek (reporting comments by Professor David Shirk on border fence legislation).
81. The ascendance of the Closed Border paradigm was also apparent when the governors of
Arizona and New Mexico declared states of emergency for counties bordering with Mexico. Ginger
Thompson, Citing Border Violence, 2 States Declare a Crisis, N.Y. TiMs, Aug. 17, 2005, at A14
(reporting that the declarations would make available $1.75 million in New Mexico and $1.5 million in
Arizona for local border enforcement spending). In addition, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger told a group of newspaper publishers that the United States should "close the border" with Mexico.
He later apologized and corrected himself, saying he meant "secure" the border. Carla Marinucci,
Schwarzenegger Apologizes for "Close the Borders" Remark, Critics Deride his Explanation of
Language Problem, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2005, at A5.
82. See Meredith Kolodner, Immigration Enforcement to Benefit Detention Companies, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 19, 2006, at CI (reporting that some of the biggest beneficiaries of the Bush proposal may be the
companies that build and manage private prisons around the country, including the Corrections
Corporation of America and the Geo Group, formerly the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, the two
biggest prison operators). "By the fall of 2007, the administiation expects that about 27,500 immigrants
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valve for Mexico's elite, allowing them to avoid significant internal reforms.
Meanwhile, American workers would continue to feel threatened by undocuthe perception of continued vulnerability to
mented immigrant labor and 8by
3
attack.
and
terrorist infiltration
Perhaps a Martial Wall of 700 miles or longer would be less porous, but if so,
it would be at the risk of closing off Mexico's safety valve and increasing its
social and political unrest at a time when the United States should be firming up
its southern border. It is precisely because of intensified security concerns that
out. 84
Closed Border advocates should be asking what it is we would be walling
Perhaps such a Closed Border would lead to significant capitulations by Mexico's privileged elites, and to rule of law reforms and massive increases in
private foreign investment. But it is hard to imagine any of these wishful
consequences falling into place quickly or without great social and political
upheaval, potentially during a time of rising foreign threats that may require
more urgent attention to security at all U.S. borders and ports of entry.8 5
The Closed Border discourse, therefore, offers a militarized and isolationist
86
approach, a dismal choice between an ineffective and still porous Martial Wall
or a more draconian Martial Wall.87 It is a discourse that marginalizes other
border paradigms such as models of integration based on regional and development assistance, foreign aid, activist government and the mass mobilization of
resources.

will be in detention each night, an increase of 6,700 over the current number in custody. At the average
cost these days of $95 a night, that adds up to an estimated total annual cost of nearly $1 billion." Id.
83. For the utter futility of building physical barriers for security while ignoring the complex
conditions-political, economic, social, even cultural and religious conditions-on the other side of
those barriers, see Edward Wong, Iraqis PlanningTrench Network Around Baghdad,N.Y. TDAms, Sept.
16, 2006, at AI (reporting plan to build barriers around Baghdad to control the exits and entrances, and
to search people and cars).
84. "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know / What I was walling in or walling out, / And to whom I
was like to give offense." Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in SELECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 23 (1963).
85. The relative complacency of the U.S. response to September 11th-no great mobilization of
financial resources and no draft of industry and labor-is in sharp contrast to the words and actions of
the World War II generation. For instance, in a fireside chat to the nation little more than two months
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt said, "Never before have we had so little
time in which to do so much." President Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Progress of the War, Address of the
President (Feb. 23, 1942) (transcript available in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and
Museum), availableat http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/022342.html.
86. See, e.g., Vik Jolly, Skeptics Scoffat Border-Arrest Figures," ORANGE Co. REG., Nov. 2, 2006, at
4, availableat http:lwww.ocregister.comlocregisterlnewslabox/article_1342265.php (reporting that while
arrests at the border have declined, this may be the result of increasing enforcement in rural Arizona, an
area that migrant smugglers are easily avoiding); Nicole Gaouette, Border BarrierApproved, L.A.
TiMEs, Sept. 30, 2006, at Al (quoting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy as dismissing the border fence as "a
feel-good plan that will have little effect in the real world").
87. See Gaouette, supra note 86, at Al (reporting an "angry condemnation from the Mexican
government" when the U.S. border barrier bill was passed, and quoting Mexican Foreign Minister Luis
Ernesto Derbez that Mexico has "indicated in a clear and unambiguous manner that the wall is
unnecessary and that it is not a gesture that shows friendship between the countries of Latin America,
the Caribbean and the United States").
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B. Regional Development as Adjustment Assistance:
A Well-Worn Path to Open Borders
The Closed Border, offered as the only alternative to the Porous or Open
Border, evokes the image of a wall that separates, excludes and divides people.
Behind the wall is an unknown world of vulnerable and desperate people. All
the more reason for some to want such a wall. But perhaps there is opportunity
for other alternatives in the Closed Border paradigm, and that behind the closed
door could be a world of activity and hopeful expectation: the door may be
closed, but someday it will open again.
There is a sequencing of reform implicit in this approach: first there is the
time for setting boundaries, for claiming the space to work on internal reform,
and later, the maturity and strength to interact with others on the basis of
equality and mutual respect, and finally the opening of borders. 8s Such a path to
opening borders has been well traveled by the European Union, "a geopolitical
revolution of historic dimensions" which now boasts twenty-five member nations with a combined economy and population greater than the United States. 89
According to T.R. Reid in The United States of Europe: The New Superpower
and the End of American Supremacy, "Americans have largely ignored this
European revolution" even though "Europe is a more integrated place today
than at any time since the Roman Empire." 90 The EU has opened its borders
within, but only after raising living standards for countries awaiting membership in the EU. Through its Regional Assistance Program (RAP), the EU invests
hundreds of billions of euros in the infrastructure of new and existing members,
building "an ambitious network of bridges, tunnels, ports, and rail lines." As
Reid concluded, this infrastructure investment has facilitated the removal of
customs and immigration controls within the EU. 9 '
EU regional policy, according to the European Commission ("EC"), puts into
practice the solidarity between the peoples of Europe, one of the fundamental
objectives of the Treaty of the European Union, by strengthening "economic
and social cohesion [and] by reducing developmental disparities between its

88. If life-span development theories are applied, each state passes through a sequence of stages in
which change is qualitatively rather than quantitatively different. See Jom W. SAwnTRocK, A ToPICAL
APPROACH TO LiFE SPAN DEVELOPMENT 15 (2002). There is an Eastern and holistic emphasis on change:
the self-concept and its boundaries are recognized as "constructed, rather than given, fluid rather than
rigid, and capable of considerable expansion." SusAN X. DAY, THEORY AND DESIrN INCOUNSELING AND
PSYCHOTHERAPY 433 (2004). As the state passes to higher stages, it could be seen as helping the
individual move up Maslow's hierarchy of needs from biological survival and necessity to higher
needs. Id. at 163, 434 (referring to self-actualization as the "ongoing actualization of potentials,
capacities and talents").
89. T.R. REID, THE UNrrED STATES OF EUROPE: THE NEW SUPERPOWER AND THE END OF AMERICAN

SUPREMACY 1-3 (2004). The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EU, guarantees free
movement of citizens within the EU.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id. at 2-3.
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regions."9 2 In contrast, there is little genuine solidarity between the peoples of
NAFTA, precisely because of the huge economic and social disparities, particularly between Americans and Canadians on the one hand, and Mexicans on the
other.
Interdisciplinary research in migration and demographic studies suggest a
similar blueprint for dealing with regional integration between countries with
big disparities in living standards. For instance, as concluded in a major study
by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population Problems:
States should invest in basic infrastructure to increase the feasibility, profitability, and productivity of private investments by migrants and nonmigrants
alike. Poor infrastructure-roads, airports, railroads, electrical power, telecommunications, irrigation, and education-make the returns to local investment
take the step of tying their
too low and uncertain for migrant households9 to
3
life savings up with local production activities.
Likewise, the EU's public infrastructure investment creates a climate that
draws in private investment, raises living standards, and creates the social and
political foundation for opening borders. Over the present six-year period, the
amounts of such public capital transfers within the EU will exceed 1 trillion
euros 94 in size and scale, an ongoing Marshall Plan.9 5 For the period between
2000 and 2006, EU regional aid was 257 billion euros, about 37% of the EU
budget; of this, about 44 billion euros was in pre-accession aid and for new EU
members. 96 These investments, targeted to Europe's poorer regions, have financed infrastructure, job creation, local development projects, retraining of
displaced workers, rural development and aid to farmers.97
The impact in countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland has been

92. European Commission, The European StructuralFunds: A Solidarity Policy (2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/tlas/factsheets/pdf/facteu25_en.pdf.
93. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JOAQUIN ARANGo, GRAEME HUGO, ALl KouAoucI, ADELA PELLEGRINO & J.
EDWARD TAYLOR, WORLD IN MOTION:

MILLENNIUM 291 (1998)

UNDERSTANDING

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE

(also warning against an over-reliance on labor export as a strategy for

economic development).
94. George Parker, Regional aid disputefuels EU budget fight, FIN. TuAS (London), Feb. 25, 2005,

at 3 (reporting the EU regional aid budget for 2007-2013 as 1.025 trillion euros ($1.353 trillion at 2005
exchange rates), or 1.26% of the EU's gross domestic product during that period).
95. EU development assistance to non-EU countries, when combined with the foreign aid programs
of EU member states, is now larger in size than U.S. foreign assistance programs. REID, supra note 89,
at 1.
96. European Commission, Working for the Regions, http://ec.europa.eu/commi/regional-policy/intro/
working4_en.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
97. EU regional policy includes three objectives: to promote development of regions whose development is lagging behind, such as remote regions; to support the economic and social conversion of areas
experiencing structural difficulties; and to support the adaptation and modernization of education,
training and employment systems. European Union, Summaries of Legislation, Provisions and Instruments of Regional Policy, http://europa.eu/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/g24203.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2007).
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enormous, making a crucial difference in raising the living standards of new
members. For instance, Ireland's economy fared quite badly in the late 1980s,
with slow economic growth, large trade deficits, low private sector investment,
an unemployment rate that was the second highest in the EU, and a significant
outflow of Irish citizens seeking work elsewhere.98 But during the 1990s Ireland
received more than 10 billion euros in EU regional aid, in addition to several
billion in loans from the European Investment Bank. 99 EU regional aid and
public infrastructure investment now makes up some 5% of Ireland's gross
domestic. product ("GDP"), an enormous stimulus that has reversed the migration outflows.' ° Today, Ireland's population has risen to a modem high, thanks
largely to immigrants from other European nations. ° '
One way to look at the EU regional aid program is as fiscal compensation to
members for the dislocations arising from trade liberalization and a unified
monetary policy and interest rate. The fiscal remedy builds a floor on living
standards, thereby undermining the economic incentives for people to migrate
in search of opportunity. Likewise, in the United States there have been a
patchwork of programs-from New Deal public works projects, Tennessee
Valley Authority and rural electrification, to interstate highway spending-that
thereby lowering incentives
have assisted the development of poorer regions,
02
'
States.
United
the
within
migrate
to
for people
The history of Ireland's economic success is also consistent with theories of
"economic takeoff" that stress the precondition of massive public investment to
build "social overhead capital," such as utility networks, transportation infrastructure, even public housing. In The Stages of Economic Growth: A NonCommunist Manifesto, published in 1961, the economic historian Walter W.
stage, without which
Rostow considered such public investment as a necessary
10 3
other economic policies would be doomed to failure.

98. European Commission, Ireland-The Impact of the Structural Funds, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
regional-policy/country/overmap/irl/ifslen.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. "About 400,000 people now in Ireland are foreign-born, nearly double the figure from the last
census in 2002." Ireland:PopulationRises to Modem High of 4.2 Million, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at
All (reporting a population increase of 8.1% in just four years, the highest rate in Europe); see also
Lauren Tara Lacapra, A growing number of U.S. workers are heading to lucrative jobs in Ireland,
ORANGE Co. REG., Nov. 20, 2006, available at http:/www.ocregister.com/ocregister/money/smallbusiness/
article_1358097.php (reporting estimate that "5,000 U.S. citizens will apply for Irish work permits this

year, about three times the number of Irish who will have applied to live in the U.S.").
102. Such federal spending may explain why there have not been more mass migrations within the
United States. Cf.Kevin Johnson, supra note 42, at 11 (arguing that free movement within the United
States has generally not led to mass migration).
103. RosTow, supra note 12, at 17-19, 24-26 (1961). According to economic historian Michael
Bernstein, in the field of development economics and growth theory, "there is perhaps no better
example of the resonances between that field and the Cold War concerns of the American government"
than Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth. MICHAEL A. BEaRSTEIN, AMERICAN ECONOMICS AND THE
AMERiCAN ECONOMY IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY: DOCRI'NAL LEGACIES AND CONTEMPORARY POLICY PROBLEMS 372 n.17 (Michael A. Bernstein & David E. Adler eds., 1994). While some would argue the
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Rostow's work was extremely influential for a time,' ° but it bumped up
against the orthodox economic view, as expressed by Albert 0. Hirschman in
The Strategy of Economic Development, that public investment in social overhead capital, while important, was probably "overadvertised" and "overdone
since alternative and possibly more desirable uses of public funds are simply
not within the horizons of the planners."' ' Hirschman's argument was conclusory, not empirical, based more on assumptions that the fallibility of planners
exceeded the benefits of overinvestment in social infrastructure.
Rostow's central lessons seem all but forgotten today, namely the critical
by6
importance of public investment in social infrastructure, even if financed 10
grants."
or
loans
soft
assistance,
technical
of
form
"international aid in the
Even Hirschman, however, accepted that foreign capital might play an important role in the early stages of development in the transfer of entrepreneurial and
managerial abilities and other technical skills. 10 7 But a more constrained view
of foreign aid and public investment lives on in the market model's agenda for
rule of law reforms while accepting without question a macroeconomic environment of fiscal austerity and public sector budget cuts for countries trying to
develop.'8
The Rostow view on public infrastructure investment, while largely ignored
by the NAFTA framework, has been the dominant theoretical perspective and
policy response in the EU.' 0 9 Since the 1950s, regional development assistance

ahistorical deficiency of Rostow's analysis-that conditions for takeoff are never the same in two
places and at two times-historical and cultural approaches to modeling development in capitalist
economies often suffer a different deficiency, namely that of assuming away any role for the public
sector in making capital investment decisions. See David P. Levine, "The Theory of the Growth of the
Capitalist Economy," 24 EcON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 47, 50 (1975) (accepting restrictive assumptions of private capital ownership and direction, while conceding such assumptions are not innocent).
104. Turgeon, supra note 60, at 139.
105. ALBERT 0. HiRscuMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 86 (1958). Hirschman can be
seen as anticipating the "Law and Economics" argument that privatization is the appropriate response to
declining levels of public investment and the allocation of public goods. HENRY N. BuTLER, EcONOuC
ANALYSt; FOR LAWYERS

367 (1998) (asserting the superiority of private allocation of public goods). In

the real world, however, privatization has time and again failed to provide sufficient levels of public
goods. It certainly was not a very effective allocation mechanism for airport security on the morning of
September 11, 2001. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Airport Security Companies Talk of Lawsuits if U.S.
Takes Over Their Duties, N.Y. TMm, Oct. 25, 2001, at B9. Privatization is an equally implausible
solution for the provision of public infrastructure in depressed regions.
106. RosTow, supra note 12, at 142.
107. HIRscHmAN, supra note 105, at 38-39.
108. See generally WORLD BANK, INrnATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFoRM (2000). Likewise, some
critics of foreign assistance, such as William Easterly, overlook the significance of huge disparities in
aid levels between the high levels of the Marshall Plan period and today's relatively low levels, which
are magnitudes lower as percentages of both GDP and budgets of donor and recipient countries alike.
Easterly also ignores that much of what he calls aid has not been in the form of grants, but loans at
significant rates of interest and often with IMF-imposed austerity conditions. WiLLIAM EASTERLY, THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWrH 31-34 (2001); WnLuAm EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN 24-26 (2006).
109. See, e.g., DAVID PINDER, REGIONAL ECONONc DEVELOPMENT AND PoLIcy: THEORY AND PRACrICE IN
Ta EUROPEAN CommNIUrY (1983). William Vickrey, a former Nobel Laureate in Economics, shared the
view that more government spending was needed, including long-term investment in public infrastruc-
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has been channeled to poorer regions, with a large proportion initially going to
poorer regions in Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Spain."o In
addition to targeting new members, the EU has been giving significant regional
aid and humanitarian assistance to non-EU countries in Eastern Europe and
North Africa, sources of often unwanted illegal immigration to the EU, including from several nations in line to join the EU. 1 '
The creation of the European Social Fund in 1960 and the European Regional
Development Fund in 1975, both in anticipation of further enlargement of the
European Community (as it was then called), can be seen as reflecting a proper
sequencing of reform: first, adjustment assistance and public2 infrastructure
development; later, the opening of borders for labor migration."
The final step in the EU sequence is the Open Border for the movement of
people, as guaranteed under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome.1 3 To give
substance to this right of free movement, EU institutions have provided for the4
portability of certain social benefits and the freedom to provide services."
There have been numerous regulations and directives promulgated by the
Council of Ministers and EU Commission, and as interpreted by the European
Court of Justice, to make many benefits "exportable," therefore paid by an EU
member state even if the beneficiary resides in another EU state. The extension
of this European social model to new members has required further attention to
sequencing, with the adoption of transitional arrangements prior to the full
portability of benefits for citizens of new member states. 115 While these regula-

ture. LINDA MCQUAIG, THE CULT OF IMPOTENCE: SELLING THE MYTH OF POWERLESSNESS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 61 (1998).
110. Id. at 80, 110; see also KLAus-DrETER BORCHARDT, EuRoPEAN UNIFICATION: THE ORIGINS AND
GROWTH OF THE EuROPEAN CotmuITrrY 51 (1986).
111. See European Commission, Key Figures on ECHO Humanitarian Assistance, httpi/ec.europa.eu/
echo/statistics/echoen.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Europe Cares, Interconnecting Africa: The
EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, http://www.europe-cares.org/africa/docs/infrastructure-partnership-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
112. EUROPEAN COMMIlSSION, STEPS TO EUROPEAN UNrrY: Commrurrv PROGRESS TO DATE 20, 51 (5th ed.
1985).
113. Treaty of Rome, art. 48, Mar. 25, 1997, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, available at http://www.bmdf.co.uk/
rometreaty.pdf (providing for the free movement of workers within the EU and that such freedom "shall
entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment").
114. See Antonio Segura Serrano, Improvements in Cross-BorderAccess to Health Care within the
European Union, 43 HARv. Ir'L L.J 553 (2002) (analyzing various decisions of the European Court of
Justice enhancing the ability of EU citizens to move freely and benefit from deeper health integration
within the EU by providing for the portability of health benefits, reimbursement of health care
expenses, and freedom to provide services across EU internal borders).
115. The European Court of Justice has ruled that unemployed workers must meet conditions of
residence before receiving jobless benefits. EurActiv.com, Unemployed workers' mobility is conditional, July 19, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/unemployed-workers-mobility-conditional/
article-156852 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). But a wide range of social security and health care benefits
are exportable. Communicationfrom the Commissionfor Free Movement of Workers, COM (2002) 694
final (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2002_0694en01.
pdf.

20071

CLOSING THE BORDER AND OPENING THE DOOR

tions and court decisions are naturally of interest to legal scholars, it should be
kept in mind that they are relevant only at the final stage of EU integration, after
regional development has helped to raise living standards for citizens of new
EU member states.
The EU's development program has not always been well sequenced. One of
the more conspicuous recent examples of the EU getting the sequence of reform
wrong was the May 2004 entry of Poland to the EU. While some regional aid
had already arrived in Poland, the lion's share of aid was not planned to arrive
until 2007. In the intervening two-and-a-half year period, it is estimated that
800,000 Poles emigrated, resulting in such a severe labor shortage within
Poland that the government has reportedly been concerned that it "may not be
able to spend the money that is due to begin arriving in January from the
16
European Union for projects like improving roads and the water supply.""1
This sequencing of reform appears to be backwards: opening the border to labor
migration before sending massive amounts of foreign aid across the border to
invest in infrastructure.
One area in which the EU did get its reform sequence right was in waiting to
liberalize trade and investment until after the Marshall Plan had helped European countries rebuild their infrastructure: massive public investment preceded
the opening of their economies to free trade and private investment. In was not
until the end of the 1950s, after the Marshall Plan ended, that West European
nations moved towards freer trade and allowed their currencies to become
convertible on foreign exchange markets.' 7 Yet, today the IMF prematurely
pushes currency convertibility on developing countries that still have enormous
unmet social infrastructure needs. 1' 8 For nearly fifteen years following the end
of World War II, Western European democracies were able to expand their own
fiscal policies to invest in infrastructure and social overhead capital without
undue worry of capital flight and collapsing currencies or excessive inflows of
With regard to transitional arrangements prior to the full portability of benefits for citizens of new
member states, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EQuAL OPPORTUNrrIES DG,
THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS FROM THE NEW MEMBER STATES
FOLLOWING ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON 1 MAY 2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
employment social/freemovement/docs/transition.en.pdf.

116. Judy Dempsey, Polish Labor Is Scarce as Workers Go West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 1, at
16.
117. When Western European countries returned to "nearly general convertibility at the end of the
1950s, and accepted the corresponding Article (Article VIII) of the [International Monetary] Fund's
Articles of Agreement, this meant convertibility on current account only." HAROLD JAMES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETrON WOODS 589 (1996). West Europeans waited to accept
currency convertibility while Britain sought to obtain an IMF commitment to allow deficit countries to
impose discriminatory measures against chronic surplus countries. Id. at 108. Such use of the Article
VH "scarce currency clause" would also put pressure on stronger economies to recycle their surpluses
to weaker economies in the form of increased foreign aid and regional development assistance. Canova,
supra note 15, at 1636-43 (discussing history of U.S. as post-war surplus powerhouse accepting the
burdens of adjustment by giving Marshall Plan aid to deficit countries).
118. Canova, supra note 15, at 1610-11 (discussing how IMF hostility to current account restrictions
is built into Articles IV and VIII of its Articles of Agreement).
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illegal immigrant workers. As a result, the European social model of universal
health care, education, housing, and income supports preceded EU open borders.' 9 The proper sequencing of border reform provided the nation-state
with
20
the time and space to meet the rather pressing needs of its populations. 1
In contrast, Mexico has put the cart before the horse by liberalizing trade,
capital, and current accounts prior to any significant investment in its public
infrastructure needs.1 2 1 In 1994, when the peso was collapsing, a more accurate
aphorism would have been that Mexico had let the horse out of the barn. 2 2
Portfolio capital-hot money-fled the country, leaving behind only an empty
barn and a deficient infrastructure. This is perhaps the most serious mistake in
Mexico's development strategy that continues to be overlooked, in large part
because it is also the sequencing pattern that is promoted by the WashingtonWall Street Consensus and the Bretton Woods sister institutions, the IMF and
123
World Bank.
Since this sequencing deficiency is ignored, it is easy for commentators and
public officials to argue that Mexico "never really liberalized its economy ...to
the extent necessary for a modern society," that it needs more market-based
policies, and "the benefits of reform have been less than expected."' 24 Certainly,
in some areas it is true that Mexico has not significantly liberalized. It protects
certain strategic industries (as does the United States and many other countries)
and the rule of law is lacking in many areas. But Mexico did liberalize its
capital and currency markets more quickly perhaps than is either necessary or
wise for a developing economy.
The case against the EU regional development program is perhaps most
elegantly expressed by Daniel Cohen in Globalizationand Its Enemies where he
points out that public investment in transportation systems tends to draw people
and jobs to core urban areas and away from smaller villages that often disap-

119. JUDT, supra note 35, at 328-30 (arguing that "the role of the state [throughout Western Europe]
was crucial in financing large scale changes that would have been beyond the reach of individual
initiative or private investment," including public investment in infrastructure, industrial plants, and
comprehensive public welfare services and benefits).
120. Addis, supra note 9, at 12-13 (referring to the strong nation-state model as a "thick" state, in
contrast to today's "thin" states); see also ERic FoNER, WHO OWNS HISTORY? RETHINKING THE PAST IN A
CHANGING WORLD 100 (2002) ("American history clearly demonstrates the critical role of a powerful
national government in democratizing civil society ....).
121. For instance, NAFTA Article 1109 required that Mexico liberalize its capital accounts by
removing all restrictions on the inflow and outflow of capital. Canova, supra note 15, at 1587. NAFTA
Article 1410 could also be used to permit Mexico to impose prudential restrictions on capital flows, and
perhaps also on current transactions. Id. at 1626.
122. Id. at 1585, 1596 (providing empirical indicators of Mexico's 1994-1995 currency panic and
subsequent economic and social crisis).
123. See STIGLIrZ, supra note 7. Now more than sixty years old, the sister institutions of the IMF
and World Bank are beginning to show their years, unable to remember the more disciplined and
regulated environment that they were created to help administer.
124. See Luis Rubio & Jeffrey Davidow, Mexico's Disputed Election, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2006,
availableat http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901 faessay85507/luis-rubio-jeffrey-davidow/mexico-sdisputed-election.htm.
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pear.1 25 The migration away from poor regions only exacerbates the existing
regional inequalities. In Europe, he claims, "in spite of a general reduction in
inequalities between countries, regional inequalities stopped decreasing 20
years ago."' 1 26 But even accepting Cohen's empirical claims, the outcome he
describes would not necessarily be such a bad tradeoff for a country like
Mexico: a general reduction in inequality between Mexico and its northern
neighbors, even if the poorest regions within Mexico lag behind its more
prosperous regions.
Moreover, perhaps Cohen's observation of growing regional inequalities is
not even inevitable. Cohen's warning, when combined with Poland's dilemma,
suggests that the quality and kind of public investment are as important as the
sequencing of liberalization. Perhaps initially, public investment in health,
education, and housing construction would create the conditions for local
economic takeoff and sustainable growth if undertaken before heavy investment
in transportation systems connecting periphery regions to urban centers, and of
course before the opening of borders to labor migration.
The sequencing of reform is also related to problems that economists will
recognize as "the burdens of adjustment" and "the transfer problem." The
United States was in a good position to give Marshall Plan aid precisely because
the United States was amassing large trade and current account surpluses.
European allies were in great need. The winter and spring of 1947 became "the
hinge on which was suspended the fate of the continent.' 127 The United States
recycled its surpluses by transferring credits to European allies with large trade
deficits, not yet able to export, and in great need of imports of food, energy and
natural resources.' 28 The United States, as the surplus power in the world,
accepted much of the burden of adjustment for its European allies.
After the Marshall Plan ended and the crisis had passed, the international
monetary system's bias became increasingly felt by deficit countries.1 29 Instead
of transferring persistent and chronic surpluses through grants and foreign
assistance, the surpluses would be recycled by the private financial markets in
the form of loans at high interest rates.1 30 The burdens of adjustment would fall
exclusively on deficit countries in the form of fiscal austerity and declining
living standards. Slow growth would temper the deficit country's appetite for
imports.
It is in this context that the structuralist/statist response to the market model

125. DANIEL CoHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITs ENEMmS 67-69 (2006).

126. Id. at 70.
127. JUDT, supra note 35, at 86.
128. Id. at 86-91.
129. See JAMs, supra note 117, at 131-33, 279-82.
130. This was a return to the failed post-World War I approach when the United States "gave only
loans, not grants; and these were nearly always supplied through the private capital market. As a result
they carried a price tag and were usually short-term. When they were called in at the outset of the
Depression, the effect was disastrous." Id. at 98.
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must be seen. Their "import substitution" strategy was an attempt to adjust
without accepting the conditions of IMF austerity. But when -the United States
turned decisively to a strict monetarist experiment in 1979, interest rates
skyrocketed and the "terms of trade" plummeted for deficit countries.' This
was the equivalent of 1947 for many struggling debtor nations unable to meet
the basic needs of a great many of their people. But the surplus countries of the
world did not step up and accept their share of adjustment burdens.' 32 By now
"adjustment" was no longer seen as an opportunity for massive U.S. Treasury
spending on foreign aid, with the attendant dangers of rising taxes and rising
inflation, but as a strictly financial problem through the IIMF and central banks
countries to reduce public spending and take new
which would require deficit
1 33
loans at high interest rates.
In October 1982, the Federal Reserve came up with a political strategy to
forestall deficit countries from banding together to push for comprehensive
reform and for a more rational and equitable distribution of the adjustment
burdens. The Fed's plan, to focus mainly on four debtor nations, was a classic
divide and conquer approach. Mexico was one of the four. 134 Adjustment was
painful, Mexico's social and economic crisis deepened, and the illegal imnigration stream rose. A decade later, no sooner was Mexico thrown the lifeline
called NAFTA than its peso collapsed, and another IMF adjustment was imposed. Mexican society has not yet recovered.
IV.

REFORMING THE BURDENS AT THE BORDER

A. Mexico's Ongoing Adjustment Crisis
In considering the wider application of this EU historiography, numerous
studies confirm Mexico's dire need for investment in physical and social

infrastructure, from health care and education to sewage facilities and everything in between. Could a NAFTA-wide regional development program mobilize and steer resources to Mexico's border and interior regions, and to countries
south of Mexico? If development assistance was set at levels comparable to the
EU program, that would translate into more than $37 billion a year for Mexico

131. LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 32-34 (1996).
132. While the United States was no longer a surplus country in its global trade accounts (and, in
fact, was just assuming the mantle of largest deficit country in the world), its vast wealth and the
dollar's favored position as the world's dominant reserve currency, continues to give the United States
the resource capability of providing significant levels of public capital and development assistance to
less developed countries like Mexico.
133. Sa'EN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: How UNELECTED CENTRAL BANKmRs ARE GOVERIo
a CHANGED WORLD ECONOMY 223 (1995).
134. Id.
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(5% of the country's $741 billion GDP). 135 Although Mexico is now the second
largest trading partner of the United States and the main source of illegal
immigration into the United States, the entire U.S. 36foreign aid program for
Mexico is only about $30 million (not billion) a year. 1
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the federal government's primary foreign assistance .agency, claims "an authentic partnership
exists between the United States and Mexico.' 137 But it is certainly not the kind
of partnership that EU members enjoy. 1 38 While the EU regional aid policy
provides many billions in infrastructure investment, the online list of USAID
achievements begins and ends with the
training of 10,000 Mexican potters to
39
remove lead from pottery production. 1
The $30 million in U.S. foreign aid to Mexico, particularly in the context of
budgetary austerity imposed on Mexico by U.S. and multilateral financial
institutions, is woefully inadequate to put a dent in Mexico's unmet infrastructure needs. 140 According to a report by Merrill Lynch, public spending in
Mexico on infrastructure, including electricity generation, roads, railways, and
water plants, was a third lower in 2004 than a decade earlier.14 ' The report
concluded that the public sector is not spending enough on transport, electricity
and water-not in Mexico and not in the
rest of Latin America-and that
142
private investment has failed to fill the gap.

135. The World Factbook, Mexico, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mx.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2007) (reporting Mexico's GDP as $741 billion at official exchange rates and as $1.13
trillion at purchasing power parity).
136. Mexico, USAID Budget, U.S. Agency for International Development, available at http:/I
www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/mx.htm.
137. Id.
138. See PASTOR AND CASTAREDA, supra note 32, at 115.

139. Id. USAID refers to other donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World
Bank, and the North American Development Bank, all of which make loans at interest, and often with
structural adjustment conditions, such as fiscal cutbacks and privatization requirements. Id. at 128, 151,
219, 223.
140. When assistance for counterterrorism and counternarcotics is factored in, the aid levels rise, but
remain at modest levels. David Jackson, Bush plan cuts Latin America aid; House members say 'wrong
message' sent at crucial time, USA TODAY, March 9, 2007, at 9A (reporting that U.S. aid to Mexico,
including development, law enforcement and military assistance, will fall from $67 million to $45
million this year). There are certainly good reasons to be concerned with the modes of aid, i.e., bilateral
vs. multilateral, tied aid vs. untied aid, direct public support vs. partnership with private industry. See,
e.g., Amy McFarlane, In the Business of Development: Development Policy in the First Two Years of
the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 521 (2003). But while the modes of aid are important,
so too are the levels of assistance.
141. Belo Horizonte, Slow! Government obstacles ahead; Infrastructure in Latin America, THE
ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006, at 41. The Merrill Lynch report concluded that 40% of Mexico's roads are
pre-modern, and that throughout Latin America total spending on infrastructure has averaged less than
2% of GDP.
142. Id. Mexico depends on oil revenue to fund nearly 40% of its public spending. With production
declines in its biggest oil fields, Mexico will now experience an even bigger squeeze on essential public
services and infrastructure, such as schools, police, roads and healthcare. Pemex, the state-owned oil
conglomerate will either have to spend more on expansion and oil exploration, or open itself to private
investment and foreign partners. Either way, the amount of oil revenues available for public infrastruc-
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The plight of Mexico's crumbling and inadequate physical infrastructure has
become apparent at countless locations along the U.S.-Mexico border. For
instance, an hour south of Tucson, the U.S. side of Nogales is now dealing with
the raw sewage runoff from the Mexico side of Nogales-a flow of more than
14 million gallons of raw sewage that has contaminated the aquifer, water
collector system, groundwater and surface water on both sides of the border,
including a cross-border tributary to the Santa Cruz River. 143 While Nogales,
Arizona prepares to begin a $62 million upgrade of its treatment plant, Nogales,
Mexico remains without the resources to build modern plumbing, so their drains
and toilets will continue to pollute across the border.' 44
The shortfalls in public investment in Mexico and throughout Latin America
translate into desperate people fleeing north across the U.S.-Mexico border, and
for many who remain south of the border, opportunities are limited, and life is
rather nasty and brutish. 145 Regional development programs would put unemployed people and resources to work; the lack of such development dooms
many to very harsh social conditions, including poverty, violence, and despair. 146 For more than twelve years, the Mexican border city of Judrez has been
plagued by hundreds of brutal and horrific crimes against young women and
girls, including kidnapping, rape, mutilation, and murder. 147 Most cases go
unsolved, even uninvestigated, and despite numerous arrests, the killings go on.
Amnesty International reported that as of
2006, over 400 bodies have been
48
recovered, and hundreds are still missing. 1
According to The Daughters of Judrez, an authoritative study of these serial
killings, there has been considerable speculation that the killer or killers are
American citizens. Additional theories include illegal trafficking in human
organs, ritualistic satanic sacrifices, copycat killers, and conspiracies between
the powerful Judrez drug cartel and corrupt Mexican officials. 14 9 While these
are just theories, what is known is that most of these young women are
ture is likely to shrink. Maria Dickerson, Production decline worsens at Mexico's biggest oil field;
Output could be halved in five years, crimping a major source of funding for public services, L.A.
Tals, Feb. 8, 2007, at Cl (quoting David Shields, author of two books on Pemex, that this "very
serious situation for Mexico's public finances ... underlies the need to wean the nation off oil
revenue").
143. Shaun McKinnon, Nogales grapples with murky issue: Mexico's sewage, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb.
25, 2007, atAl,A1O.
144. Id.
145. E.g., Ginger Thompson, Shuttling Between Nations, Latino Gangs Confound the Law, N.Y.
TimS, Sept. 26, 2004, § 1, at 1 (reporting estimate of 70,000 to 100,000 gang members across Central
America and Mexico, accounting for rising levels of violence and overcrowded prisons, and driving
crime in cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, and the suburbs around Washington, D.C., as well as
Durham, N.C., Omaha, Neb., and Nassau County, N.Y.).
146. Elvia R. Arriola, Voices for the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the Maquiladoras,Latina
CriticalLegal Theory, and Genderat the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 729 (2000).
147. See TERESA RODRIGUEZ, DIANA MONTANE & LISA PULITZER, THE DAUGHTERS OF JUi.REz: A TRUE

STORY OF SERIAL MURDER SOUTH OF TiE BORDER (2007).

148. See id.
149. Id.
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maquiladora workers who have disappeared on their way to or from work.' 5 0
Unfortunately, Ju6.rez is so lacking in public services-not just effective law
enforcement, but also any kind of reliable roads and public transit-that women
work in the darkness of the early morning or in
must walk for miles to and from
5
the evening after long shifts.' 1
Sadly, the almost complete lack of investment in the basic infrastructure of
Jud.rez is among the factors that contribute to its lawlessness and culture of
impunity, and thereby breeds ever more crime and corruption. 152 The market
model helps to undermine the rule of law at its most base level of indignity and
violence. Yet it fails to consider the connections between the strangulation of
the public sector and the collapse of public safety. The Washington Consensus
is, after all, the construct of an economics orthodoxy that justifies and celebrates
the decline of the public sector based on abstract mathematical models and
biased assumptions that more privatization is always the solution, no matter the
problem. 153
Somewhat more perplexing is the deference of many liberal legal scholars to
a free market model that is often less about freedom than about domination and
or in the words of
control,' 54 a model based on the economics of abstractions,
155
Joseph Stiglitz, the "triumph of ideology over science."'
The lack of investment in social overhead capital is not limited to Mexico and
Latin America. Basic social infrastructure needs also go unmet in the less
developed regions of the Arab and Muslim world, from Asia to Africa and the
Middle East. In Pakistan, where privatization meets "faith-based initiative,"
IMF-imposed austerity creates a vacuum that has often been filled by Saudifunded madrassas, the private religious training schools that often preach jihad

150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, The PoliticalEconomy of Violence: Toward an Understanding of the Gender-BasedMurders of Cuidad Juarez, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 795, 808-09,
815-23 (2005) (recognizing the harsh labor conditions of maquiladora workers, the privatization of
infrastructtire, and cut-backs in public spending as factors contributing to the murders around Judrez, its
culture of violence, and state impunity); John A. Hall, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in
Contemporary Cambodia, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 119, 124-25 (2000) (recognizing the problem of
government impunity contributing to continuing human rights violations).
153. See discussion infra Part V.
154. Perhaps this deference within the legal academy to mainstream economic dogma simply
suggests a view of scholarly inquiry that remains largely limited to the discourse of judicial reasoning.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
155. The worldview of orthodox economics, with its extreme levels of abstraction and disregard of
social contexts and interactions, has been compared to the developmental disability of autism. POSTAurisnc ECONOMics NETWORK, http://www.paecon.net (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). Joseph Stiglitz,
Comment, There is no invisible hand, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 20, 2002, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,863426,00.html; see also Milton Friedman, Conversation
with Milton Friedman, in CONVERSATIONS wrrH LEADING EcONOMISTS: INTERPRETING MODERN MACROECONOMICS 122-44 (Brian Snowden & Howard R. Vane eds., 1999) ("Economics has become increasingly
an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with real economics problems.").
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against the West. 156 In Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, Iran has become the
major donor of aid for schools, health clinics, and militias operated by Hezbollah and Hamas, 157 and even in American-occupied Iraq, Iran and its proxies
have reportedly provided significant aid to Shiite populations and militias.1 5 8 It
is also difficult to imagine peaceful outcomes in any of these hot spots while
neighboring regions remain underdeveloped .and places of poverty and despair. 159
Yet the Washington-Wall Street agenda remains focused on attracting private
investment, both domestic and foreign, while squeezing the public sector with
budget austerity and cutbacks.1 6° For instance, Luis Rubio and Jeffrey Davidow
argue that Mexico's principal goal should be "to put the economy into a high
growth orbit and to make the leap from the pack of struggling second-tier
economies into the developed world."1 6 1 Their choice of words is instructive:
by neglecting public investment in infrastructure and social overhead capital
Mexico will surely remain stuck on the
(the Rostow pre-conditions to take-off),
62
tarmac and never get into orbit.1

156. See TARIQ ALi, THE CLASH OF FuNDAMENrALISMs: CRUSADES, JMADS AND MODERNITY (2002)

(describing the pathologies and symbiotic relationship between market fundamentalism pushed by the
IMF and World Bank, and Islamic religious fundamentalism); Timothy A. Canova, IMF Has No
Recovery Road Map, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 13, 2003, at B3 (arguing that lIvF-imposed fiscal austerity
and privatization creates strategic opportunities for Islamic fundamentalists); Nadeem Malik, In the
name of Allah, AsiA TIms, July 27, 2005, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsia/
GG27DfO2.html (reporting that local elites continue to oppose mass education to prevent greater
pressures for democratization). The World Bank continues to downplay the inadequate levels of public
investment in Pakistan. Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Tristan Zajonc, Religious
School Enrollment in Pakistan (World Bank Working Paper No. 3521, 2005), available at http://www.
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/defaultWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/02/28/000112742_20050228152509/
Rendered/PDF/wps3521.pdf (concluding that only one percent of Pakistanis are enrolled in the madrassas, and
that therefore concerns about the decline in Pakistan's education system are exaggerated).
157. Michael Young, Hezbollah's Other War, N.Y. TMEs MAG., Aug. 13, 2006, at 34, 37 (describing
Hezbollah's virtual monopoly in the provision of basic services and patronage jobs); Robert F. Worth &
Hassan M. Fattah, Relief Agencies Find Hezbollah Hard to Avoid, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2006, at Al;
Geoff D. Porter, Cold, Hard Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A31 (warning of Iranian support of
Hamas).
158. Michael R. Gordon & Dexter Filkins, Hezbollah Helps Iraq Shiite Army, U.S. Official Says,
N.Y. T~s, Nov. 28, 2006, at Al.
159. Michael Slackman, Out of Desert Poverty, a Caldron of Rage in the Sinai, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2006, § 1, at 4 (reporting that men from poverty-stricken El Arish, with its crumbling public housing
and infrastructure in the Egyptian Sinai, have carried out suicide bombings against Israeli and
multinational peacekeeping targets).
160. Rubio & Davidow, supra note 124 (calling for cut backs in worker protections while seeking
largely private foreign and domestic investment).
161. Id.
162. Likewise, the Bush administration's Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative
proposed only $140 million for technical assistance to all Latin American countries combined, enough
to co-opt some local elites, but nothing on the scale needed to lift the stagnant living standards for most
Latin Americans. Timothy A. Canova, Free-marketpolicies must help Latin America, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 17, 2003, at 23A (contrasting meager U.S. foreign aid with the $19 billion annual cost of U.S.
agricultural subsidies); Timothy A. Canova, Fix NAFTA Before Stretching It Hemisphere-Wide, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 18, 2003, at A5 (reporting Canada's contribution at only $24 million).
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Within the NAFTA project some experts grudgingly recognize that regional
assistance is a necessary component to economic integration, but the lack of
resources committed to regional development is telling. The North American
Development Bank (NAD Bank) was created under the auspices of NAFTA
(although not legally part of NAFTA) with a mandate to help fund Mexico's
adjustment and infrastructure needs with market-based loans.1 6 3 In its twelve
years, NAD Bank has provided little more than $1 billion in loans and grants (or
about $100 million a year) to support implementation of infrastructure projects
on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.' 64 This relatively small lending effort
has resulted in NAD Bank's critics referring to it as the NADA Bank-"nada"
means "nothing" in Spanish.165 They note that NAD Bank lending is at market
rates of interest that are often not affordable to many Mexican communities, and
the bank has refused to broaden its mandate by funding general infrastructure
projects.' 66

According to economist Sidney Weintraub, the best way to deal with Mexico's emigration pressures would be for the United States to provide substantial

development aid to Mexico, with the condition that Mexico increase collections
from its own taxpayers, which at twelve percent of its gross domestic product is
among the lowest in the hemisphere and substantially less than in the United
States. 167 A political reason exists for this condition as well, according to
Weintraub: U.S. taxpayers would be more likely to support a development aid
program for Mexico if they knew that wealthy Mexicans were being made to
1 68
pay their share as well.
Robert Pastor, former director of Latin American Affairs at the U.S. National
Security Council, has proposed a regional development program for NAFFA

163. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 76-77 (reporting that Mexico and the United States each contributed
$225 million of paid-in capital, giving the NAD Bank a total lending capacity of $2 billion); see also
David A. Gantz, The North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission: A New Approach to Pollution Abatement Along the United States-Mexico Border, 27 LAW
& POL. INT'L Bus. 1027 (1996).
164. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 76-77.
165.. See Jorge G. Castaneda, Dividends at the Border; saving an infrastructure development bank
could pay offfor the U.S. and Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at B 13 (Castaneda is a former foreign
minister of Mexico and a professor of politics and Latin American studies at New York University). The
NAD Bank was anticipated by early proposals for a Latin American Development Corporation to
facilitate investment in infrastructure and new industries as part of an economic integration plan for
Latin America. SIDNEY DELL, A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET? 195-96 (1966) (tracing the early
proposal to Dr. Radl Prebisch, the Argentine structuralist economist who helped form the basis of
economic dependency theory).
166. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 77-78; Press Release, North American Development Bank, North
American Development Bank highlights proposals to modernize water and wastewater management in
border cities during the 4th World Water Forum (Mar. 20, 2005), available at http://www.nadbank.org/
Reports/Press Releases/english/2006/032006.htm.
167. Sidney Weintraub, Development aid can ease illegal immigration, FIN. TtMES (London), Apr.
18, 2005, at 15 (reporting that federal tax revenue in Mexico is less than 12 percent of its gross
domestic product, "one of the lowest ratios in Latin America and substantially less than in the U.S.").
168. Id.
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modeled after the EU assistance plan: "When the European Union first decided
on a regional policy, its funds were scarce, but with each enlargement, the
Union expanded the resources for poor regions to the point at which the sheer
magnitude of investment helped lift some and gave a sense of community to
all"169

Pastor could have added that such a regional policy, if successful, would
lower incentives for Mexicans to emigrate from their country. Migration theory
and empirical studies suggest that dislocations in source countries like Mexico
often cause surges in migration flows. These harsh economic and social conditions are often referred to as the "push" factors that drive people away from
their places of origin. 170 In Shifting Involvement: Private Interest and Public
Action, Albert 0. Hirschman also posited a "rebound" effect from being pushed
away that "makes for an exaggeration of the benefits and an underestimate of
the costs [of emigrating]. ' t 1
According to Pastor, the level of EU resources is significant from the
perspective of the donors and recipients alike: about 0.045% of EU donors'
GDP, and 2.0 to 4.0% of recipient GDP. 17 2 Pastor translated these sums into a
large regional assistance program for the border and interior areas of Mexico:
2.0 to 4.0% of Mexico's GDP would be about $10-20 billion a year.' 73 Since the
time of Pastor's estimates, with the uneven development of Mexico's economy
and its unmet infrastructure needs, perhaps a program comparable to the EU
could be as high as $50 billion a year. The Marshall Plan, which consumed
about 0.5% of U.S. GDP in the years 1948-1951, would cost about $201 billion
(in 2005 dollars).174 If continued over four years, the time span of the Marshall
Plan, a program of such size and scale and duration could permanently transform Mexico, help the country achieve economic takeoff and sustainable growth,
and prepare the way for a truly Open Border. Yet, commentators and policymakers prefer to dismiss the possibility of such rapid change. 175
169. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 136.
170. See GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 5, at 171 (discussing the longer-term flows that arise from
changes in social and economic policy in source countries, such as "cuts in once-generous farm
subsidies by the Mexican government in the 1980s and the introduction of NAFTA in 1994" that added
about 750,000 subsistence farmers to the flow of undocumented Mexican migrants to the United States
by 1996 alone); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security, and the Environment: The
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 419 (2004)
(critique of institutionalized double-standards that undermine food security and ecological sustainability by permitting protectionism in developed countries while requiring developing countries to open

their markets to highly subsidized foreign competition).
171. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS:

PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 80-81
(1982).
172. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 136. As the European Commission reports, regional assistance has
made up as much as 5.0% of recipient GDP in relatively newer and less developed member states like
Ireland. European Commission, Ireland-The Impact of the Structural Funds, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
regional-policy/country/overmap/irl/ifsl_en.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
173. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 136.
174. JUDT, supra note 35, at 91.
175. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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The Weintraub and Pastor proposals are not all that different from proposals
that were put forward by the labor movement at the time of the debates about
NAFI'A. According to Noam Chomsky, those labor proposals were modeled on
EU expansion and designed to lead to high-wage, high-benefit, high growth
economies. 176 The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an independent
research bureau of Congress, provided a similar proposal for an alternative
blueprint for NAFTA. Unfortunately, all of these proposals were ignored by
Republican and Democratic administrations, as well as the mainstream media. 177 A more progressive NAFTA is opposed by large corporate interests, the
public remains skeptical of any grand foreign assistance programs, and academthe corporate flow since they
ics and professionals are willing to go along with
78
are largely protected from foreign competition. 1
The resistance of many Americans to large foreign aid programs no doubt
stems in part from distrust of corruption within Mexico. Such concerns were
certainly also valid during the Marshall Plan as Western Europe was trying to
emerge from years of war, occupation, and deceit. In Postwar: A History of
Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt concluded: "To live normally in [Nazi] occupied
Europe meant breaking the law," including the laws of the occupiers, "but also
conventional laws and norms as well."' 179 Black markets, illegal barter, and theft
"w[ere] so widespread that in the eyes of many people [they] ceased to be ...
crimes."' 8 ° The end of Nazi occupation did not put a quick end to the cultures
of corruption. For instance, to mention but one example, patronage and corruption were particularly rife in postwar-Italy, one of the largest recipients of
Marshall Plan aid. 18 1
While economists often note the stifling impact of corruption on growth, we
should also recognize that economic development, employment, and educational opportunities can also undermine incentives to engage in corruption. The
relative stability and moral recovery throughout West Europe during the Marshall Plan period, in just four years, suggests that regional development may be
the most effective and efficient way to undermine corruption in Mexico.
To complicate reform prospects further, there is also the expected resistance
176. Posting of Noam Chomsky to ZNet Blog, Immigrant Civil Rights Movement, http:ll
blog.zmag.org/node/2551 (Apr. 11, 2004 6:29 EST).
177. Id. (reporting that OTA was abolished soon after its failed proposal); see also NoAM CHOMSKY,
WORLD ORDERS OLD AND NEw (1996). See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S.-MExico TRADE: PULLING TOGETHER OR PULLING APART? (1992), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/ota/diskl/1992/9241/9241.PDF.
178. DEAN BAKER, THE CONSERVATVE NANNY STATE: How TE WEALTHY USE THE GOVERNMENT TO
STAY RICH AND GET RICHER (2006), available at http://www.conservativenannystate.org/cnswebbook.
pdf (including doctors, lawyers and CEOs among the pampered groups that are protected from foreign
competition). Of course, Baker could have easily included professors in law and other disciplines as
well.
179. JuDT, supra note 35, at 37.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 258-60. While the United Kingdom and France got the largest sums in absolute amounts,
"the relative impact on Italy and the smaller recipients was probably greater still." Id. at 91.
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south of the border. Successive Mexican governments have traditionally been
hostile to direct U.S. assistance, and rejected both the Alliance for Progress and
the Peace Corps. This obstacle is no doubt related to left-wing and nationalist
182
perspectives that view all foreign aid as imperialistic in design and effect.
Perhaps these challenges are also a function of the self-interest of Mexico's
bureaucratic elite,183 among the most highly paid in the world, to administer the
austerity of the free-market model rather than the populism of a fullemployment mobilization model. Mexico's new president, Felipe Calder6n, for
instance, when promising infrastructure investment programs for Mexico's one
hundred poorest communities, seemed to offer no new sources of financing,
only offsetting budget cuts elsewhere in Mexico.1 8 4 And Calder6n, ever a free
market disciple, has not asked the United States or Canada to help provide the
resources he would need to keep good on his promise.
Mexico's rejection of U.S. foreign aid is a seeming litmus test for any
Mexican president, however counterproductive and irrational. It is an unfortunate legacy of the history of U.S.-Mexico relations, and Mexican sensitivity to
American dominance. Portfirio Diaz, the early 20th century free-market Mexican president who conceded foreign domination over Mexican industry before
being chased from office, may have expressed the futility of this view 1when
he
85
said, "Poor Mexico, so close to the United States and so far from God."'
But perversely, while fearing undue U.S. influence on its internal policies,
successive Mexican governments have accepted loans from U.S. and multilateral financial institutions which have come with significant conditions that have
certainly hampered and limited the country's development choices. 1 86 Mexico
seems to get the worst of all worlds: American domination of its economy
through the "cross-conditionalities" of U.S. and multilateral financial institutions, but without very much in outright grants and foreign assistance.' 87 It is a

182. See TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 25-26, 97-98 (1971) (finding the "trap" in Kennedy
administration foreign aid and Alliance for Progress programs; even though tied to land reform and
wider distributions of income in recipient countries, it was also tied to growing U.S. export markets and
protecting the interest of U.S. private concerns).
183. loan Grillo, Mexican president announcesplan to help 100 poorest towns, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Dec. 6, 2006, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/20061206-1257mexicocalderon.html.
184. Id. (reporting Calderon's plan to draw money from other federal agencies for investment in the
"100 towns and villages where residents live in deep poverty, often lacking roads and drinking water
and suffering from malnutrition and disease").
185. JOHN Ross, THE ANNExATION OF MEXIco: FROM THE AzTEcS To THE I.M.E, at 52 (1998); see also
Rubio & Davidow, supra note 124 (describing Mexico's complex and often contradictory attitude
toward the United States, including "its fears of a loss of sovereignty").
186. PASTOR, supra note 53, at 142, 151, 219, 223, 236 (recounting loan conditionalities and
limitations imposed by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Inter-American Development

Bank).
187. Michael Manley, Jamaica's former Prime Minister, was particularly critical of the "crossconditionality" by which various international financial institutions incorporate IMF conditions into
their loan agreements with developing countries. Manley described such cross-conditionality as being
held in place by two ropes tied around one's neck. See LiFE AND DEBT (Tuff Gong Pictures 2001); see
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strange combination, reminiscent of Lynn Turgeon's dictum that "the only thing
worse than being exploited is not being exploited"-with the variation that the
only thing worse than being exploited by trade, private investment, and high
interest loans is not being exploited with foreign assistance.188 Mexico has
apparently been too proud to negotiate hard and demand the same benefits that
new EU member states bargain for when joining in free-trade with more
productive and powerful neighbors. The new EU members receive literally tens
of billions of euros of free transfers of foreign capital, technology, goods, and
public services from their wealthier trading partners. In contrast, Mexico receives barely $30 million in such transfers from the colossus to their north.
Clearly there is something quite dysfunctional in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Behavioral psychology tells us that the failure to maintain proper interpersonal boundaries is often related to disparities and shifts in power relations
between people, particularly between family members, colleagues and neighbors.1 89 Therapeutic theories and practice counsel such people to disengage for
a time and refrain from interaction to work instead on their own personal
growth. In this way, each person can find the space and time to gain greater
awareness and strength; likewise, for nations of people. The historical lessons
and knowledge of the proper sequencing of reform suggest that Mexico should
welcome the buffer of a border wall if it means a wall of investment in public
infrastructure in the poorest regions in Mexico. Such a Marshall Plan model of
regional development would transform a Closed Border and infuse it with new
hope and meaning by empowering NAFTA neighbors to create the conditions
for lowering barriers and opening the border in the future.
B. The Stimulus of Giving
While Pastor was pessimistic that U.S. public opinion and Congress would
not support a large foreign aid program for Mexico, he was writing before the
September llth attacks altered the political landscape, heightened anxieties
about security at the border, and pushed the Closed Border paradigm to the
forefront of policy debates. As Congress considers militarized Closed Border
proposals, perhaps a Marshall Plan will become a more compelling alternative
to secure the border by providing social and economic security at the sources of

also MICHAEL MANLEY,JAMAICA: STRUGGLE IN THE PERIPHERY (1982); Holger Henke, Jamaica'sDecision

to Pursue a NeoliberalStrategy: Realignments in the State-Business-Class Triangle, LATIN AM. PERSP.,
Sept. 1999, at 7, 27.
188. Jim Merritt, Ten Things I Learnedfrom Lynn Turgeon, in LYNN TURGEON: 1921-1999, REMEMBERING AN EXTRAoRDINARY MAN, A GENEROUS SPIRIT AND A GLOBAL CITIZEN (M. Melkonian ed., 1999).
Perhaps there is also some relationship between Turgeon's dictum and Turgeon's Law which holds "that
strong currencies produce weak economies and weak currencies produce strong economies ... in
advanced capitalist economies." TURGEON, supra note 131, at 95, 107. Turgeon's Law should not be

held to apply to economies with weak currencies in underdeveloped countries.
189. DAY, supra note 88, at 373.
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illegal immigration. 1 90
In a 2006 Memorial Day weekend commencement address at the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, President Bush invoked the alliances and
institutions built by President Harry Truman as "the foundations for America's
victory in the Cold War."'19 ' It is easy to sing the praises of the so-called
Greatest Generation-the generation that won World War II in less than four
years and then laid the foundation for post-war strength and prosperity. But it is
also important to recognize the actual institutions and massive size of financial
commitments that made all that possible. Under the Marshall Plan, from 1947 to
1951, the United States gave (as grants, not loans) about $13 billion for
reconstruction of Germany, Japan, and other war-torn countries-more than all
previous U.S. foreign aid combined. 19 2 Marshall Plan spending made up about
13% of the total U.S. budget in 1948, which would translate into well more than
$377 billion in federal spending in the upcoming fiscal year. 193 The impact was
by nearly 40% in Marshall Plan
immediate, as economic growth increased
194
years.
four
only
in
countries
recipient
According to Judt, throughout the spring of 1947, prior to announcement of
the Marshall Plan proposal, a broken and corrupt Europe was everywhere beset
by a "sense of hopelessness and impending disaster."' 195 Europe lay physically
and spiritually devastated, with many countries lacking a strong tradition in
democracy and with commercial market relations distorted and compromised by
mass corruption, one party rule, and occupations. But change came quickly. The
speed of West Europe's postwar recovery provides a corrective to the myth that
recovery and political stability is "of slow, coral-like growth." According to a
number of leading historians, including Judt, nothing is farther from the truth.
As J.H. Plumb concluded: "Political stability, when it comes, often happens to a
society quite quickly, as suddenly as water becomes ice." 196 That just such a
sudden and dramatic change occurred in West Europe in the first half of the
190. At least one U.S. Presidential candidate has publicly endorsed a new Marshall Plan of foreign
assistance in education, health care, and development in Africa and other poor regions. Nicholas D.
Kristof, Obama: Man of the World, N.Y. TIMEs, March 6, 2007, at A21 (quoting Senator Barack
Obama's endorsement that the "Marshall Plan was part of a security strategy; it wasn't simple charity").
191. Elisabeth Bumiller, At West Point, Bush Draws Parallels With Truman, N.Y. Tlm s, May 28,
2006, at 26.
192. JurDT, supra note 35, at 91.
193. Curt Tamoff, The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments and Relevance to the Present, in
THE MARSHALL PLAN FROM THOSE WHO MADE IT SUCCEED 349, 379 (1999); Paul Davidson, Reforming
the World's Money, 15 J. POST-KEYNEsIAN Eco. 153, 156 (1993); see also, Economic Report of the

President and Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, Feb. 2007, p. 323, Table B-78
(reporting 2008 federal budget estimate of $2.9 trillion), available at: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/
2007_erp.pdf.
194. JOHN BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865, at
720 (1977).
195. JuDT, supra note 35, at 89.
196. See id. at 241 (quoting J.H. PLuMB, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL SmAurry INEARLY EIGrTEENI CENTURY ENGLAND 1675-1725, at xvii (1967)); see also Hmsc AN, supra note 171 (suggesting
historical cycles between private consumption and public-spirited activity grounded in social context
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1950s was a direct result of the Marshall Plan combined with the large public
97
spending of strong and protected nation-states. 1
There is every reason to believe that a large regional development program
for Mexico would achieve big gains for the Mexican population precisely
because the country is starting at such a low level, with enormous social gaps
and high levels of poverty.1 9 8 Yet, on both sides of the border there is an
unfortunate complacency that looks upon Mexico's development as a long-term
project that could take decades. For instance, Jeffrey Davidow, a former U.S.
ambassador to Mexico, has characterized a dozen years of incremental gains as
a "considerable dent" in poverty alleviation,199even though as he concedes, the
poverty rate "still hovers around 50 percent.
While at the time of this writing, many Americans would probably oppose a
large NAFTA-centered foreign assistance program as a big "give-away" of tax
dollars, that would ignore the lessons of economic history and the so-called
grants economy. 2°° According to Kenneth Boulding and Martin Pfaff and
numerous histories of reparations and foreign assistance, the giving of foreign
aid is often structured as a transfer of real resources (goods and services) from
the donor to the receiving country. 20 1 As Turgeon understood, the Marshall Plan
"underwrote a unilateral flow of over $13 billion worth of United States goods
to all Western countries. 2 °2 Countries receiving American aid necessarily spent
much of those funds employing U.S. companies and workers to produce the
machines and equipment needed for reconstruction projects in Europe. Turgeon
concluded that the Marshall Plan was thereby "employment-creating" in charac-

and social contagion); RIcHARD FARSON, MANAGEMENT OF THE ABsuRD (1997) (explaining the paradox
that big changes are easier to make than small ones).
197. See JUDT, supra note 35, at 325.
198. Likewise, since Italy was starting at such a lower level, its gains under the Marshall Plan were
relatively greater than France and Britain. Id. at 91.
199. Although there has been little improvement in Mexican living standards during the past twenty
years, Rubio and Davidow counsel patience for "the path that Mexico started down 20 years ago," and
they dismiss the possibility that U.S.-Mexico relations could be reversed over the next six years. Rubio
& Davidow, supra note 124 (praising the "professional, high-quality programs to address poverty" of
the administrations of Ernesto Zedillo and Vincente Fox between 1994 and 2006). High quality
programs, perhaps; unfortunately, just not high quantity. American post-war planners did not accept
such long time horizons for rebuilding Western Europe after World War II. It helped to motivate
American policymakers that there was a Soviet threat just to the east. See, e.g., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN
STUDiEs, N.Y. UNIV., THE MARSHALL PLAN: FIFrY YEARS AFTER (Martin A. Schain ed., 2001); MicHAEL
HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAN AND THE REcONSTRUcTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 19411952 (1987).
200. While Rubio and Davidow propose a major fund for infrastructure development
modeled after
the European Union's regional assistance program, they find it "doubtful that the political mood in the
United States would support that or that Mexico could develop the right mechanisms to make the best
use of the additional resources." Rubio & Davidow, supra note 124. They also propose "a massive
infusion of funds to improve Mexico's educational system," but offer no guidance on where those funds
would come from. Id.
201. KENNETH E. BOULDING & MARTIN PFAFF, THE GRANTS ECONOMICS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1972).
202. Lynn Turgeon, The Political Economy of Reparations,NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE, Winter 1973, at
120.
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ter, i.e., creating employment within the United States.2" 3
Judt has characterized France's initial position on German reparations in a
similar way: the reparations were to include "obligatory labour services in
France for German workers" and the transfer of agricultural produce, timber,
coal, and machinery to France, a flow of goods and services not unlike the
giving of foreign aid.2 ° " What was different about this postwar settlement,
however, was that in the end it was the victors of the war that were paying
reparations to the vanquished. 20 5 A year-and-a-half after the war ended, the
20 6
British were paying $80 million a year in occupation costs in Germany.
Similar aid transfers from the United States were not limited strictly to occupation costs, but grew along with the Cold War effort. For instance, by 1950, the
United States was employing 13,000 people and spending $129 million on the
U.S. Information Agency alone for cultural exchange and information programs
mostly in Western Europe. 207 These "aid" flows employed thousands, and U.S.
military aid, payment for occupation forces in Europe, and Marshall Plan
transfers kept many more Americans employed both at home and abroad.20 8
Precisely because of its employment-creating aspects, there is an inherent
danger that foreign aid will displace workers in recipient countries. This was the
so-called "transfer problem" which, according to Turgeon, contributed to the
periodic breakdown in economic activity after World War I as France, Britain,
and the United States were not always able or willing to "accept" reparations by
absorbing and importing additional goods and services from Germany.20 9 After
World War II, this problem was avoided by supplying much of the aid in the
form of goods and machinery that war-torn recipient countries were not yet able
to produce themselves.2 10 Much aid was also spent on simply putting Europeans
back to work.2 t '
The Marshall Plan was big government at its best, a massive U.S. fiscal
stimulus to reconstruct societies by employing U.S. and foreign workers alike.
There should be no doubt that a massive U.S. foreign aid program for regional
development along the border would stimulate the American economy. The

203. Id.
204. JUDT, supra note 35, at 114.
205. Id. at 123.
206. Id. While the British spent $80 million in 1946 on occupation costs in Germany, they received
$29 million in reparations from Germany. The British taxpayer had to make up the difference, which
was imposed through bread rationing. Id.
207. Id. at 223.
208. Tony Judt reports that aid to Italy was initially devoted to "urgently needed imports of coal and
grain, together with help for struggling industries like textiles. But thereafter 90 percent of Italian
counterpart funds went directly to investment: in engineering, energy, agriculture and transportation
networks." Id. at 95.
209. Turgeon, supra note 202, at 113-16 (quoting Jacob Viner from his 1943 ForeignAffairs article,
German Reparations Once More: "Many countries now believe that receipt of reparations in the form
of an increased flow of goods and services is not in their economic interest").
210. JuDT, supra note 35.
211. See generally id.
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major economic and financial problems raised by such a huge fiscal expenditure
relate more to the ability of the federal government to maintain price stability
and the value of the dollar as the economy booms. But those are challenges that
beg for other creative solutions, programs of regulatory coordination
that use
2 12
market incentives and mechanisms to deter speculative activity.
C. Planningthe Border: From Martial Wall to MarshallWall
In mid-2006, as part of his proposal on immigration reform and border
control, President Bush invited military contractors to design a "virtual" fence
to seal gaps in the border with high technology motion sensors, drones, and
satellites.21 3 The virtual wall, unlike the Marshall Plan and the EU Regional
Assistance Program, would not be labor-intensive and would certainly neglect
the infrastructure and development needs of the border region. The virtual plan
therefore ignores the social and economic realities in Mexico, which fuel illegal
immigration northward. As discussed above, for such real problems, regional
development and job creation are needed on a mass scale on both sides of the
border, in recipient and donor countries alike, to ensure the widest political
support for such an expensive program, and for the manpower needed to
reconceptualize and build a border region that actually attracts people to stay.
Also in mid-2006, when more than a dozen leading architects and urban
planners were asked how they would design a U.S.-Mexico border fence,
several of their proposals suggested using such a fence as an opportunity for
regional development and to create a door for neighboring people. For instance,
Calvin Tsao proposed an enterprise zone that would re-create the border as a
series of developing cities. He noted that "as development along the border
matures, the need to cross the border diminishes. 2 14 Imagine a wall of investment, a public space that attracts people from all sides of NAFTA borders for its
opportunities for learning and productive employment.
Enrique Norten, a Mexican-born architect, proposed building great highways
and other infrastructure, and invoked the success of the EU border approach,
although without mentioning its Regional Assistance Program by name.2 15
Environmentalists may question the social utility of building highways, but
certainly in the towns and cities along the border, there is great need for paved
roads, new hospitals, sewage treatment, and water systems. One could imagine
a range of other infrastructure investments that would build community, contribute to Mexico's regional development, enhance security at the border and
address other pressing regional and global problems.
A Marshall Plan along the border could create research centers in some thirty
212. See infra notes 334-341 and accompanying text.
213. William J. Hamilton, A Fence With More Beauty, Fewer Barbs, N.Y TIMEs, June 18, 2006, § 4,
at 14.
214. Id.
215. See id. ("Look at Europe, where this is happening. Spain was a border country 10 years ago.
Now it's part of a greater community.").
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border towns-mini-Manhattan Projects-to develop alternative energy sources
and more fuel efficient cars and transportation systems. The Manhattan Project
was the multi-billion dollar research effort that was funded and coordinated by
the federal government, and developed the first atomic bomb by bringing
together people from industry, government, and research universities at the Los
Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico. 1 6 As a number of leading scholars and
commentators have recognized, the Manhattan Project is a compelling metaphor
and model for present-day proposals to address a wide range of environmental
and technological problems, including "some of the gravest challenges facing
humanity.' ' 21 7 Vladimir I. Keilis-Borok and Michael D. Intriligator have proposed establishing fifty Manhattan Projects "to mobilize science and technology
to address the many threats we face as a nation and a world," including
initiatives for energy independence, to prepare for and address pandemics and
natural disasters, 2 8 from water shortages and tsunamis to climate change and
global warming, and to2 19better understand and deal with threats to public safety
and economic security.
In the past two years, NAFTA countries have moved in the direction of
enhanced cooperation on some of these issues through the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America, an initiative that seeks harmonization
of some standards, further liberalization of trade, and the sharing of information. 2 20 But the SPP is clearly dominated by corporate influence and a market
model agenda, largely excludes the public from its deliberations, and provides
nothing in the way of actual funding to support regional development or even
joint research efforts.

To achieve the greatest benefit for Mexico's regional development, priority

216. WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, THE OxFoRD ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO WORLD WAR nI, at 24-25 (2002).
217. See, e.g., Vladimir I. Keilis-Borok & Michael D. Intriligator, Fifty Manhattan Projects (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (manuscript at 3); Thomas L. Friedman, A Million
ManhattanProjects, N.Y. TMEs, May 24, 2006, at A27.
218. See Michael T. Osterholm, Preparingfor the Next Pandemic, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at
24-37; Stephen Fidler, Launch-padfor reconstruction,FIN. TnMEs, Dec. 7, 1998, at 4 (reporting stalled
efforts of Central American countries to rebuild after the devastation of Hurricane Mitch).
219. Keilis-Borok & Intriligator, supra note 217; see also M. Alfimov, R. Corell, V. Courtillot, V.
Fortov, M. Intriligator & V. Keilis-Borok, Basic Science for the Survival of Humanity in the Third
World War, KOMMERSANT DAILY, Nov. 29, 1997 (published in Russian). The authors of this proposal
included the Chairman of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, the Assistant Director of the U.S.
National Science Foundation for Geosciences, the Director of the Institute of the Physics of the Earth in
Paris, and a former Russian Minister for Science and Technologies, as well as two UCLA professors,
Vladimir I. Keilis-Borok, Professor in Residence at the Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics
and the Department of Earth and Space Studies, and Michael D. Intriligator, Professor Emeritus of
Economics, Political Science and Public Policy. Among their proposed "superprojects" are initiatives
dealing with food security, prevention of disease and malnutrition, global cooperation in responding to
major natural disasters, economic development in poor regions, developing novel forms of transportation, recovering mineral and other resources of the continental shelf, and new approaches to air, land,
and sea traffic control.
220. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, SPP Fact Sheet, http://www.spp.gov/
factsheet.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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should be given to creating new universities, research centers and community
colleges in long-neglected maquiladora and border towns, as well as selected
regions in Mexico's interior. These could become centers for research in
regional development and integration, alternative fuel development, 221 foreign
language training, and civil engineering to increase the capacity of NAFTA
countries to provide foreign assistance around the world, help others respond to
natural disasters, rebuild public infrastructure, and thereby meet the preconditions
for economic take-off and environmentally sustainable develop222
ment.
In this way, a Marshall Plan for the Closed Border would provide a model for
dealing with Mexico's own porous southern border and the development needs
of Latin American and Caribbean countries.22 3 It could employ resources and
create new centers of learning in depressed areas along the U.S.-Canadian
border and in the interior regions of NAFTA countries.2 24 Multitudes of people
could be drawn to the vitality of these borderlands, thereby reversing the flow of
people desperate to transcend the borders that limit their lives.22 5
Along the U.S.-Mexico border, between the thirty magnet border towns, lie
vast stretches of Sonoran and Chihuahuan desert, areas that would be suitable
for construction of a different kind of border wall of public investment. James
Comer has suggested a border fence of monumental proportions to include solar
energy-collecting panels as the foundation of a productive and sustainable
221. In his 2008 budget, President Bush proposes that the Department of Energy spend $2.7 billion
to develop cleaner electricity, $179 million for biofuels development, and $395 million for research into
recycling spent nuclear fuel. These are rather modest amounts for a $13 trillion a year economy and
$2.9 trillion budget at a time when the United States is confronted with serious environmental and
foreign policy challenges related to its dependence on imported oil and carbon-based fuels. David R.
Baker, Big Oil cautious about clean-energy spending, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2007, at CI
(contrasting the record profits for big oil companies with their relatively modest investments in biofuel
and alternative energy research; in 2006, BP earned $22 billion and spent $15.5 billion buying back its
own stock, "almost twice what it may spend on renewable power and alternative fuels in a decade").
222. RosTow, supra note 12, at 6-7.
223. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 1, 12.
224. Cf Fitch Lowers Michigan's $1.6B GOs to "AA- ", Bus. WmIE, Jan. 26, 2007 (reporting lowered
ratings on $1.6 billion of Michigan's general obligation bonds and $2.4 billion of State Building
Authority bonds, reflecting the state's accelerating economic decline and deteriorating financial condition); Charlie Cain & Mark Hornbeck, Will new state panel push for tax increase?, DETRorr NEWS, Jan.
11, 2007, at IA (reporting proposals to reduce Michigan's $1 billion budget deficit through tax hikes
and spending cuts); Louis Aguilar, New home building plummets, DErTorT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, at IA
(reporting nearly fifty percent drop in construction of new homes and larger housing downturn in
region); Dina ElBoghdady, "Housing Crisis Knocks Loudly in Michigan," WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007,
at Al, A6 (reporting record foreclosures and job losses, "Michigan has lost 305,000 jobs since 2001,"
perhaps 40% in the automotive industry; about 65,000 people moved out of Michigan from July 2005
to July 2006, according to the U.S. Census Bureau; in late 2006, housing prices were falling in
Michigan, the only state in the country; and Michigan's per capita income is below the national average
(7% below the average) for the first time since the Great Depression).
225. The Marshall Plan facilitated such scientific and cultural exchange between the United States
and European allies by paying for many tens of thousands of Europeans to visit and study in the United
States, sometimes for short periods. See JUDT, supra note 35, at 350-51 (reporting Marshall Plan
financing of visits by Europeans, including students and trade unionists).
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environmental zone that would attract industry and create jobs in cargo terminals and automated assembly plants.2 26
Corner's proposal could be further developed to include the construction of
thousands of energy-generating windmills, along with innovations in windmill
technology to minimize the potential hardship to birds and other wildlife. Such
a fiscal stimulus would create economies of scale and allow NAFTA to become
a world leader in the mass production of alternative energy technologies,
227
industries that are already dominated by Japanese and Chinese companies.
The grand scale of Corner's vision is reminiscent of the mobilization model of
World War II when the public sector mobilized its enormous purchasing power
and investment capabilities to alter America's consumption patterns.228 The
mobilization of resources to the border would provide a historic opportunity to
re-shape consumption patterns from environmentally destructive practices by
building the cleaner energy technologies and industries of the future. As MIT
economist Lester Thurow has argued, if the U.S. economy is to succeed in the
future, capitalism will have to shift "from a consumption ideology to a builder's
ideology," from a mass consumption economy to "a constructive economy [in
which] all human beings can participate in the act of creating lasting worth. 2 2 9
A wall along the U.S.-Mexico border would also pose a challenge to the
movement of indigenous peoples and the wildlife they regard as kin. For
instance, the 700 mile double-layer fencing that Congress approved in late 2006
would span from Calexico, California to Douglas, Arizona, and would cut
across the Tohono O'odham Nation southwest of Tucson. 230 This is an unforgiving stretch of desert. Since the Border Patrol tightened enforcement in California and Texas, more illegal immigrants are being apprehended or die trying to
cross the border in and around Tohono O'odham country than any other part of
Arizona.2 3 1
Tribal members have been concerned about the symbolism of a solid wall
226. Comer referred to his proposal as a partnership between 20th century territorial power and 21st
century green, global inter-connectedness: "a kind of Bush meets Gore hybrid." Hamilton, supra note
213.
227. Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed, China's Sunshine Boys, N.Y. TMmEs, Dec. 6, 2006, at A29 (reporting
that the top four solar manufacturers are companies in Japan and China).
228. HAROLD G. VAT=ER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR H (1985). Victor Davis Hanson has
warned of the national security threats stemming from America's energy consumption patterns. Victor
Davis Hanson, Blood and Oil, REAL CLEAR POLmCS, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.realclearpoliticscomi/
articles/2006/1 1/blood and oil.html (arguing that the United States must expand production and "diversify our energy sources with solar, nuclear and ethanol and coal gasification").
229. LsTER Tiuiow, THE FurTURE OF CAPrIAuSM 315 (1996).
230. Randal C. Archibold, Border Fence Must Skirt Objections From Arizona Tribe, N.Y. TIaEs,
Sept. 20, 2006, at A24 (reporting concern of Tribal members about "the free range of deer, wild horses,
coyotes, jackrabbits and other animals they regard as kin"). Megan S. Austin, A Culture Divided by the
U.S. -Mexico Border: The Tohono O'odham Claim for Border Crossing Rights, 8 Az. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. (Fall 1991); Tina Faulkner & George Kourous, Native Communities of the Borderlands: An
Introduction, 7 BoRDERLuNEs (Interhemispheric Resource Center, Dec. 1999), available at http://usmex.irc-online.org/borderlines/1999b162/bl62oview.html.
231. Archibold, supra note 230.
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that impedes their movement and the movement of wildlife. Yet, tribal leaders
have been working with the National Guard and Border Patrol to enhance
enforcement, in part because of the increase in illegal immigrants breaking into
Tohono O'odham homes, stealing food, water, clothing, and other belongings,
and in part out of awareness that the federal government could always proceed
to build fencing without tribal permission. 32 In 2004, the Tohono O'odham
Legislative Council and Executive Office, with some reluctance, passed a
resolution to seek federal funding for building a vehicle barrier fence on the
western edge of the reservation. 3 3
According to Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, the Tohono O'odham tribal police
department estimates that about 1500 people cross the border on Tohono
O'odham lands each day, and that "[s]ince the militarization of the border2 in
34
1999, the number of illegal border crossers has increased exponentially."
Significant amounts of illegal drugs have been seized, thousands of vehicles
abandoned, and millions of pounds of trash left on tribal lands. 2 3 5 The Tohono
O'odham estimate that the tribe is spending more than $5 million annually on
law enforcement to patrol the border and provide health care to illegal immigrants, while U.S. assistance to enhance tribal law enforcement efforts appears
to be at a rather low level, only about $1.4 million in 2004.236
The cooperation between Tohono O'odham members and federal agents has
not been without problems. Federal agents have at times shown their ignorance
of tribal ways, such as by interfering with tribal ceremonies, entering property
uninvited and blocking members from crossing back and forth across the
border. 237 Meanwhile, an increasing number of tribal members, faced with
poverty and unemployment, have reportedly turned to smuggling migrant workers and illegal drugs across the border.23 8 The federal response has been to seek
more cooperation with tribal leaders, increase the presence of agents, formalize
a program of cultural training for its agents, and to prepare for the use of
electronic cameras and sensors to track movement across the border.2 39

232. Id.
233. Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, Contemporary and Comparative Perspectives on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 'Att Hascu 'Am 0 'I-oi? What Direction Should We Take?: The Desert People's
Approach to the Militarizationof the Border, 19 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 339, 350 (2005).
234. Id. at 348-50 (describing the militarization of the border as part of the Arizona Border Control
Initiative and Border Patrol check points on Federal Route 15 across tribal lands without consultation
with the Tohono O'odham Nation).
235. Id. at 348.
236. Id. at 348-49. However, the United States did also provide $10 million for border-security
related activities.
237. See Archibold, supra note 230 (suggesting that federal agents could easily confuse the
movement of pickup trucks from a border village to an all-night wake with a movement of illegal

aliens).
238. Id. (reporting that tribal members "had been offered $400 per person to transport illegal
*immigrants from tribal territory to Tucson, a 90-minute drive, and much more to carry drugs").
239. Id.; see also Eric Lipton, U.S. Project to Secure Borders To Begin in Arizona Desert, N.Y.
TiMEs, Sept. 22, 2006, at A14 (reporting a six year, $2 billion contract with Boeing, the giant military
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There have been repeated federal attempts to provide some accommodation
of Tohono O'odham concerns while also supporting the tribe's efforts to enforce
its borders. The Reagan administration undermined one attempt because of its
opposition to providing services to Mexican O'odham while in the United
24 °
States, even though there were barely a thousand O'odham residing in Mexico.
Other stumbling blocks have been federal insistence that O'odham cross only at
official border crossings and that O'odham carry tribal identification papers to
cross over their own land. 24 ' As Luna-Firebaugh concludes, "If this is approved,
the O'odham would
become the only people in the United States or Mexico
24 2
.required to do so."
It is important to note what is missing in the federal response: no significant
federal funding to assist the Tohono O'odham, to employ members as border
agents or wildlife conservators, or to provide assistance in building schools,
health clinics, or housing.24 3 There is far more Martial Wall than Marshall
Plan. 244 The former endangers traditional cultural practices, the freedom of
indigenous people, and the free movement of wildlife;2 45 the latter offers the
only real possibility of joining together as responsible stewards of the land. Yet
if Mexicans are wary of accepting foreign assistance from the United States, the
Tohono O'odham people may be even more so.246 The United States would
need to prove its good intentions through deeds, not by imposing harsh conditions on aid, but by providing autonomy and responsibility along with resources. During the Marshall Plan, this is how Americans overcame skepticism
among recipient countries, by leaving it to the Europeans "to take responsibility

and aerospace company, to provide radar systems, cameras, ground sensors, aerial vehicles, wireless
communications equipment and vehicle barriers, as well as traditional fences").
240. Luna-Firebaugh, supra note 233, at 351-53 (discussing various bills introduced in Congress), &
354 (estimating 1238 Tohono O'odham in Mexico). If there was universal health coverage, along with
portability of health benefits, the provision of medical services would not be an issue. This is the
approach followed by the European Union. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
241. Lun-Firebaugh, supra note 233 at 351, 347 (reporting that "border patrols have stopped and
searched tribal members and in some cases returned them to Mexico").
242. Id. at 351-52, 355.
243. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is expanding the Shadow Wolves, a federal
unit of- Indian officers operating in Tohono O'odham country from 15 members to 21. Randal C.
Archibold, In Arizona Desert,Indian Trackers v. Smugglers, N.Y. Tims, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al (reporting
"a growing appreciation among federal authorities for the American Indian art of tracking, honed over
generations by ancestors hunting animals," and a new program "for the Shadow Wolves to train border
guards in other countries, including some central to the fight against terrorism," including Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, which border Afghanistan).
244. Cf Archibold, supra note 230 (reporting one tribal member's conclusion: "We are in a police
state .... It is not a tranquil place anymore").
245. Luna-Firebaugh, supra note 233, at 346-50.
246. The Gadsden purchase, by which the United States acquired about half of Tohono O'odham
lands, left the other half of their lands in Mexico and had a "devastating" effect on the O'odham people
and culture: "Contacts between the people were severed and the political history and structure diverged
sharply. The land base of the Mexican O'odham was eroded and religious and cultural connections to
land on both sides of the border were lost to those on the other side." Id. at 347.
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for determining the level of aid and the manner of its distribution. 24 7
The most logical solution is for NAFTA countries to provide significant
development assistance to the Tohono O'odham Nation to help it improve its
law enforcement and border control capabilities, while also facilitating the
development of its social infrastructure, from education, job training and health
clinics to housing and transportation. Perhaps the use of high technology
sensors-the so-called "virtual wall"-would aid the O'odham in facilitating
the free movement of wildlife over their tribal lands and across the border.
Certainly the O'odham themselves would be in the best position to understand
what technologies and resources were needed and how best to deploy them. 248
In addition, with improved economic and social conditions in Tohono O'odham
country, tribal members would be less likely to facilitate smuggling of drugs or
illegal aliens. And with the improvement in economic and social conditions
south of the border, stemming from regional development for Mexico, the flow
of illegal immigrants could be reversed. This approach would respect the rights
of O'odham members to travel freely to religious sites on their traditional
lands,24 9 while also recognizing that it is the Tohono O'odham themselves who
are in the best position to safeguard their own borderlands.
Other architects and urban planners have proposed aesthetic and artistic
designs for parts of the wall that are more rooted in the land itself and respectful
of the sacred nature of building relationships of understanding at the border. For
example, Antoine Pedrock has conceived of a physical wall designed as a
mirage in the desert, an earthwork of rammed tilted dirt to be constructed by
low wage laborers; while Eric Owen Moss has designed miles of transparent
columns and tunnels of light that would use the long desert border, with its great

247. JUDT, supra note 35, at 93. "Marshall's proposals were a clean break with past practice. To
begin with, beyond certain framing conditions it was to be left to the Europeans to decide whether to
take American aid and how to use it, though American advisers and specialists would play a prominent
role in the administration of the funds. Secondly, the assistance was to be spread across a period of
years and was thus from the start a strategic programme of recovery and growth rather than a disaster
fund." Id. at 91. Likewise, Michael Intriligator has pointed favorably to the Marshall Plan requirement
that the recipient country review the proposals from other recipient nations to ensure "a type of due
diligence, as in corporate funding proposals, that is often lacking in foreign aid programs." Letter from
Michael Intriligator to Timothy A. Canova (April 5, 2007) (on file with author) (suggesting comparable
peer review for foreign assistance by donor nations in the same region to avoid corruption, waste, and
mismanagement, including the diversion of funds to offshore accounts of corrupt officials or being used
to fight internal wars, as in "Angola, Congo/Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, among
many others").
248. It has been said that indigenous people know all about homeland security, as they have been
"fighting terrorism since 1492." Russell Morse, Fence In The Sky-Border Wall Cuts Through Native
Land, THE NATIVE PREss, Feb. 22, 2007, available at http://www.thenativepress.com/news/fencesky.html.
249. One of those religious sites is Boboquivari, "a sacred mountain on O'odham lands north of the
U.S.-Mexico border." Luna-Firebaugh, supra note 233, at 357. I am indebted to my friend Robert Cruz,
a Tohono O'odham, for taking me on a climb to the summit of Boboquivari in the weeks following the
'September 11 th terrorist attacks.
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expanse of space and vision, as a place of cultural and artistic exchange.2 5 °
These plans are reminiscent of the New Deal public works programs that
employed millions of young men during the Great Depression.251 Perhaps such
walls could bring together the youth of the Tohono O'odham nation and young
people from around the United States, Mexico, and Canada to find meaning and
purpose in the collective action of building, maintaining, and continually reconstructing a sacred space of lasting worth.
The border project should seek to create all along the U.S.-Mexico border
sacred spaces that teach tolerance and respect, and foster mutual understanding
by bridging the barriers in language and culture. The process of cultural
interaction should be the vibrant pulse that runs through the mini-Manhattan
Projects, schools, and research centers constructed in the borderlands.25 2
It is ultimately not good fences, but good health, jobs, and schooling that
make good neighbors.25 3 Without a wall of opportunity, there is a vast divide
between the Tohono O'odham and those passing through their territory, whether
Border Guards, smugglers, or desperate migrants. Regional development *can
bridge those divides while respecting the heritage and cultural traditions of
indigenous people and protecting the free movement of wildlife.
There is no shortage of creative solutions for reforming the border region.
The only limits are those of the imagination. Along the border, millions of
ordinary people could share in the benefits and the responsibilities of building a
better future. The creation of such a Marshall Wall would be one of this
country's great challenges and among history's greatest achievements. It would
require the mobilization of massive resources-human, industrial, technological, and financial-while transforming the lives of millions of people. Such a
mobilization would hasten the day when the United States and Mexico may
share a truly Open Border, which would be a lasting testament to the spirit of
cooperation and shared security between neighbors.
D. Mobilizing Donor Capacity
The Marshall Plan was a shining moment in American history, when the
world's premier economic power recycled its surpluses to provide adjustment

250. See Hamilton, supra note 213.
251. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) employed more than 2.25 million young men in 1500
camps located in every state from 1933-1940; the Works Progress Administration (WPA) provided

work to thousands of unemployed actors, musician, writers, artists, and teachers; the Public Works
Administration (PWA) cleared slums and built housing; and rural electrification and the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) brought infrastructure investment to some of the nation's least developed
regions. See BROADUS MrrcHELL, DEPRESSION DECADE: FROM NEw ERA THROUGH NEw DEAL 1929-1941, at
222, 323-34, 339-44 (1947).
252. Montoya, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing the multifaceted nature of cultural and psychological
borders and concluding that "borderlands should be. regarded not as analytically empty transitional
zones but as sites of creative cultural production that require investigation").
253. Ignorance of the conditions of our neighbors may lead to the defeatist conclusion that only
"good fences make good neighbors." See Robert Frost, Mending Wall, supra note 84.
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assistance to countries in need. A generation of Americans mobilized for action,
first to fight and win World War II, and then to win the peace by reconstructing
war-tom Europe and Japan with a massive rebuilding program. But this history
is largely forgotten today and is too easily dismissed by the academic left as
mere corporate welfare.2 54
Others who criticize the Marshall Plan as a model for today claim that the
United States simply lacks the "infrastructure for giving" on such a large scale.
World War II expanded the industrial and export base of the U.S. economy
while training millions of Americans in the armed forces and the civilian
wartime economy with the skills that would prove so useful for Marshall Plan
giving, from training in dozens of foreign languages to civil and industrial
engineering and countless other skills. Mobilization provided the trained manpower for both warfare and production. The boom from that mobilization was
felt for the next decade and provided the U.S. government with the financial
resources to become the world's great donor of foreign assistance.
After the war, there was less a demobilization than a remobilization of human
resources. As the end of World War II approached, Congress passed the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, the so-called GI. Bill of Rights, to
assist veterans in job training and higher education, health care, employment
and business. Some 17 million veterans received federally-subsidized lowinterest loans for home mortgages,2 55 and between 1945 and 1952 alone,
veterans received
$13.5 billion for education and training, an enormous amount
256
at the time,

257
In contrast, today there is significant underemployment in the United States,
the public infrastructure is deteriorating,2 58 there is no program of universal

254. For instance, Howard Zinn is critical, in part, because one of the Marshall Plan's economic
selling points and objectives was to build up markets for American exports. HowARD ZwN, THE
TwEwmrIa CENTuRY 176 (2003).
255. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL ExuBERANCE 16 (2d ed. 2005). In passing the G.I. Bill, Congress
was determined not to repeat its past neglect of war veterans. In 1932, after denying relief to World War
I veterans, President Herbert Hoover called in the Army, under the command of General Douglas
MacArthur, to violently evict thousands of WWI veterans, the so-called "Bonus Army," from the streets
of Washington. MrrcHELL, supra note 251, at 109-10.
256. BLUM Er AL., supra note 194, at 722 (1977).
257. For instance, although there are approximately 4.4 million youths aged 16 to 24 who are neither
in school nor working, the federal Job Corps program employs only about 60,000 low-income youths
each year, and programs by the National Guard and Labor Department employ about 18,000 more. Erik
Eckholm, Job Corps PlansMakeover For a ChangedEconomy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2007, at A12.
258. See Louis Uchitelle, Disasters Waiting To Happen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 3, at 1
(reporting American Society of Civil Engineers finding that the United States must spend $1.6 trillion
over the next five years to prevent deterioration of public infrastructure, from highways and levees to
drinking water); Press Release, American Society of Civil Engineers, America's Crumbling Infrastructure Eroding Quality of Life (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/
page.cfm?id= 108; Leslie Eaton, Gulf Hits Snags In Rebuilding Public Works, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31,
2007, at AI (reporting closed and crumbling school buildings, roads, and libraries, and leaking public
water systems across southern Louisiana and Mississippi because "[local governments cannot afford to
fix them, and billions of dollars in recovery assistance promised by the federal government have only
started to trickle to the region" nineteen months after Hurricane Katrina). See also Libby Sander and
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national military or civilian service, 259 and the United States now imports far
more than it exports.2 6 ° These conditions undermine our capacity to play the
role of global donor of foreign aid. 2 6 1 That role is also hampered by the
persistent myth that foreign aid somehow transfers resources from, and reduces
the wealth of, the donor country, when in fact it should add a significant
stimulus to employment and economic growth for the donor nation.2 62
Peter Drucker concluded that the G.I. Bill of Rights and the mass participation of U.S. veterans "signaled the shift to the knowledge society," and that
future historians would "consider it the most important event of the 20th
century., 26 3 On a political level, the G.I. Bill made the Marshall Plan possible
because Americans were far less threatened by painful dislocations and adjustments following World War I. According to historian Michael Bennett, there
would not have been a Marshall Plan "if America's 16 million veterans-more
than one fourth of the civilian work force-hadn't successfully readjusted to
civilian life thanks to the GI Bill. '" 264 The G.I. Bill provided an entire generation
with social security and economic opportunity, a kind of domestic Marshall
Plan that stimulated U.S. productivity for many years to come.26 5 As a practical
matter, it also provided millions of Americans with training and skills, adding to
the country's infrastructure and capacity for giving, which were necessary for
its massive Marshall Plan and other foreign assistance programs.
Without the war and its mobilization, including the G.I. Bill, for an entire
generation of Americans the benefits of a booming economy and the social tonic
of assimilation would have been delayed, at best.2 66 Today, by contrast, newer
immigrants in the United States and throughout Western Europe, as well as
other minority groups, lack the opportunity to assimilate through universal

Susan Saulay, Bridge Failure in Minnesota Kills 7 people, N.Y. Twis, Aug. 2, 2007, at Al (reporting
collapse of major bridge in Minneapolis).
259. See Talk of the Nation: Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act Debate (National
Public Radio broadcast May 11, 2005) (reporting estimate of between 750,000 and 850,000 gang
members in the United States-more than the number of active-duty members of the U.S. Army or
Navy).
260. See, e.g., NTAIAFERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF THE Am CAniuc
EMmE (2004).
261. U.S. economic history suggests that high levels of private consumption, a truncated public
sector, and the transition from a manufacturing to a service economy-attributes of the so-called
"American way of life"-"have had a deleterious effect upon the ability of the federal government to
respond to contemporary economic decline." See Bisms.i, supra note 103, at 377, 384.
262. Turgeon, supra note 202.
263. PEraR F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPIAUST SOCIETY 3 (1993). Yet, Howard Zinn's history entitled The
Twentieth Century makes no mention at all of the G.I. Bill. What adds poignancy to this omission is the
fact that Zinn himself went to college after World War I on the G.I. Bill. HowARD ZINMN,
Tim TwEmarm
CENTURY (2003) (mentioning Zinn's education and Ph.D. from Columbia under the G.I. Bill on an
"About the Author" page).
264. BENTr, supra note 39; see also PAUL DICKSON

&

THoMAs B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN

AmERicAN Epic 276 (2004).
265. See TURGEON, supra note 131, at 6, 68.
266. Timothy A. Canova, American Wartime Values in Historical Perspective: Full-Employment
Mobilization or Business as Usual, 12 IN'L LSA J. IN'L & Comp. L. 1, 11 (2007) (discussing the
benefits of cultural assimilation from national service and the G.I. Bill).
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national service, and the education and other benefits provided by the G.I.
Bill.26 7 Opponents of the mobilization model argue that it would be costly and
wasteful to employ millions of young men and women in national service. 26 8 Of
course, they ignore the enormous cost and waste of needs unmet, infrastructure
not built, and men and women kept idle.26 9
The Marshall Plan provides a model for dealing with Mexico's development
needs through regional assistance for the border and other poor interior regions
of Mexico. The G.I. Bill provides a complementary model to create the required
infrastructure and donor capacity for such a massive regional development
effort. Together these programs are part of a larger mobilization model that
empowered the nation-state to raise and spend massive funds, direct consumption patterns, and ensure the general public welfare, not in a distant future, but
with all deliberate speed.2 70
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:
MOBILIZING AND GLOBALIZING THE BORDERS OF FINANCE

The mobilization model requires a hyperactive fiscal policy. The nation-state
must spend tremendous amounts of money on its public sector. This means
massive public investment in physical infrastructure like transportation systems,
housing, hospitals, schools, universities, factories, electricity grids, sewage
treatment and water facilities. This also means massive spending on social

267. See, e.g., PETER D. SALINs, ASSIMILATION AMERICAN STYLE (1997). Martin Luther King Jr.
recognized the positive impact that the G.I. Bill had for African-American soldiers after World War II.
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 94-95, 157,
326, 367-68 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) (praising the GI Bill for offering hope for AfricanAmericans after World War II and as centerpiece of a national development program for people of all
races). Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's proposal for a new G.I. Bill of Rights would be limited to
Americans now serving in uniform, a relatively small volunteer force compared to the mass participation of universal military service during World War H. It would therefore lack much of the widespread
social benefits and assimilation effects of the original G.I. Bill. Richard Sisk, Dems Tack a Pullout Plan
onto $100B War Bill, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), March 9, 2007, at 14 (reporting Sen. Clinton's narrow
objectives in proposing a G.I. Bill of Rights to address the scandal of inadequate treatment and facilities
for injured Iraq War veterans at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center).
268. See, e.g., Winston Groom, An Army of 50 Million?, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 11, 2006 (asking
what on earth the United States. would do with so'many millions of people conscripted into service, and
arguing that universal service would produce nothing but "a gigantic, useless mob of half-trained
malcontents").
269. Keynes noted "the imbecile idiom of the financial fashion" that dismisses public works for
mortgaging the future: "though how the construction today of great and glorious works can impoverish
the future no man can see until his mind is beset by false analogies from an irrelevant accountancy."
John Maynard Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REV. 755 (1933).
270. According to Judt, the post-World War II rehabilitation of Western Europe owed much to this
mobilization model: "There was a great faith in the ability (and not just the duty) of government to
solve large-scale problems by mobilizing and directing people and resources to collectively useful
ends." JUDT, supra note 35, at 69; see also ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING
BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER

61-67 (1965) (discussing contributions of public spending, state

planning, and regulation of the market to unprecedented postwar economic growth in advanced
industrial countries of the Western world).
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overhead capital, such as education (as in the G.I. Bill), health care, and job
training. Finally, in addition to investing in such goods for its own population,
some nation-states (those with large surpluses or great wealth) will purchase
allies, neighbors, and even former adversaries (as in the Marsuch goods 27for
1
Plan).
shall
Such spending gives the nation-state enormous influence on the pace and
direction of economic development. During World War II and the Cold War, it
was federal purchasing power that altered production and consumption patterns
to the most militarily strategic and socially useful purposes. It is not an
exaggeration to state that American social policy has depended primarily on
public spending; when the spending has been massive, such as on the G.I. Bill,
social policy and race relations have moved forward.2 72 Such public spending
and state planning, anathema to the free market model, demands and may
achieve even greater rationality and transparency than private planning.
But all of this spending is possible only if there is a sufficiently large
mobilization of public finance. While taxing and spending is a province of our
elected branches, public finance is largely formulated by unelected central
bankers. 273 In the market model, where there is woefully inadequate investment
in public infrastructure, the central bank serves as a check on the fiscal
capabilities of elected politicians. The independence or autonomy of central
banks is considered sacrosanct by the liberal economic orthodoxy, and acceptance of that principle is a litmus test of respectability in the economics
profession. Central bank autonomy, it is claimed, is the only way to ensure price
stability and maximum employment for the economy. The market model,
therefore, empowers unelected bankers to neutralize fiscal policy, and thereby
limit the capabilities of the nation-state.
It was not always this way. What is largely missing from today's economics
texts and our public discourse is any appreciation or even mention of the period
of public finance when the Federal Reserve lost its independence, from 1941 to
1951, the so-called "pegged period" of public finance, and the most impressive

271. "Post-1945 investment [in Western Europe] came above all from the US government. In 1956,
US private investment in Europe amounted to just $4.15 billion. It then began to rise sharply, taking off
in the 1960s." JuDT, supra note 35, at 351.
272. Cf MIcHAEL K. BROWN, RACE, MONEY, AND THE AMERIcAN WELFARE STATE 7 (1999) ("Questions
of fiscal capacity-the ability of policymakers to raise revenues necessary to finance new policies and
to spend-lie at the center of the political development of the American welfare state."); IRvING
BERNSTlEN, GUNS OR BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON JOHN*sON 364-65, 369-70 (1996) (arguing that

deficit concerns, along with the Federal Reserve's unwillingness to finance growing federal deficits,
undermined hopes for "guns and butter" and led to the de-funding of Great Society programs).
273. See generally SYLVIA MAXFtELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL PoLmCAL ECONOMY
OF CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTIS (1997); ELLEN FRANK, THE RAW DEAL: How MYrs AND
MISINFO CAION ABOUT DEpIcrrs, INFLATION, AND WEALTH IMPOVERISH AMERCA (2004) (concluding that
"[tihe economic origins of our current impasse lie in the extraordinary power ceded to the Federal

Reserve and other central banks in the 1980s and 1990s").
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decade of economic growth in American history.2

74

A. Toward a New Historiographyof InstitutionalPerformance
The decade from 1941 to 1951 included World War II and the two most
expensive Cold War programs, the Marshall Plan and the G.I. Bill of Rights.
The United States mobilized its physical resources as no other nation-state has
done before or since. The federal government built the greatest armies and
navies and air forces in the world. It mobilized 16 million Americans in
uniform, more than 12 million at its peak.275 It trained hundreds of thousands in
foreign languages and cryptography; it monitored a flood of enemy communications traffic.2 76 It mobilized industry and technology, invested in the Manhattan
Project, factories and other infrastructure, and social overhead capitalRostow's preconditions for economic takeoff.
The U.S. economy soared, growing in real terms by more than fifteen percent
a year for three consecutive war years. In less than five years, from 1940 to
1945 when the war ended, economic output doubled. 277 Take-off was complete 7 8
274. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONoMIcs 280-86 (3d ed.
2007) (providing Federal Reserve and monetary history that includes pre- and post-pegged period, but
nothing on the pegged period itself); STEPHEN G. CECCHETrI, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
(2005) (making no mention of the fiscal and monetary expansion of the pegged period); ExECunvE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF

ECONOMIC ADVISERS 280-84 (1996) (providing GDP statistics no earlier than 1959); PAUL A. SAMUELSON
& WILLIAM D. NRORDAus, MACROECONOMICS 191-211 (18th ed. 2005) (historical overview of Federal
Reserve and monetary policy omitting any mention of pegged period); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC

425-26 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing federal deficits no earlier than 1970). Rosen's orthodox bias
is also reflected by discussing the "crowding out hypothesis" without any mention of "crowding in."
See TURGEON, supra note 131, at 34, 48 (contrasting differences between these hypotheses). Economics
texts that discuss the pegged period are usually either from that period itself or are written by heterodox
economists. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 351-52 (1948) (discussing wartime finance);
JAMES K. GALBRAIT & WILLIAM DARrrY, JR., MACROECONOMICS 240-42 (1st ed. 1994) (heterodox text
describing pegged period).
275. Canova, supra note 266, at 7.
276. Id. at 7-9.
277. Id. at 4-5, 17. Critics of the mobilization claim the economic growth and employment of this
period was somehow illegitimate because it was directed toward war; some have bent over backwards
to actually recalculate the growth by discounting war expenditures. See Robert Higgs, Wartime
Prosperity?A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940s, J. ECON. HIST., Mar. 1, 1992. Others
argue that hidden inflation reduced the real economic growth of the period. See MILTON FRIEDMAN &
FINANCE

ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ,

A

MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1867-1960, at 557-58 (1963)

(conceding that even with such hidden inflation "it seems unlikely, however, that allowance for these
defects would reverse the qualitative conclusion that prices rose more slowly during the war than before
or after"). Perhaps Keynes's observation is the most appropriate response-that wars, like pyramid
building, have unfortunately often been the only form of large-scale spending that statesmen have
found justifiable. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
130-31,220 (1936).
278. Economic historians recognize that revivals of activity in "mature" economies can be linked
with the creation of new markets, product innovation, and extension of consumer credit. See, e.g.,
BERNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 389. Of course, the government can stimulate new markets and product
innovation through its spending programs, as it has from aerospace to the Internet. See Internet Society,
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Behind all of these public sector accomplishments was massive public spending. Federal spending did not just double or triple during the war. It rose more
than fifteen-fold, from $6 billion in 1940 to $95 billion in 1944. The total cost
of the war, about $320 billion, was twice as large as all previous federal
spending combined, going back to George Washington.27 9 Through its massive
purchasing power, the federal government directed the allocation of resources,
the patterns of production, consumption, and technological innovation.
Where did the federal government get the money to spend so freely? It did
raise taxes. The top federal income tax bracket was a marginal rate of more than
90%.280 But taxes covered only about 41% of the war costs. The rest was
borrowed by the Treasury Department.
The Treasury borrowed large sums from the public through the great Victory
and Liberty bond drives. In Clint Eastwood's movie, Flags of Our Fathers,
battle-scarred veterans from the Battle of Iwo Jima are suddenly thrust back to
the home front to help sell war bonds to stadium crowds. 28 ' The Treasury
Secretary expresses alarm that the government could run out of money if the
public were not to purchase enough war bonds. The war would grind to a crawl
after all the hard fought gains. But this was a bit of myth-making. Flags of Our
Fathers took some dramatic license. As was recognized at the time in every
finance text, economics text and monetary history, the Federal Reserve stood
ready to purchase war bonds at any price necessary to keep the rate for Treasury
borrowing at near zero.2 82
The bond drives were important-just not primarily for the reasons depicted
in the movie. The chief value of the bond sales was to suppress inflation by
soaking up consumer purchasing power in a fully employed economy. In that
way, they helped shape consumption patterns toward the war effort.28 3 However, the primary way the federal government was able to pay for World War II
was by borrowing massive amounts of money from the Federal Reserve System. 284 At near-zero interest rates for Uncle Sam, and with a 3% inflation rate
A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks, http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/cerf.shtml
(recounting role of U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and National Science
Foundation (NSF) in development of the Internet) (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
279. Canova, supra note 266, at 4.
280. Certainly, 94% was a high marginal tax rate. But there were more tax brackets and workers had
jobs. The unemployment rate fell to an unheard of 1.2% by 1944. The Great Depression was finally
over. Id. at 5; see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., How Should Congress React to Bush's Tax Proposals?,
114 TAX NoTEs 1233 n.37 (2007) (arguing that marginal income tax rates over 90% during World War H1
did not prevent real economic growth ranging from 8.1% in 1944 to 18.5% in 1942).
281. FLAps OF OUR FATHERS (Warner Brothers 2006).
282. The interest rates were pegged at 3/8 of 1% on Treasury bills and 2.5% on long-term Treasury
bonds. See BOARD OF GovERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SysTEm, THE FEDERAL RESERvE SysTEM:
PuRPosEs AND FuNCnONS (1947); see also, SAMUELSON, supra note 274, at 351-55; FRIEDMAN &
SciwARTz, supra note 277; LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING (5th ed. 1969).
283. VATrER, supra note 228, at 11. The war bond drives also helped to boost morale on the home
front.
284. Throughout World War U1,the Fed created the money to pay for Treasury bonds. Money
creation is a traditional function of central banks. Congress could create money as well, as it did during
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for the last three years of the war, it paid for the federal government to borrow
massively. 285 And the borrowing was massive. During the war, the federal
deficit was more than 30% of GDP, 286 more than ten times larger than today.
And yet Treasury borrowed at negative real interest rates.
This revolution in public finance was a central feature of the mobilization
model: it mobilized financial resources to pay for war production, and then for
postwar reconstruction and the G.I. Bill. This arrangement continued after the
war, until 1951. During that time, the federal government spent grandly on the
Marshall Plan and G.I. Bill. Throughout the entire period, the central bankers at
the Fed were forced to purchase Treasury bonds in whatever amounts and
whatever price was needed to keep the interest rate near the low wartime pegs.
The most impressive period of economic growth in American history, therefore,
coincided with a Federal Reserve System that lacked any real independence.
The nation's central bankers resembled the fabled "Maytag repairman" with
little to occupy their time and attention. Since interest rates had to be kept fixed,
the Federal Reserve could not even threaten to raise rates any time it got a whiff
of inflation.
How, then, did the federal government keep prices stable? This is a part of the
history that should give state planning a good name. Wages and prices were
controlled by the Office of Price Administration (OPA), which operated far
more transparently than today's Federal Reserve. Economists were less like
today's mathematicians and more like accountants keeping track of costs and
closing loopholes. They were accountable to the politicians who appointed
them, and the politicians would suffer at the polls if consumer prices rose too
fast. Historians have generally concluded that "the OPA was one of the war's
brilliant successes. 2 87
Perhaps state planning was easier during this period because the objective
performance criteria were compelling and obvious: the consumer price level,
interest rates on Treasury borrowing, and of course the number of tanks and
aircraft and carrier fleets produced. Through its purchasing power, rationing
credit away from luxury consumption, tax policy, bond sales, and wage and
price controls, the U.S. mobilization was more extensive and more effective
than any in the world. Likewise, after the war for a time, the government shaped
investment and consumption patterns through the Marshall Plan and G.I. Bill.
When the Federal Reserve regained its independence in the so-called TreasuryFederal Reserve Accord of 1951, the mobilization model's days were numbered.

the Civil War when it authorized the Treasury Department to spend currency into circulation. This was
the Greenback. Some $450 million, an enormous sum at the time, was issued during the war. See
generally GRETCHEN RrrrER, GOLDBUCKS

AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE

POLmCS OF FINANCE INAMERiCA, 1865-1896 (1997).
285. Canova, supra note 266.
286. Id.
287. BLUM ET AL., supra note 194, at 685 (From October 1942 to September 1945 at the war's end,
the consumer price index rose only 8.7 percent, less than three percent a year for three years).
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OPA disappeared and the Federal Reserve was back in business, raising interest
rates to contain inflationary forces and withholding support from the federal
government's financing needs. Deficit spending was suddenly costly for the
Treasury Department. There were recessions again, and real economic growth
was no longer in double-digits as in World War II.
Then in the early 1970s, Richard Nixon, who had worked as a junior attorney
in the tire-rationing division of the OPA during World War I,288 imposed price
controls so ineptly as President that the federal government has never since
intervened in the price determinations of big corporate enterprises, even when
there has been ample reason to suspect collusive price fixing and price gouging
of consumers.2 89 When Jimmy Carter was elected president, he rejected a
routine reauthorization that would have given him the power to impose wage
and price controls in an emergency; he thereby became the first president since
Franklin Roosevelt without such emergency authority. 29° By 1979, large corporations and unions were pushing prices and wages in an upward spiral. In the past,
just the threat of imposing wage and price controls-a truly big stick-was
enough to enforce some restraint on the private sector. But without such
emergency authority, Carter lacked credibility with those exercising price and
wage setting power in the markets. 29 1 His failure to contain inflation opened the
door for a more active monetary policy by the Federal Reserve.29 2 The active
Federal Reserve became a major constraint on fiscal policy, which hastened the
decline of the nation-state, a trend that continues today.
The "Law and Economics" school has criticized wage and price controls for
leading to shortages and the development of black markets to evade the
controls.2 9 3 This conclusion is based on the assumption that the U.S. economy
is characterized by free competitive markets. 2 94 This is a highly flawed assump-

288. DANmIL YEROIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS 60 (1998).

289. NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, DONALD E. CUtLLEN & DAVID LEwIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 617-25 (1980).
290. According to Alexander Cockburn, President-elect Carter rejected wage and price control
authority in a sanctimonious moment of proclaiming himself a new kind of Democrat, not unlike an
Eisenhower Republican. In December 1976, soon after Carter's election, "Democratic leaders in
Congress came to him and offered a routine reauthorization of [emergency authority to impose]
wage-price controls. Carter held a press conference in which he expressed opposition to wage-price
controls and support for the free market to take care of any inflationary problems." ALExANDER
CocKauRN, THE GOLDEN AGE IS INUs 264 (1995).
291. Id.
292. ROBERT LEKAcHMAN, GREED Is NOT ENOUGH: REAGANo Cs 122-27 (1982).
293. BUTLER, supra note 105, at 156-66 (1998) (arguing that price controls punish human nature, and
that price ceilings will result in producers reducing their output and consumers increasing their
demand). In a free competitive market, there are "empirically-verified relationships between the price
and quantity of a good. The law of demand states that there is an inverse relationship between price and
the quantity of goods that consumers are willing and able to purchase.... The law of supply states that
there is a positive relationship between price and the quantity that producers are willing and able to
supply." Id. at 31.
294. Id. at 55.
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295
tion, given the many empirical studies on the concentration of U.S. industry
and the many known cases of collusion and price fixing by large corporations.22996 But from this assumption of competitive markets, it is a small step to
conclude that "an economy driven by central planning can never match the
results of competitive economic markets. 29 7 The unprecedented U.S. economic
growth and export boom from 1941 to 1951, a period that included World War
II, the Marshall Plan, and the G.I. Bill, should be evidence enough that state
planning and coordination of private enterprise-the "mixed market"-can
produce superior results than private market planning alone.298
Any resurrection of the mobilization model to facilitate regional development
in NAFTA countries would raise concerns about price inflation, shortages and
bottlenecks in strategic industries and sectors of the economy, such as energy
and housing. The question is whether the public sector will provide coordinating mechanisms in the form of selective controls, rationing, and antitrust
enforcement, or in the form of one-blunt instrument-high interest rates for all
sectors-imposed by a largely unaccountable monetary authority.299 While the
former are often denounced as state planning, the latter is a prescription for
continuing decline in the capabilities of the nation-state.300
Unfortunately, in the absence of state planning, there are not freely competitive markets but systems of corporate planning and collusive behavior, sometimes on a vast scale. For instance, after World War II, there was a relative
decline in state planning and a steady aggrandizement of power by corporate

295. See, e.g., JOHN R. MuNKrRs, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: FROM COMPETITIVE

MARKET STRUCTURES TO CENTRALIZED PRIVATE SECTOR PLANNING (1985); THE STRUCrURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY (Walter Adams ed., 6th ed. 1982); WILLIAM N. LEONARD, BUSnESS SIZE, MARKET POWER,AND
PUBLIC Poucv (1969); JoHN KENNETH GALRAITm,AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1952).
296. See RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BUSINESS POWER AND THE ABUSE OF
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1988); see also Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalAntitrust and the Doha Dome, 43

VA. J. INT'L L. 911 (2003) (discussing need for harmonized and cooperative approaches to international
antitrust cases).
297. BtrLER,supra note 105, at 55 (emphasis in original).
298. The Law and Economics critique of controls also suffers from problems of causation. The
nature of the World War II full-employment, full-capacity boom suggests that many shortages would
have quickly resulted even in the absence of price controls. See ELIOT JANEWAY, THE STRUGGLE FOR
SURVIVAL (1951); VATrER, supra note 228. Controls and rationing were then implemented to allocate the
distribution of goods in a market characterized by shortage. While such allocations were not made with
perfect fairness, there was certainly more transparency and accountability than in allocation decisions
dominated by private market players exercising oligopolistic market power. Transparency can also be
facilitated by judicial review of Price Administrators' determinations. Cf.M. Kraus & Bros. v. United
States, 327 U.S. 614 (1945).
299. See Albert Gore, Jr., Address at the Institutional Investor Summit on Climate Risk 3 (May 10,
2005), available at http://www.generationim.conmedia/pdf-al-gore-10-05-05-speech.pdf (quoting the
psychologist Abraham Maslow: "If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a
nail"). So it is if the only tool is monetary policy, then every problem appears to be one that can be
addressed by manipulating the rate of interest.
300. As Munkirs recognized, in order to eliminate inflation by attempting to slow growth within a
highly concentrated economy the Federal Reserve "would need to drive interest rates so tremendously
high, or so severely restrict the money supply, that many of the country's middle-sized businesses
would literally be destroyed." MuNms,supranote 295, at 185.
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actors. In the late 1940s, General Motors, Firestone Tire, Greyhound Bus, Mack
Truck, and Standard Oil of California colluded with each other and created front
companies that bought up more than 100 electric trolley, rail and bus lines
around the country. After taking control, they promptly shut down the electric
lines and replaced them with gas-powered motor buses. 30 1 The tracks and cars
from the Los Angeles electric rail system (at the time the largest system in the
country) were simply dumped in the ocean. Los Angeles and a hundred other
cities were motorized at the expense of air quality and an atomized traffic-filled
future.3 °2
The GM conspiracy demonstrates the long-term threats to our quality of life,
and potentially to our ecosystems, from removing the nation-state from economic planning altogether. It is the polar opposite of proposals to create new
Manhattan Projects for development of alternative energy sources. This is a
cautionary tale. If the nation-state gives up on planning, then powerful private
actors will step into the vacuum and proceed to plan our futures for us.
The corollary, as seen in the 1941-1951 pegged period, is that whatever
future the polity can imagine and agree upon, the state can claim the resources
to plan it; and with sufficient financial resources, the nation-state can mobilize
armies, rebuild shattered societies, modernize public infrastructure, and train
and educate millions of citizens.
At the level of the individual, economists would agree that it makes rational
good sense to borrow more than the individual's annual income to invest in his
or her education. This is quite often the case for university students. While
amounts borrowed can be quite high, the result is often an eventual increase in
one's purchasing power and upward mobility. Taking on debt is therefore a
good investment in the future, particularly if the interest rate is low.
Likewise for nation-states. There is nothing magical about confining one's
budget deficit to 2 or 3% of overall economic activity each and every year, as is
now the practice.3 °3 The success of the World War II and early Cold War period
suggests that it might make good sense for an entire society to take on far
greater amounts of debt, perhaps 10 or 20 or 30% of GDP, as long as the debt is
borrowed at low interest rates. Such mobilization of financial resources would
allow the federal government to influence and perhaps once again dominate
events in the world by directing the pattern of production: spending on health
and education, in foreign aid and public infrastructure. While enormous public
301. RUssELL MoKnIBER,CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BusINEss POWER AND THE ABUSE OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST

221-28 (1988).

302. Russell Mokhiber reports that these companies were charged with violating U.S. antitrust laws
in a conspiracy to restrain trade. General Motors and the other corporate conspirators were ultimately
fined $5000 each; other individuals found guilty at trial paid fines of $1 each; and no one was sentenced
to jail. Id. at 226-27. A 2006 documentary film, Who Killed the Electric Car?, explores the role of
General Motors and other corporate interests in limiting the development of the battery electric vehicle.
See Who Killed the Electric Car?, http://www.whokilledtheelectriccar.coml.
303. CECCHETrn, supra note 274, at 393 n.23 (reporting that the EU's Stability and Growth Pact of
1997 requires that annual budget deficits not exceed three percent of a country's GDP).
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spending will never guarantee success, without sufficient public spending,
failure is only a matter of time.
As also reflected in resurrecting the history of the 1941-1951 mobilization
period, to claim sufficient financial resources, the federal government may also
have to limit the independence of the Federal Reserve and therefore assume
greater responsibility for maintaining price and currency stability through direct
controls, the threat of controls, and the use of regulatory coordination and
market incentives. There are normative questions as to whether the objectives of
spending programs (from war in Iraq to reforming our borders) are important
enough to justify the mobilization of financial resources. There are also technical questions about how to maintain price and currency stability without an
active monetary policy.
This is not the place for an exhaustive study of the pegged period or a
comprehensive historiography of monetary policy since 195 1.30 5 For analytical
purposes, it is enough for us to sketch the major contours and differences
between the market model and the mobilization model with relation to public
finance. In the mobilization model, monetary policy was neutralized, central
bankers were disempowered, fiscal policy was hyper-activated, and state planning and regulation were crucial stabilizers. In today's market model, everything is turned upside down: monetary policy is activated, central bankers are
empowered in the name of price stability, fiscal policy is neutralized, and state
planning and regulation are hampered.3 °6
B. Law's Silence and the FederalReserve's Protective Wall
In their Principlesof Macro-Economicstext, Robert Frank and Ben Bernanke
offer various explanations for the economy's failure to achieve full employment, including the existence of minimum wage laws, the power of labor
unions, the existence of unemployment insurance, and the burden of govern304. According to Katty Kay, BBC Washington Correspondent, the Lebanese economy is doing
"terribly badly. Nobody's investing. Businesses are really suffering. And as the economy suffers, so
does the Western-backed government." Chris Matthews Show, NBC News Transcripts (Feb. 4, 2007),
available at http://www.thechrismatthewsshow.conitranscripts/transcripts.shtml. As private investment
falls, and as Western governments fail to provide significant amounts of foreign aid for public
investment in Lebanon, Iran has stepped in with support for its Hezbollah ally, which poses a grave
threat to the Lebanese government. Id.
305. See Canova, supra note 266; TIMOTHY A. CANOVA, THE FED AT WAR: NATION-BUILDING AT HOME
AND ABROAD (manuscript on file with author).
306. Typical of this ideology of fiscal restraint, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, accepted Osama bin Laden's thesis that if the Unites States tries to defend against
every conceivable threat, it would bankrupt the country. Eric Lipton, U.S. Can't Protect All Targets,
Chertoff Says, N.Y. TiMs, Sept. 12, 2006, at A21 (Chertoff argued against a mandate that every cargo
container headed into the United States be x-rayed and subject to a radiation scan before leaving a
foreign port.). Richard Posner warns that the Constitution was not intended to hamper the federal
government from maintaining its existence or protecting the American people. RicHARD A. PosNER, NOT
A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTIrruION

IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

(2006). But the failure to

scrutinize the Federal Reserve's suspect constitutional status serves to undermine such federal capabili-

ties.
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ment regulations.3 °7 Nowhere is there mention that the nation's only genuine
full-employment, during World War II, coincided with all those alleged villainspowerful labor unions, unemployment compensation, minimum wage laws,
government regulation, and state planning. Nowhere do the authors suggest that
full employment was achieved precisely because of massive federal spending
on public infrastructure. 30 8 It is therefore not surprising that Ben Bernanke now
chairs a Federal Reserve System that constrains the fiscal policy options of
Congress and the President.
Over the past decades, there have been numerous constitutional challenges to
the Federal Reserve brought by members of Congress, groups representing
manufacturers and unions, and ordinary citizens, alleging violation of the
Appointments Clause as well as the private nondelegation doctrine. 30 9 The
Federal Reserve's institutional structure-which conducts monetary policy
through its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that includes significant
private representation-is an agency captured by design, a delegation of lawmaking power to an agency stacked with private parties selected outside of.any
public appointment process. 3' 0 Each of these challenges has been dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on procedural grounds, for lack
of standing for private plaintiffs, or simply on equitable discretion grounds in
cases involving Senate plaintiffs alleging violations to the appointments doctrine. 31 ' Apparently, the substantive claims were too compelling to hear on their
merits, and when given the opportunity to review the Federal Reserve's struc-

307. FRANK & BENAN, supra note 274, at 229-31.
308. Frank and Bernanke also seem to take the view that the only way to increase a society's
technological progress is through private-sector investment and innovation. They therefore characterize
anyone opposing the introduction of new labor-saving technologies in the private workplace as a
Luddite. Id. at 220-26. In light of the serious shortfalls in public infrastructure investment, it might be
more accurate to refer to those with such free-market myopia as the "New Luddites" who prevent the
modernization of public infrastructure and social overhead capital.
309. See Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Comm. for Monetary
Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Riegle v. Fed.
Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
310. In Reuss v. Balles, the D.C. Circuit took the view that the district court, in determining whether
the plaintiff-appellant had standing, "should have assumed that the FOMC is a private group exercising
improperly delegated powers, and then asked whether that fact injured an interest of the [appellantplaintiff]." 584 F.2d at 467. Some legal scholars, in justifying the Federal Reserve's autonomy, have
wrongly ignored the FOMC's existence. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State,
57 U. Cm. L. REv. 407, 441 n.89 (1990) (characterizing the Federal Reserve Board as an independent
agency not susceptible to capture); A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 543, 595 (1995) (concluding that the Federal Reserve Board has less autonomy
than many federal government corporations). Others have assumed that the Board of Governors
exercises legal and practical control over the FOMC, thereby sanitizing the private nondelegation
challenge. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing FinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503,
526 (2000).
311. Melcher, 836 F.2d 561 (dismissed on grounds of equitable discretion); Comm. for Monetary
Reform, 766 F.2d 538 (dismissed for lack of standing); Riegle, 656 F.2d 873 (dismissed on grounds of
equitable discretion); Reuss, 584 F.2d 461 (dismissed for lack of standing).
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ture in 1978,312 the Supreme Court denied certiorari, thereby upholding the
D.C. Circuit's restrictive standing analysis.31 3
The Supreme Court's 2007 holding in Massachusettsv. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, which required more transparent agency determinations in the
EPA's regulation of greenhouse gases, also relaxed the standing requirement in a
way that could potentially open the door for a state or even private plaintiff
challenging the Federal Reserve's structure.3 14 Of course, the Court could still
deny standing on the grounds that any injury traceable to the Federal Reserve is
not easily redressed by the Court, or simply deny justiciability by following the
D.C. Circuit's "equitable discretion" holdings. The latter course would, in
essence, recognize the judiciary's lack of institutional competence when compared with that of Congress to legislate the structure of the nation's monetary
system.
For much of the early history of the United States, the politics of money were
among the nation's most important public issues. 315 As John Kenneth Galbraith
concluded, "Only the politics of slavery would divide men more angrily than
the politics of money. ' 316 From the constitutional debates about the First and
Second Banks of the United States to the Civil War Greenback and the Free
Silver campaigns, elections and fortunes turned on questions of money. But
since the creation of the Federal Reserve System early in the 20th century, there
has been remarkable silence in our public discourse and among the legal
academy on questions dealing with the strange constitutional status of money
and central banking.3 17
Perhaps this silence is related to the dismissals of legal challenges on

312. Reuss, 584 F.2d 461. Although the holding under review was the D.C. Circuit's denial of
standing, had the Supreme Court approved the cert petition, it may have been able to review the private
nondelegation issue. Therefore, contrary to Michael Froomkin's suggestion, the Court apparently had at
least one modem opportunity to revisit the private nondelegation doctrine. See A. Michael Froomkin,
Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L. J.
17, 155 (2000). However, since the denial of certiorari in Reuss, a majority of Justices have denounced
the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," casting doubt on whether the Supreme Court today would
revisit the private nondelegation doctrine under similar circumstances. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 98-102 (1998) (Scalia, J.); see also Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical
Jurisdiction" in the FederalAppellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 855, 878 (2001) (arguing that
the ambiguities in Steel Co. leave unclear the future validity of hypothetical jurisdiction).
313. 439 U.S. 997 (1978). It is worth noting that in his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge J. Skelly
Wright argued that Congressman Reuss had standing as a bondholder to challenge the constitutionality
of the composition of the FOMC. Reuss, 584 F.2d at 471 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
314. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007); Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2007, at Al, A18
(reporting majority opinion that state could show "concrete and particularized injury" stemming from
rising sea levels along the coast and "risk of catastrophic harm").
315. E.g., WILLIAM F HIxSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING INTHE EIGHTEENTH AND
NINETam CENTuRrus (1993).
316. JoHN KENET GALBRArrH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 44 (1995).
317. WILLIAM GREiDE, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RFsERVE RuNs THE CouNTv 289
(1987) (With the advent of the Federal Reserve, "ordinary citizens would no longer grasp the political
meaning of money.").
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procedural grounds and the Supreme Court's failure to rule on the merits, which
together deprive scholars of a substantive discourse. There is also the pervading
attitude that money is a technical matter best left to the experts, and since
mainstream economists have accepted the independence of central banks, perhaps legal scholars are too willing to defer to their judgment. Unfortunately, the
state of the economics profession does not warrant such blind allegiance.
According to economic historian Michael Bernstein:
With its focus on individual decision-making, its preference for quantitative
measurement that ignores qualitative reflection, and its insistence that marketdriven solutions are in principle a superior means for the achievement of
public policy objectives, modem economic analysis attains a professional
respectability and discursive rigor while at the same time forfeiting the
opportunity
to have a decisive, practical, and effective impact in public
3 18
affairs.
By deferring to an economics profession so lost in mathematical irrelevance,
legal scholars are essentially forfeiting the impact of law on a very wide range
of public affairs. 31 9 This is particularly so when accepting the assumption that
central bank independence is everywhere and always the only credible model
for a country's economic progress. Law should naturally have some say about
the troubling constitutional status of this powerful institution. Unlike any other
captured public agency, the Federal Reserve has the power and authority to
encroach upon the budgetary powers-important constitutional prerogatives-of the elected branches of government.320
In calling for a "New Legal Process," Edward Rubin notes the range of
withering critiques of the Legal Process school: Law and Economics and Public
Choice called into question the purposive, rational, and public interest of public

318. BERNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 390; see also DUNCAN K. FOLEY, ADAM'S FALLACY: A GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC THEOLOGY (2006) (characterizing economics as a discourse of faith and belief, and fulfilling a
theological role whereby economists are priestly figures with arcane knowledge justifying the ways of
the market).
319. There have been conservative economic voices who have attacked the Federal Reserve's
discretion. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Casefor Overhauling the Fed, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1985,
at 5 (criticizing the Fed for "churning" its accounts by unnecessary and excessive trading in government securities to add profits to the bond-dealing operations of the Federal Reserve's financial
constituency). Friedman called for a fixed rule to limit the growth of monetary aggregates. By the early
1980s such monetarist theories were a proven failure. GREmER, supra note 317, at 479-83. The
Keynesian solution would limit Federal Reserve discretion by requiring a fixed rule of pegged interest
rates, supplemented with selective credit controls to allow the Federal Reserve to ration credit away
from luxury goods (like building yachts and Lear jets) and other private consumption and toward public
spending.
320. In addition, the Federal Reserve System does not rely on congressional appropriations, its
monetary policy is not subject to audit by the Government Accountability Office, and it is exempt from
the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
DRAFT REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Mar. 1996); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERvE
SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCnONs

7 (8th ed. 1994).
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institutions; and Critical Legal Studies followed in the steps of the Legal Realist
critique by showing how legal rules are often indeterminate, subjective, and far
from neutral. 32 ' Yet at least Legal Process scholars recognized the need to
provide constitutional reinforcement of governmental institutions to ensure
minimum levels of accountability. For instance, in his classic Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, John Ely lamented the demise of the
nondelegation doctrine.32 2
But Ely's was a largely defeatist view that the doctrine was dead, not
susceptible to resuscitation-the victim of "death by association" with pre-1937
substantive due process decisions and narrow readings of the Commerce
Clause.32 3 Broad delegations to administrative agencies were also derided by
Theodore Lowi and other political scientists.3 24 As troubling as such broad
delegations are to publicly-appointed bureaucrats,32 5 they raise added concerns
when made to privately-appointed officials, such as the presidents of the
regional Federal Reserve Banks sitting on the Federal326Open Market Committee"the poster child of an unconstitutional delegation."
This democratic deficit-unelected central bankers constraining the fiscal
powers of elected officials-poses perhaps the most important practical impediment to resurrecting any mobilization model to deal with 21st century challenges.3 27 Any discussion about mobilizing significant federal resourceswhether for war in Iraq, homeland security, or reforming our borders-also
requires greater understanding and discussion about the role of the Federal
Reserve and monetary policy in constraining fiscal capabilities and imposing a
market model on the economy. Such a microanalysis of the Federal Reserve and

321. Rubin, supra note 3, at 1398-1401; see also LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A
SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (2005) (providing an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing the law).

322. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-133 (1980)
(lamenting that much lawmaking has been delegated to unelected administrators).
323. Id. at 133; cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1721 (2002); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation
Doctrine'sDeath Are Greatly Exaggerated,70 U. Cm. L. REv. 1297 (2003).
324. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNIrED STATES 96-97,

300, 302 (2d ed. 1979). According to Alan Brinkley, an antipopulist critique of deliberative democracy
"is visible in the extraordinary, and largely unchallenged, authority of presumed experts on the Federal
Reserve Board to chart the course of our economy." ALAN BRINKLEY, NELSON W. POLSBY & KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, THE NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 141 (1997). Of course, it's even worse if one considers the
FOMC, rather than the publicly-appointed Board of Governors.
325. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993); Donna M. Nagy, The SEC at

70: Playing Peekaboo with ConstitutionalLaw: The PCAOB and its Public/PrivateStatus, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 975 (2005).
326. I am indebted to John Ely for this characterization of the Federal Reserve System, which he
expressed in numerous discussions with the author. Interview with John Hart Ely, in Key Largo, Fla.
(Apr. 23, 1998).
327. The democratic deficit is a global phenomenon, and the model of central bank independence
has been pushed on advanced and developing countries around the world, often by the IMF as a
condition for financial assistance. See FoNER, supra note 120, at 98 (arguing that "basic economic
decisions are made by multinational corporations and institutions like the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, not the nation-state").
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other private and public institutions of planning and control requires a synthesis
of discourses in constitutional law, political science, economic and historical
analysis-perhaps a new legal process, or perhaps just the old legal process, but
with a greater sense of purpose and confidence in constitutional processes.
The abdication within the legal academy to an extra-constitutional central
bank has been more pronounced among liberal scholars than conservatives. For
instance, Cass Sunstein calls for adoption of Franklin Roosevelt's proposed
second Bill of Rights to guarantee social and economic rights without any
appreciation of the monetary accommodation that would be required, for such a
hyper-active fiscal program.32 8 Likewise, Harold Koh, in proclaiming a "Transnational Legal Process," seems equally unconcerned with the ways that autonomous central banks and international financial institutions may undermine state
sovereignty and limit the participation of individual citizens and groups in the
international order.32 9 Without such recognition, "rule of law" reform will
remain an agenda of double-standards.3 3 °
In recent years, it was the Court's dissenting conservatives-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-who were most troubled by the
broad delegations of lawmaking power, even if those cases involved delegations
to publicly-appointed agents. 33 1 As Douglas Ginsburg has concluded, "The
Supreme Court, by failing to prevent delegations of legislative authority, forgoes a significant opportunity to maintain the structure of government prescribed by the Constitution. 3 32
Conservatives who oppose big government have at least recognized the need
to restore political accountability in the delegation of legislative power. In
contrast, liberals who call for increased government spending on social overhead capital wring their hands when Congress rejects such programs, unwilling

328. CASS R. SuNsTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNISmtao REVOLUTION AND WHY WE

NEED rr MORE THAN EVER (2004). Sunstein defends broad delegations of congressional authority to
administrative agencies without making any distinction between publicly-appointed and privatelyappointed agents. Id. at 54-55. Neither the Federal Reserve nor the G.I. Bill of Rights is even listed in
the index.
329. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REv. 181 (1996) (expressing an optimistic belief in the benign nature of international institutions as
reflecting "the rule of law, not power"). Apparently, according, to Koh, any defects in delegations of
sovereign power to private actors are made up by the illusion of inclusion. "In short, international law is
enforced by a transnational legal process, which is triggered not just by the United States and Russia,
but also by the Security Council, the GAT, Exxon, Greenpeace, the Paris Club, Amnesty International,
and the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School." Id. at 194. For a decidedly
less complacent view of the transnational legal process, see David Kennedy, Boundaries in the Field of
Human Rights: The InternationalHuman Rights Movement: Partof the Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS.
J. 99, 118-25 (2002) (arguing that the international human rights movement treats symptoms while
ignoring distributions of power within the broader society).
330. Gonzalez, supra note 170.
331. Douglas Ginsburg, Article I: Legislative Vesting Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CoNsTrrrnoN 46, 46 (Edwin Meese III
et al. eds., 2005).
332. Id. at 48 (arguing that such unconstitutional delegations allow legislators to remove important
legislative decisions from political accountability).
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to recognize that congressional budgetary powers and choices are limited by
largely unaccountable central bankers at the Federal Reserve.3 33 For any project
to enhance the federal government's ability to respond to crises and to assist its
neighbors and allies, there must be a greater understanding of the role of
monetary policy in limiting the budgetary capabilities of Congress, and a
renewed commitment to reform our monetary institutions by providing genuine
standards of transparency and accountability.
C. Mobilizationfor Globalization
The market model is a general description of a range of complex relationships, and it varies from country to country and through historical time. For
instance, U.S. fiscal policy is less constrained by central bankers than is fiscal
policy in many other nations, largely because the dollar is the main reserve
currency in the world, so foreigners have been willing to finance large U.S.
budget and current account deficits.3 34
No other country is as fortunate. The United States, the greatest deficit
country in history, is not subject to the same burdens of adjustment as other
deficit countries. In the heyday of the World War II and early Cold War
mobilizations, the United States was the greatest surplus country in the world,
with enormous trade and current account surpluses and monetary reserves.33 5
Those surpluses were effectively transferred and recycled through overseas
military outlays and Marshall Plan spending. Future research may focus on the
relationship between a country's trade balance and its capacity to mobilize
resources. John Kennedy, as President, was confronted with concerns about the
growing size of the U.S. trade and current account deficits, and international
pressure on the value of the dollar.336 Kennedy expressed an understanding of a
relationship between a favorable trade balance and a country's ability to provide
foreign assistance.33 7 Large U.S. trade surpluses during and after World War II
enabled the United States to provide large amounts of foreign assistance, such
as the Marshall Plan. 338 Likewise, large trade and current account surpluses are
now allowing the People's Republic of China to provide significant levels of
foreign assistance around the world.33 9

333. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, The Marshall Plan: Model for U.S. Leadership in the
21st Century, Address at Harvard Univ. Commencement (June 5, 1997), in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
DISPATCH, June 1997, at 1-4 (articulating the case for a new Marshall Plan without addressing the
institutional, financial, and economic issues to make it happen).
334. FERGUSON, supra note 260.
335. PAUL POAST, THE ECONOMICS OF WAR 25 (2006).

336. JAMES, supra note 117, at 158-59.
337. JAMES HEPBURN, FAREWELL AMERICA: THE PLOT TO KniL JFK .120 (2002) (quoting Kennedy, "We
can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade
and payments at the highest possible levels of growth.").
338. POAST, supra note 335, at 25 (graphically depicting large U.S. trade balances).
339. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Cuts in Africa Aid Hurt War on Terror and Increase China's Influence,
Officials Say, N.Y TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 1, at 12. Since the time of Mao Zedong, China has avoided
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Foreign aid can therefore be seen as a response to the adjustment problem.
Increased international trade results in currency imbalances, as well as dislocations to many workers in industries that are losing to overseas competition.
While the IMF regularly places adjustment burdens on deficit countries. to slow
their economies and import less, foreign aid giving is a way for surplus
countries to accept adjustment burdens by transferring resources-both financial and in kind-back to deficit countries.3 40
Today the setting is more complex: the United States is the largest deficit
country in the world and the dollar is increasingly exposed and vulnerable in
foreign exchange and global capital markets. 34 ' But even with its huge foreign
debt, the United States is wealthy enough to support a massive foreign aid
program for Mexico's regional development. The main danger would be if
market expectations of future U.S. inflation led to a sell-off of dollardenominated assets.
The globalization of finance, therefore, raises complex obstacles to resurrecting the mobilization model. Perhaps a price control authority today would not
look like the OPA that kept inflation low during World War H through a
command and control regulatory approach. The late William Vickrey, a Nobel
laureate in economics, suggested the creation of a market to raise prices-the
so-called Vickrey Market.34 3 Such market mechanisms are already in use in
other contexts, such as in permitting firms to trade in unused pollution credits. 344 A market for the right to raise prices, if applied to the largest industries
and firms in the country, would thereby use market incentives and mechanisms
to ensure price stability.
Likewise, the late James Tobin, another Nobel laureate in economics, proposed a small tax on foreign exchange transactions to deter speculation against

incurring trade deficits. LYNN TURGEON, STATE & DISCRIMINATION: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COLD WAR 110
(1989) (reporting the Maoist policy of "balanced equivalents").
340. JAMr s, supra note 117, at 132.
341. Some would argue that surplus countries like China and Japan should be transferring resources
back to the United States, in the form of increased imports of U.S. products or services, or as grants and
long-term loans. Others have suggested that surplus countries allow their currencies to appreciate in
value. Still others propose increasing global liquidity or creating an international currency. Id. at
131-36.
342. Other relatively advanced countries have had to deal with such international pressures on their
currencies and public finances. See JutDT, supra note 35, at 462; JAMEs, supra note 117, at 180, 279-82
(recounting British currency problems in the 1970s).
343. See Timothy A. Canova, The Macroeconomicsof William Vickrey, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1997,
at 95-109. Vickrey's work built on and contributed to proposals by other economists. See generally
ARBA P. LERNER & DAVID C. COLANDER, MAP. A MARKEr ANTn-INFLATION PLAN (1980); INCENTIVE-BASED
INCOMES POLICIES: ADVANCES IN TIP AND MAP (David C. Colander ed., 1986).
344. See, e.g., EcoNomic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 146-51 (1996), availableat http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/usbudget/fy97/pdf/erp.pdf; Note, A Remedy for the Victims of Pollution Permit Markets, 92 YALE L.
J. 1022, 1027 (1983); Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B. Stewart, & Jonathan B. Wiener, Environmental
Policyfor Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-BasedApproaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1 (1992).
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the currencies of countries pushing for higher growth and full employment. 34 5
Known as the Tobin Tax, this proposal could also raise hundreds of billions of
dollars a year, funds that could then be used as part of a global Marshall Plan.34 6
Like the Vickrey Market, the Tobin Tax proposal would require an administrative apparatus to track the flow of currency and prevent evasion.34 7 Both the
Vickrey Market and Tobin Tax are examples of proposed institutional reforms
that would use advances in technology, as well as market mechanisms and
incentives, to improve the functioning of markets.34 8 Such increased surveillance and control could also supplement U.S. efforts to track and impede the
349 The administrative costs
flow of terrorist financing and money laundering.
350
could be covered by the transaction tax itself.
Tracking currency transactions around the globe in real time and on an
ongoing basis, even in a computerized age, would be an enormous laborintensive task requiring increased international cooperation and harmonization
of standards. 35 ' A Tobin Tax could also require an army of bureaucrats fluent in
scores of foreign languages and trained in the intricacies of finance and the use
of technology. Likewise, the Vickrey Market would require an administrative
apparatus to coordinate a market for raising prices. But this should not serve as
an argument against such administrative solutions in a world with vast underem-

345. James Tobin, A Proposalfor International Monetary Reform, E. ECON. J., July-Oct. 1978, at
153-59. Philip Bobbitt seems to accept the proliferation of capital flows as inevitable as the decline in
the nation-state and the power of the Federal Open Market Committee. PHILuP BOBBrrr, TiE SHIELD OF
AcHiLLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 229, 701 (2002) (reporting the market agenda of
FOMC and the enormous size of foreign exchange markets, with no discussion of Tobin Tax or other
strategies for reclaiming resources for nation-states).
346. Canova, supra note 15, at 1629-33 (estimating that a one percent Tobin Tax would generate
$700 billion in revenues annually based on 1999 volumes in foreign exchange transactions).
347. Research in the economics of asymmetric information suggests that market institutions can be
used to correct the problems associated with market failures. MARKET FAILURE OR SUCCESS: THE NEW
DEBATE (Tyler Cowen & Eric Crampton eds., 2002); see also DEBATING THE TOBIN TAX: NEW RULES FOR
GLOBAL FINANCE (James Weaver, Randall Dodd & Jamie Baker eds., 2003).
348. See Canova, supra note 15, at 1631 n.251; Addis, supra note 9, at 9-10 (arguing that the
communications revolution has made it easier to monitor violations of law and increased the ability of
states and the international community to respond).
349. JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS 15, 20-22 (2007) (arguing that the surveillance of
international transactions through the SWIFT payments system was authorized by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977).
350. Koh has called for an international norm against illicit transfers, not of currency or capital, but
of guns. Harold Hongju Koh, The Robert L Levine DistinguishedLecture Series: A World Drowning in
Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333 (2003). While certainly a worthy proposal, it could also be seen as
another example of liberal attention to symptoms, rather than more fundamental causes of problems,
such as the declining capabilities of the nation-state. See Kennedy, supra note 329. In addition to a
norm against illicit transfers of guns, perhaps a norm to tax broadly defined transfers of currency and
capital would be appropriate.
351. See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, Pressed By U.S., European Banks Limit Iran Deals, N.Y. TiMEs,
May 22, 2006, at Al (reporting intensified State Department efforts to limit Iran-related activities of
major banks in Europe); Dan Bilefsky, EuropeansBerate Bank Group and Overseerfor U.S. Access to
Data, N.Y ThMEs, Oct. 5, 2006, at All (reporting U.S. failure to obtain support of European allies in its
use of the SWIFT system to track possible terrorist financing).
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ployment of human resources. In fact, it should be one of the key reasons to
embrace such systems of administrative control.
The labor-intensive nature of the mobilization model is precisely one of its
great virtues. During the First World War, British propaganda postcards showed
352
children asking their father, "Daddy, what did you do in the Great War?"
During the great mobilizations of U.S. history, millions of Americans played
walk-on roles, and without them the United States could not have prevailed so
quickly in World War H, rebuilt war-torn Europe, and created the conditions for
postwar peace and prosperity. For many in our present generation, we have
"exchange[d] a [walk-on] part in the war for a lead role in a cage., 353 While not
easy to quantify with scientific certainty, it would certainly be far better to
provide education and training and direct employment for today's young men
and women-in the United States, Mexico, and around the world-than to
accept their continuing mass unemployment and underemployment. 4
There are numerous tangible benefits that would flow from resurrecting a
mobilization model for today's world. The nation-state would be empowered to
address the most important challenges facing global citizens, including national
security, sustainable economic development, and the threats of global warming
and climate change to species survival. The use of market mechanisms, such as
the Vickrey Market and the Tobin Tax, would ensure a decent level of price and
currency stability while economic activity expands dramatically.
Finally, by exercising its fiscal muscle and enormous purchasing power, the
federal government would be able to start planning for the future. It could shape
American production and consumption patterns for a more environmentally
sustainable future. For that is what the mobilization model should really be
about-mobilization for a purpose, to create better living conditions for today
and the future.
VI. THE DOOR INTHE WALL
War has a way of demoralizing society and complicating the work of social
justice. As depicted in Amazing Grace, the movie about the abolition of the
British slave trade, war often impedes human progress.3 55 The Napoleonic Wars
between Britain and France initially silenced Britain's abolitionists, but the
conflict soon provided the opportunity to make more slave ships subject to

352. The Great War: 1914-1918, http://beck.library.emory.edu/greatwar/postcards/view.php?id=daddy
(last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
353. PINK FLOYD, Wish You Were Here, on WISH You WERE HERE (Columbia Records 1975).
354. As Keynes wrote: "It is better that a man should tyrannise over his bank balance than over his
fellow-citizen; and whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter,
sometimes at least it is an alternative." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 374 (1936). Of course, employment or G.I. Bill-type education subsidies could
help keep many people from scapegoating each other by maintaining positive balances in their bank
accounts.
355. AMAZN GRAcE (Bristol Bay Productions 2007).
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seizure, thereby weakening the slave trade and hastening its end. 356 Similarly,
World War II and its Cold War aftermath provided the political opening for
progressive social changes in the United States.3 57 Both the Marshall Plan and
G.I. Bill were exercises of "soft power" that offered the world a compelling
model of progress based on western culture, values, and ideas. 8 Perhaps there
are similar opportunities for dramatic changes and long-awaited progress in
today's confusing range of'global conflicts.3 59
"Every wall is a door," Emerson wrote. 360 The wall along the U.S.-Mexico
border is not always visible to the naked eye. It is a hot desert wall that
swallows the desperate and the hopeful alike. It includes a martial wall of
Border Patrol agents and another wall of human traffickers that prey on the
hopes of migrants. Closing the border would make the door more visible and
help clarify what is required to open the border in the future.
The Porous Border has been a mixture of blessing and disaster for migrants,
many of whom have passed through the border to find work and meaning. Many
others have been turned back, robbed or murdered, or have otherwise perished
trying to cross the desert. The Porous Border has also been a mixed blessing for
Mexico. The remittances from Mexicans working in the United States have
sustained families and purchasing power in Mexico, but also while providing a
safety valve that permits Mexican officials to prevent or delay reforms. The
Porous Border has also been a mixed blessing for Americans. It provides U.S.
businesses with low-wage and low-skilled labor to work our fields and construction sites and clean our offices. But it arguably does so by undermining union
jobs and working conditions, and taking jobs from America's large but often
invisible underclass.
Finally, the Porous Border troubles the collective sub-conscious of those who
feel threatened and vulnerable to another September llth. While the Porous
Border provides hope and gain for many, it also carries the potential for future
unimaginable catastrophes.

356. Id.
357. Leon Keyserling, chair of Truman's Council of Economic Advisers, and others in the Truman
administration "linked projects of military and political interventions world-wide with increased fiscal
spending targets at home." See BERNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 373 (concluding that the Truman Doctrine
epitomized the blueprint for a more aggressive pump-priming stiategy for the federal budget).
358. This wise management of soft power can vitiate the need for exercising hard power, while also
ensuring more success when hard power is employed. See JOSEPH NYE, SoFr POWER: THE MEANS TO
SUCCESS IN WORLD PoLITcs (2004). Many who advocate market model solutions, such as liberalized
trade, also make the case for soft power. See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade:
Winning the War on Terror Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587 (2004).
359. George Orwell argued that wars are mainly "internal." HOWARD ZINN, PASSIONATE DECLARATIONS: ESSAYS ON WAR AND JUSTICE 73 (Perennial 2003). While Orwell was warning against restrictions
on free speech and civil liberties, the World War H and Cold War histories suggest that to prevail even
in a just or "good war" requires that it be fought internally through the mobilization of resources on the
home front. See, e.g., JANEWAY, supra note 298.
360. Albert Camus, Create Dangerously, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 272 (J. O'Brien
trans., 1974) (from 1957 Nobel lecture at University of Uppsala).
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The Porous Border and the Open Border operate on the shortest of time
horizons. There are jobs and profits to be made now, regardless of the long-term
impact on communities or threats to national security and public safety. The
Open Border would be easier on the migrant, harder on the displaced American
worker, and more troubling to those concerned about our vulnerability to
terrorist attacks.
A Closed Border based on Martial Plans would be a mixed blessing. Mexico's safety valve could be broken, and the ensuing political and social upheaval
could lead either to needed reforms or to a deepening crisis and a failing state
on our southern border. In such a context, a militarized martial wall would be
seen by many as a provocative symbol of an America that cares more about the
security of foreign investments than the well-being of ordinary people.
But a Closed Border through a Marshall Plan would spur a generation of men
and women to productive, creative, and meaningful work on both sides of the
border, while also lowering the chances of future security disasters. There is
perhaps no other way to provide the capital and massive infrastructure needed
for Mexico's economic takeoff. A resounding success on our southern border
would provide a compelling model for regional development throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean, and perhaps along more contentious borders around
the world.
While a Closed Border could threaten entrenched and privileged elites on
both sides of the border, the boom in economic activity resulting from a
Marshall Plan would provide the security, adjustment assistance, hope and
opportunity demanded by those threatened by change. Regional development
would provide a door between the United States and Mexico. Such a border
wall need not be a place of separation and exclusion, but rather a public space
that draws in energy, where people would come from near and far to help build
a strong and prosperous Pan-American community. Although such a program
would require time, commitment and resources, history suggests this as the only
way for neighbors to build a genuine door of opportunity and an Open Border
for the future.

